The UK and the Regulation of PMSCs

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1. Introduction

The UK is home state for a large number of land-based and maritime PMSCs. The Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) was appointed by the UK government in 2011 as its partner for the development and accreditation of standards for the UK private security industry operating in the land environment overseas.1 SCEG is a special interest group within Aerospace Defence and Security (ADS) a trade organisation advancing the UK aerospace, defence, security industries; SCEG lists 65 PMS companies as members.2 24 UK registered companies involved in providing security services in overseas territories or maritime areas are currently listed as members of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA),3 although a much larger number of UK companies signed up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers of 2010.4 Given the UK government’s preference for industry-led regulation rather than any form of statutory regulation of PMSCs, it is important to: consider the origins and development of the system of self-regulation in the

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1 Extended to include the maritime sector later in 2011.

2 https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/52900332.asp

3 http://www.icoca.ch/en/membership. But see Ministerial Statement in 2013 that 50 UK PSCs had joined the ICoCA, Hansard Col 51WS, 15 October 2013 (Simmonds).

4 See Ministerial statement that about a third of the 500 PSCs that had signed the ICoC were UK-based, Hansard Col 72WS, 17 December 2012 (Simmonds).
UK; how that keys into the international legal system; and to discern the normative framework that applies to UK, consisting of soft and hard national and international norms. Finally, an evaluation of that framework is undertaken.

2. The Origins of UK Self-Regulation

The activities of Sandline International, a UK-based company that ceased operations in 2004, included direct involvement in conflicts in Papua New Guinea and Liberia in the 1990s; but its impact on the discussion of regulation of the PMSC industry appears to be largely confined to its arms activities in Sierra Leone. Arms were delivered by Sandline to the forces of President Kabbah in contravention of a UK arms embargo on Sierra Leone, an embargo that had been imposed by executive order under the United Nations Act 1946, in fulfilment of the UK’s obligations under a Security Council imposed arms embargo. The actions of Sandline therefore breached its obligations under UK law and the UK’s obligations under international law. The recommendations of the Legg Report that the government consider introducing a system of licensing, led to a Green Paper outlining the options for regulating those PMSCs operating out of the UK and its dependencies.

The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Green Paper, ‘Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation’ of 2002 provided a thoughtful examination of the reasons for growth of the industry, including a convincing rationale for regulating what was at the time was a fledgling industry:

Bringing non-state violence under control was one of the achievements of the last two centuries. To allow it again to become a major feature of the international scene would have profound consequences. Although there is little risk of a return to the circumstances of the 17th and 18th centuries when privateers were hard to distinguish from pirates, and Corporations commanded armies that could threaten states, it would be foolish to ignore the lessons of the past. Were private force to become widespread there would be risks of misunderstanding, exploitation and conflict. It would be safer to bring PMCs and PSCs within a framework of regulation while they are a comparatively minor phenomenon.

Furthermore, the Paper pointed out that the actions of PMSCs go far beyond the commercial field, potentially involving the ‘use of force and the taking of lives’; or impacting on stability within a country or a region. In the light of this the Green Paper outlined the following options:

_A full or partial ban on private military activity abroad_, described as the most direct way of ‘dealing with an activity that many find objectionable’. The difficulties of this approach highlighted in the Green Paper were some of ones that have eventually prevailed to prevent UK statutory regulation, namely: the difficulty of enforcing such legislation due to the problems of assembling evidence and mounting a successful prosecution in British courts (note that the objection was not that the UK limits its criminal jurisdiction to its territory, an objection that appears in later debates, and one that is not strictly true); the problems of defining military activity; that it was an unwarranted interference with individual liberties; that it would deprive beleaguered governments of support; and that it would ‘deprive British defence exporters of legitimate business’, given that the provision of services is normally a necessary part of export sales.

_A ban on recruitment for military activity abroad_, which would be primarily directed at the recruitment of mercenary and would not work well in the context of companies. However, the Paper recognised that this would ‘enable the government to prevent the worst kind of interventions by the private military sector’, in that, if carefully drafted, it would help to prevent PMSCs from engaging in mercenary-like behaviour or, perhaps more accurately, in the recruitment of mercenaries.

