*Climate Refugees* is a research and advocacy organization that calls for the protection of those displaced by climate change. Through field reports and engagement, we seek to create awareness of the complexities of climate displacement, safeguard rights and strengthen protection frameworks to include individuals forcibly displaced across borders due to climate change.

The below inputs our derived from field reports and these two online publications:

* [SPOTLIGHT](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight): *Climate Displacement in the News – a timely roundup of global news and expert analysis*
* [PERSPECTIVES](http://www.climate-refugees.org/perpectives): *Climate Displacement in the Field – featuring expert commentary and distinct stories from people on the move*

We have hyperlinked features and reports in the body of this submission for ease of information and accessibility. All publications are online on our website.

We are providing inputs to your questions 1, 3, 8 and 10

1. Examples of national and/or regional laws and policies relevant to internal displacement in the context of disasters and climate change.

* As we noted in our [feature on Cyclone Amphan](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/27-amphan), which struck India and Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal this May, this disaster response was an example of early warning systems and evacuation plans in place in both countries that save lives but do little to help protect people from disasters and rebuild lives when impacted and displaced by natural disasters, especially in the context of increased intensity of natural disasters due to climate change. Adaptive measures are required to retrofit infrastructure to withstand disasters and provide livelihood options and tools for climate-resilient agriculture that safeguard food security in disasters and also in response to the impacts of slow-onset climate change. Climate displacements in South Asia are increasing but a comprehensive policy framework is still lacking because of inadequate data, the scale of the problem continues to go unrecognized and a total absence of local-level strategies on disaster displacement
* [Chile’s Monte Patria community is deeply feeling the impacts of climate change](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/25-chile) and according to Greenpeace, there is nowhere in Chile where the impacts of climate change are not felt. Yet, Chile lacks a framework to deal with the impacts of climate change, including bowing out of the UN Global Compact for Migration after being one of its early supporters.

1. The impact of climate change-related internal displacement on the enjoyment of human rights by specific groups, such as indigenous peoples, minorities, children, older persons and persons with disabilities.

* Keeping with the example of Cyclone Amphan, inadequate shelters for evacuees and the need to maintain social distancing to avoid the spread of Coronavirus, is a factor for all disaster displaced individuals but particularly women.
* As we pointed out in our feature [The Gendered Impacts of Climate Displacement,](http://www.climate-refugees.org/perpectives/genderedimpactsofclimatechange) women are often more adversely affected by climate disasters in numerous ways from displacement, gender-based violence and even death. Even before a global pandemic and one of the largest cyclones ever coincided, we knew that evacuation and emergency shelters - both in conflict and disaster settings - are often inadequate to meet the needs of impacted communities, most notably vulnerable and special needs populations such as the elderly, disabled, LGBT, women and girls.
* [More than half](https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/women-and-girls-in-internal-displacement) of the global population of internally displaced people are women and girls. Not only are women and girls vulnerable to displacement, they are also vulnerable in displacement. Numerous [studies](https://www.internal-displacement.org/publications/women-and-girls-in-internal-displacement) indicate that displacement puts women and girls at increased risk of domestic violence, likely due to higher levels of stress and trauma. This rings true regardless of whether they are displaced internally or across borders. ([The Gendered Impacts of Climate Displacement](http://www.climate-refugees.org/perpectives/genderedimpactsofclimatechange))
* Refugees, immigrants, minority and poor communities in some Miami neighborhoods are facing what Harvard University terms “climate gentrification”, due to extreme weather driven by climate change that is [displacing low-income residents from their communities](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/27-miami). We wrote about this situation in Miami and the interesting development of Miami activists using the term ‘displacement’ in reference to Miami real estate transactions of rich residents, leaving their coastal properties threatened by rising seas, to head inland to poorer refugee and immigrant communities, and in the process, displacing residents, driving up prices and the cost of living.
* We highlighted [climate change impacts on conflict in Chile](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/25-chile), where there are currently 117 socio-environmental conflicts – 82% in indigenous territories.
* Our report [Shrinking Options: The Nexus Between Climate Change, Displacement and Security in the Lake Chad Basin](http://www.climate-refugees.org/fieldreports/2017/9/18/shrinking-options-the-nexus-between-climate-change-displacement-and-security-in-the-lake-chad-basin) sheds light on the historically marginalized and disenfranchised communities in the Lake Chad Basin whose years of neglect and underdevelopment weakened climate change adaptive capacity, and in turn, left them vulnerable to abuse and human rights violations at the hands of Boko Haram and military factions as conflict escalated. The Lake Chad Basin region has far lower development indicators that the national averages of the four countries it borders: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. In one example of our research, the Lake Chad Basin Research Institute (LCRI) told us poverty is so endemic amongst the population that climate adaptive strategies such as trainings, alternative crops and heat-resistant seeds are inaccessible to the local farmers who can’t afford the cost of the seeds and inaccessible roads make access to trainings and farming demonstrations impossible.
* Researchers also noted that in recent times, farmers in the Lake Chad Basin have been displaced since 2010, long before most fled Boko Haram. Nigeria is under threat of famine, which they said is a result of socio-economic underdevelopment meeting security challenges, and less about crops. Access to farmers, limited due to conflict and poor infrastructure, reduction in cultivation areas due to climate change and Boko Haram land seizure, the cost of the new seeds and the high number of displaced farmers are all contributory factors they cited in the current food crisis. That underdevelopment has also manifested in limited access to education in the Lake Chad Basin, creating opportunities for Boko Haram to extend its influence and recruit young new affiliates. A World Bank study of the region found evidence of discrimination and limited access to social services such as education as a contributing cause of displacement. Refugees and IDPs displaced by the lake said constant moving and a lack of schools disrupted their children’s educations, effects they now recognize exiled in a foreign country. The same World Bank study found services in displacement camps offered many the opportunity of attending school for the first time.