_A licensing regime for military services_ was ultimately the ‘hard’ regulatory choice for government, as opposed to ‘softer’ forms based on self-regulation. The Green Paper’s outline of such a system is beguilingly simple:

Legislation would require companies or individuals to obtain a licence for contracts for military and security services abroad. The activities for which licences were required would be defined in the legislation. They might include, for example, recruitment and management of personnel, procurement and maintenance of equipment, advice, training, intelligence and logistical support as well as combat operations. It would for consideration whether or not to include consultancy services on security measures for commercial premises – a larger number of small consultants exist in this field; or to establish a threshold for contracts so that only those above a specified value required a licence. For

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7 Green Paper 2002 para 62.
8 Ibid para 71.
9 English criminal law is largely based on the territorial principle, which means that the offence must normally be committed in the country; but there are a limited number of exceptions for British nationals, for example treason, murder, manslaughter, and certain sexual offences – D.J. Harris, _Cases and Materials on International Law_ (Sweet & Maxwell 7th edn 2010) 230. Other exceptions to the territorial principle include a number of terrorist offences – C. Walker, _Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorist Legislation_ (Oxford University Press 3rd ed 2014) 229-32. Furthermore, British military law applies incorporating large amounts of domestic criminal law, applies to a British soldier wherever they are located in the world – P. Rowe, _The Impact of Human Rights Law on Armed Forces_ (Cambridge University Press 2005) 133-4.
10 Green Paper para 72.
services for which licences were required, companies or individuals would apply for licences in the same way as they do for licenses to export arms (though not necessarily to the same Government Department). Criteria for the export of services would be established on the same lines as those for the export of arms.\footnote{Ibid para 73.}

Given that the Montreux Document of 2008, of which the UK was a key supporter, expresses a preference for a licensing system,\footnote{UN Doc A/63/467-S/2008/636, Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict, Part 2 at paras 54-6.} the creation of such a system almost seemed inevitable in 2002, particularly given the licensing regime that had been introduced for the domestic security industry in the Private Security Industry Act 2001, after a period of self-regulation.

Although the Green Paper identified the problems in enforcement, since the licensed activity takes place abroad thereby making it difficult to know or prove that the terms of the licence were being breached,\footnote{Green Paper para 73.} presumably the same problem is encountered in terms of an arms export licence, for instance, one that prohibits the arms exported from being used against a civilian population. In addition, a licence could largely, or in part, be based on ensuring that the PMSC fulfilled its obligations in the UK, for example, in terms of vetting, training, assessing impact of the services on human rights of individuals in the host country and on the stability of that country; and this could be reflected in the terms of the contract itself, particularly if the licensing legislation required it to be subject to UK law. In other words the licence could be directed at ensuring PMSCs fulfilled their due diligence duties to prevent abuse and, only exceptionally (in cases of obvious breaches, for example in cases involving the (excessive) use of (lethal) force), would the terms of the licence be enforced by means of criminal prosecution involving investigations in foreign countries in which the PMSC in question operated. This could be combined with the fifth option outlined in the Green Paper, that of having a general licence for PMCs/PSCs,\footnote{Ibid para 75.} which the Paper did not favour by itself.

In other words, while not suggesting a scheme of ‘lite’ licensing of PMSCs, the Green Paper seemed to favour a robust scheme which reduced the incidence (and costs) of overseas investigations. This would distinguish licensing from the fourth option outlined in the Green Paper, namely that of \textit{registration and notification}. In this framework UK firms wishing to undertake contracts for military or security services abroad would have to register with the government and notify it of contracts for which it was bidding enabling the government to react if such a contract were contrary to UK interests or policy.\footnote{Ibid para 74.}
The final option for regulation outlined in the Green Paper was *self-regulation: a voluntary code of conduct*. In this soft form of regulation, PMSCs would become members of a trade association, which would be asked by the government to draw up a code of conduct for overseas work, in consultation with companies, their clients, the government and NGOs. Members would have to leave the association if they failed to adhere to the code, which would cover respect for human rights, respect for international law (including international humanitarian law), respect for sovereignty, and provide for transparency by allowing access to monitors while working overseas. The advantages of this least burdensome approach are ultimately the ones that attracted the UK government towards this form of regulation, namely that: membership of the association would ensure respectability, it would not be involved in unenforceable (or difficult to enforce) legislation, the industry itself would police it based on their superior knowledge of the work, something that could be enhanced by external monitoring, and it would establish standards of behaviour within the industry. The Green Paper did outline some difficulties with this approach, namely: it could not address the situation where UK PMSCs might damage UK interests by, for example, supporting an unfriendly government; and that the trade association would not necessarily be better off than the government in discerning what was going on overseas; and it would be in difficulties if it had to discipline one of its most important members.\(^{16}\)

The 2002 Green Paper provides a background for the development of self-regulation along the lines of the last approach identified therein. This was despite the fact that the Foreign Affairs Committee, in considering the Green Paper, recommended later in 2002 that, while self-regulation would establish better standards of PMSC conduct, it would not by itself prevent rogue or disreputable UK companies from acting against or, indeed, damaging UK interests or policies and, therefore the Committee recommended a mixed system of general and specific licences.\(^{17}\) The UK FCO itself estimated that a successful system of self-regulation would cover 90% of the sector,\(^{18}\) but, even assuming this estimate to be accurate, the remaining 10% would probably be rogue PMSCs where most of the abuse occurs. As summarised by Bohm, Senior and White, ‘during the late 1990s and early 2000s … government and parliamentary opinion clearly favoured a stronger regulatory regime as opposed to more laissez-faire approaches’.\(^{19}\) The UK’s experience with, and reliance on, contractors during its involvement in both Afghanistan from 2001 and Iraq from 2003 meant that, by the time the government again came to consider the matter in 2009, a much more powerful industry in terms of reach, capability and lobbying influence, combined with a new climate of austerity following the financial crisis beginning

\(^{16}\) Ibid para 75.
in 2008, the conservative-led government headed rapidly towards the least burdensome, least interventionist and, moreover, least expensive option of self-regulation.

3. The Development of UK Self-Regulation

The government reengaged with the issue of regulation in 2009 and, despite consultations revealing concern with a system of self-regulation, has proceeded to create a two-tiered system: ‘a government-backed system of self-regulation at the national level and adherence to regulatory norms at the international level’. As regards the latter the UK government has been a keen supporter of the Montreux Document 2008 and the International Code of Conduct of Private Security Providers of 2010, which together provide a non-binding framework for states and an international system of self-regulation for PMSCs. Although there are binding norms of national law and international law applicable to the UK government and to PMSCs (see below), none of these have been designed to specifically cover PMSCs or their activities, so it is true to say that the system of PMSC regulation being developed by the UK is a purely voluntary one; which, given the dangers of private force and violence, pointed to at the outset of the Green Paper of 2002, is remarkable.

Apart from its voluntary nature, meaning that rogue PMSCs will not be covered by the system, there are four further problems with self-regulation.

First, the industry is essentially being given the task of being a judge in its own cause. This basic problem of justice has been partly addressed by creating a national system of monitoring, inspection and enforcement through SCEG, separated from the industry association (ADS). This has also been duplicated at the international level, with PMSC membership of the International Code of Conduct being separate from the system of monitoring and enforcement in the hands of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA). At national level, the SCEG consists of a mixture of PMSCs, with some legal and insurance industry membership, as well as representatives from the FCO and the Department of Transport. There is no civil society representation, while at the international level, the ICoCA comprises states (Australia, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US), civil society and industry representatives, with equal representation of the three pillars in the Board of Directors.