**8**. The impact of health crises such as the current one related to COVID-19, and of the measures taken to respond to them, on climate change-related internal displacement, including their impact on: a) displacement patterns, b) climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies, c) preparedness and disaster risk reduction, and d) humanitarian assistance and protection to internally displaced persons.

See news and analysis in our Spotlight Features on the following:

* [Haiti COVID-19 Peak Set to Collide with Hurricanes](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/18-3)
* [New Tool To Help African Countries Predict Climate Disasters, While Climate-Fueled Challenges Ravage Region](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/18-2)
* [US Faces Hurricane Season Alongside Coronavirus](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/14-2)
* [Pakistan Faces Second Locust Battle, Challenging Food Security Amid Virus Fight And Refugee Concerns](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/5/14/2020-1)
* [Weakened By War & Flood, Yemen Fights Twin Health Threat](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/14-3)
* [Coronavirus Underscores Climate Health Threats](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/14-4)
* [Displacement Numbers Drop In East & Horn Of Africa But Climate Concerns Persist](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/11-3)
* [East Africa Flood Displacement - Ugandan Hospital, Somali Town Washed Away Amid Virus Battle](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/5/11/2020-1)
* [Migrants Caught Between Climate And Virus Threats With No Safe Place To Go](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/11-1)
* [Lebanon’s Refugees & COVID-19](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/8-2)
* [Some Say Brazil’s Crackdown On Climate Migrants Worsens Climate Crisis](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/8-4)
* [When Climate Change, Coronavirus & Displacement Meet](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/8-1)
* [Shocking Study Finds 1 Billion Or More To Be Displaced Or In Intolerable Heat In 50 Years](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/6-4)
* [Kenya Bans Entry To Camps - (We Go Inside Locked Down Camp)](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/6-2)
* [Malaysia Detains Hundreds Of Refugees & Migrants During COVID19](http://www.climate-refugees.org/spotlight/2020/5/5-1)

**10**. Information on how slow-onset effects of climate change are inter-related with conflict, i.e. how climate change and conflict combine to act as drivers and causes of internal displacement, and what specific combined effects they have on internally displaced persons.

* In our above-mentioned [Lake Chad Basin report](http://www.climate-refugees.org/fieldreports/2017/9/18/shrinking-options-the-nexus-between-climate-change-displacement-and-security-in-the-lake-chad-basin), experts interviewed said a lack of education is reflected in many of the camps and displaced communities which are teeming with undereducated youth who view their governments with distrust – a fact that Boko Haram capitalizes upon to engender recruitment and support for its cause. A political byproduct of poverty exacerbated by environmental changes has caused communities lacking options to become vulnerable to militant recruitment and violence. A former Boko Haram member confirmed in an interview with Human Rights Watch that Boko Haram’s recruitment “has nothing to do with religion, but a lot to do with economic resources.”
* Nigerians with a deep-seated frustration with the government provides fertile ground for recruitment based on financial incentives. Boko Haram seized on a lack of economic mobility to offer financial enticements in return for recruitment and support, and in some instances garnered support from unwitting recruits who had accidentally become indebted to the insurgent group. The pattern follows in Niger as well, where financial opportunities propel enrollment. Just as in Cameroon, where youth enrollment into armed groups identified similar trends of government distrust, marginalization and exclusion, and a lack of jobs, poor living conditions and opportunities for economic mobility ultimately prime reasons behind their decisions to join. Similarly, experts working in Far North, Cameroon told Climate Refugees that most Boko Haram recruitment there is based on economic gain. Besides the displaced, 1.6 million people in the Far North are food insecure, and even before the crisis, three of the four million population lived below the poverty line.
* While the Cameroonian government has control over much of the country, the Far North region in the Lake Chad Basin has been largely overlooked by the government, leaving a vacuum that Boko Haram factions have filled. In addition, Cameroon has limited institutional capacity and lacks government experience for handling refugees. Experts in Chad echoed the same concern, saying the “climate favors Boko Haram’s conflict” by seizing on the inherent insecurity and chaos that environmental displacement creates.
* The Lake Chad Basin is a long neglected rural region that governments have overlooked in favor of the political center. As a result, fishermen and subsistence farming residents have often felt marginalized by their governments, manifesting in underdevelopment, further exacerbated by the impacts of climate change. It is no coincidence then that Boko Haram has established itself in the Lake Chad Basin, capitalizing on the neglected region as a base from which to attack, recruit and expand control. As part of its counterinsurgency strategy, Nigeria and its allies have for the most part pushed Boko Haram out of the major cities and towns it once occupied.
* Boko Haram has manipulated existing fault lines to engender support for its cause in the Lake Chad Basin. For example, Boko Haram capitalizes on the long-held frustration of the Fulani who feel marginalized by the Nigerian government. Thus, any strategy dealing with Boko Haram must address the local roots of discontent.
* In our feature on [conflict, climate and migration in the Sahel](https://www.climate-refugees.org/perspectives/2020/10/4/sahel), Professor Ahmadou Aly Mbaye tells us it is certain that climate change is a contributor to conflict in the Sahelian crisis, just as climate change is a contributor to the forced migration and displacement in the Sahel and throughout West Africa. However, conflict acts as an impediment and we lack data and tools to disentangle the complex nexus climate change, institutions, development and other drivers are contributing to both conflict and displacement in the Sahelian conflict and ensuring crisis. This said, he also says there is no doubt though that climate change is playing a role in the region in contributing to conflict in the Sahel.