Clearly it is not the industry, by itself, judging the actions of its members, but a truly independent body would not include the industry at all. It is true that under the voluntary system put in place in the UK, the auditors of UK-based PSCs will be individuals from organisations accredited by the UK Accreditation Service (UKAS) as being able to measure the management, performance and activities

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20 Ibid 316.
21 Ibid 322 ‘There would be very little incentive for such contractors to sign up to the trade association’s code of conduct ... since they would not be trading on professional reputation but rather a willingness to be unscrupulous’.
of PSCs against national (PSC1 US National Standard, 2012) and international standards (ISO 18788, 2015), and these individuals and organisations are presumably approved because they are independent of PSCs.

The second problem with a voluntary system of self-regulation is that sanctions are limited, with the main one comprising exclusion of a non-compliant PSC, a sanction that ultimately does not stop the company in question from trading as the transition from ostracised Blackwater to Xe/Acdemi in the US shows.

Thirdly, the question of the standards to be applied is not as straightforward as the documents (International Code of Conduct, PSC and ISO) suggest, namely that this system will be upholding human rights, humanitarian law, and other applicable principles of international law, but given that they are not directly applicable to PMSCs, indeed most are not designed to cover corporate actors, there is then a certain amount of picking and choosing, adapting and interpreting, of standards. This is found at the international level, where the International Code of Conduct covers some human rights but not others; and in the adoption of PSC1 (2012) as the national standard and ISO 187788 (2015) as the international standard. These standards are not developed in inter-governmental fora where the development and application of international norms normally take place.

Nonetheless, an examination of ISO 187788 (below) does show a genuine engagement with human rights standard, indicating that the structural problem is not that human rights standards do not directly apply to PMSCs, given that the industry seems willing to make a genuine attempt to try and adapt their management and operational activities to them, rather the (fourth) problem is that the UK government shows limited willingness to engage with its positive responsibilities under human rights law to ensure that private actors within its jurisdiction respect human rights. Arguably, the government’s presence on both the SCEG at national level and the ICoCA at the international level is meant to address this deficiency but its critical scrutiny of the practices of PMSCs is difficult to ascertain or gauge.

In a written Ministerial statement on ‘promoting high standards in the private military and security company industry’ in 2011, the government confirmed that:

Following further consultations, ADS have been appointed the Government’s partner in developing and implementing UK national standards for PMSCs. ADS have established a special interest group, the Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) which will support the Government in the transparent regulation of companies which operate in this sector. Membership of the SCEG is open to all UK-based PMSCs who have signed the International Code of Conduct on regulation for Private Security Providers.

We are in the forefront of countries working to establish national standards derived from the International Code which was signed in Geneva in November 2010. 125 PMSCs, of which 45 are UK-based, have now signed up to the International Code and more are in the process of joining. At an international level, the UK, along with the Swiss, US and Australian governments is now working with NGO and industry partners according to a published work plan to establish a mechanism to monitor
compliance with the code … There will be no duplication between UK national and international standards. The UK Government will use its leverage as a key buyer of PMSC services to promote compliance with the International Code and to encourage other PMSC clients to do likewise.\footnote{Hansard Col 7WS, 21 June 2011 (Bellingham).}

SCEG’s aims are stated in its terms of reference:

The Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) is a group for UK-based Private Security Companies working both in complex environments on land and in high risk areas at sea. The Group has been established by the ADS Group Ltd to partner with the UK Government to promote professional standards across the UK private security industry, and to provide for their enforcement through effective monitoring and sanctions.\footnote{SCEG Terms of Reference 2015 para 1.1, available at https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/19813174.asp}

Of greatest pertinence here is SCEG’s:

Support to the UK Government in the regulation of companies who operate in this sector, and a level of confidence that these companies operate at a high professional and ethical standard. This will be undertaken through encouraging adherence to voluntary codes and association coupled with independent third party accredited certification against approved international standards and to monitor Members’ compliance. The SCEG Executive Committee is committed to the success of the International Code of Conduct Association.\footnote{Ibid para 1.2.(a).}

Given the prominence of the industry in SCEG, the nature of the ‘independent third party accredited certification’ process, needs further examination. PSC1 (2012) has been adopted by the UK government as the standard applicable to PSCs operating in complex environments,\footnote{Ministerial statement, Hansard Col 72WS, 17 December 2012 (Simmonds).} and the evidence is that the UK has adopted ISO 18788 (2015) as it is a development at international level of PSC1. SCEG’s webpage on accredited certification indicates that UKAS had informed SCEG on 17 March 2014 that accreditations had been granted to Intertek and MSS Global for PSC 1/ISO 18788 (Land) and MSS Global for ISO 28007 (the equivalent maritime standard); and on 16 May 2014 accreditation was granted to RTI Forensics for ISO 28007. These certification bodies can issue accredited certificates to PSCs and according to SCEG ‘several SCEG companies have been awarded accredited certification’.\footnote{https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/95837038.asp} An examination of the websites of the certification bodies does not reveal anything about their qualifications, processes or experience so it is difficult to judge whether such bodies can properly audit human rights compliance by PSCs. Furthermore, the fact that only ‘several’ PSCs companies, at least in those belonging to SCEG, have been certified is not suggestive of huge penetration of the UK PSC sector by the accredited certification process. In fact, according to SCEG, 5 land PSCs that are members of SCEG have been given accredited certification, while 11 land PSCs who are not members of SCEG (all but one from outside the UK) have also received it. The figures for maritime PSCs are 24 SCEG members and 34 non-SCEG members (again mostly from companies
outside the UK). As regards the international level it was anticipated that the ICoCA would begin processing requests for certification based on PSC1 in early October 2015, although there is not yet any indication that this process has begun.

Given that the International Code of Conduct was adopted in 2010 and PSC1 in 2012, the rapid implementation of such soft voluntary standards that might be expected (as opposed to the slower process of implementation that might be expected for harder forms of legalisation) does not appear to have materialised especially in PSCs specialising in land-based security services, although scrutiny and review of the process in terms of the wider UK PSC sector is hard to find, so these figures are hard to contextualise and assess. Improvements in the transparency of the auditing, accreditation and scrutiny processes involved in UK and international voluntary regulation of PMSCs would lead to increased legitimacy of the system.

4. The UK and the International System

The UK government is clearly of the view that the system of voluntary regulation put in place in the UK fulfils its international human rights obligations. This is largely explained by the fact that the government sees the international legal framework as being embodied in the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers of 2010 and in the UN’s Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights of 2011 (the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework). In other words the UK government does not accept any that any binding treaty or customary human rights obligations applies to it in relation to the oversight of the PMSC industry based within its jurisdiction. As related by MacLeod when discussing the UK’s PSC 1 pilot scheme introduced in 2013:

A pilot scheme commenced in August 2013 in the UK to ‘road-test’ PSC1 as part of the UK government’s self-described commitment to industry self-regulation. The UK has been actively involved in the drafting of the ICoC and the development of the ICoCA and its participation follows many years of regulatory inaction in this area. In doing so, the UK government considers itself to be meeting its obligations to ensure human rights protection through its support for ‘robust’ regulation. Specifically, it regards its adoption of the PSC1 certification standard with eventual ICoCA oversight as helping the UK to fulfil its ‘commitments’ under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as set out in the UK National Plan. The pilot scheme was supported and closely followed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In addition, the UK Accreditation Service, which was to certify approved Certification Bodies to carry out PSC1 audits, was actively involved in monitoring and the auditing process both in the UK and at audited project sites.

27 https://www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/59063357.asp
28 Ministerial statement Hansard Col 51WS, 15 October 2013: ‘We believe the twin-track approach of certification to agreed standards and ICoCA oversight can help fulfil the UK’s commitments under the UN guiding principles on business and human rights’.
In addition to utilising UKAS (a non-profit private company) and certification bodies (private companies), none of which are organs of state, the government may be guilty of hiding behind the soft-law façade of the International Code of Conduct and UN’s Guiding Principles when, in fact, the ‘protect’ pillar of the latter is based on states’ having hard (i.e. binding) positive obligations under international human rights law to prevent human rights abuse by private actors as well as punish transgressors and provide for access to justice for the victims. The ‘respect’ pillar, on the other hand, is based on private actors fulfilling due diligence duties as regards human rights and is not, by itself, binding on PMSCs. While the government’s encouragement of self-regulation in the UK can be said to be helping PMSCs fulfil the second pillar of the Guiding Principles it cannot, by itself, fulfil the first or, at least, it cannot ensure that the UK government avoids any legal responsibility when human rights have been violated by a UK-based PMSC.

For example, if the UK government ignores persistent and well-evidenced use of unlawful lethal force by a UK-based (or UK-contracted) PMSC in a foreign country it will have failed to fulfil its obligations to prevent human rights violations, even though that PMSC might have received accredited certification under the system now established in the UK. The argument that such abuse has occurred beyond the UK’s jurisdiction is a little disingenuous since the UK should have taken steps to prevent or stop such abuse, and punish it, by taking action in enforcement of national laws against the company in the UK. If the UK had a statutory-based compulsory system of licensing and regulation it would be able to argue that it has taken necessary steps to prevent abuse on the basis that positive obligations are obligations of conduct not of result. This means that a licensing system would reduce the incidence of abuse, it would not eliminate it but, if sufficiently robust, and revised regularly to address any gaps, such a licensing system would fulfil the UK’s obligations to protect human rights. It is very difficult to see how promoting a system a voluntary self-regulation, where the main sanction is expulsion, no matter how sophisticated the system is, can do no more than partly fulfil the UK’s obligations under international law.

31 Although UKAS could be argued to be performing governmental functions and therefore its conduct could be attributed to the UK – see Article 5 ILC Articles on States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 2001.


It is clear that existing UK legislation that may have some application to the PMSC sector when operating abroad does not provide a strong enough statutory framework to regulate the PMSC; namely the Foreign Enlistment Act 1870 (intended to combat mercenaries but not enforced); the Human Rights Act 1998 (which has been extended extraterritorially to state agents in cases like Al-Skeini, but not yet to non-state actors); the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (that could apply to PMSCs but only when they commit core crimes – war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, or aggression); the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (that applies to domestic security within the UK); and the Armed Forces Act 2006 (whereby contractors may, in certain circumstances be subject to military law and, therefore, their acts can arguably be seen as acts of the UK). The inadequacies of the existing legislative framework to deal with the problem of abuse by PMSCs when operating abroad, combined with the obligations the UK has under international law, specifically international human rights law, point to a statutory scheme of licensing and regulation as fit for purpose, and not what’s been called a ‘self-regulation plus’, or ‘robust’ system of voluntary regulation.

MacLeod describes the ‘plus’ element as being located in oversight by the government and civil society and not consisting simply of self-regulation by the industry, but she goes on to state that ‘what remains unclear, however, is the extent to which states are fulfilling their international human rights obligations by choosing the softer option of self-regulation plus and omitting legislative options’. Furthermore, it is very difficult to judge the level of oversight by governments and civil society of the self-regulation process, particularly when accreditation itself is sub-contracted to UKAS, who then authorises certification bodies. There is a sense of the government remaining at (several) arms lengths from UK-based PMSCs and, indeed, ones it contracts with, as it does not accept that contracting itself gives rise to state responsibility.

5. Evaluation

Although there is evidence of significant human rights penetration into PSC1 (and ISO 18788), the interpretation and application of human rights standards in these documents reflects both substantive and structural problems in terms of human rights compliance. Some examples of these problems as found in the ISO standard are given here:

35 Case of Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011 (European Court of Human Rights).
36 MacLeod, n.30 at 4.
37 Ministerial statement, Hansard Col 7WS, 21 June 2011 (Bellingham).
38 MacLeod n.30 at 13.
39 Ibid.
40 Montreux Document 2008 n.12 at part I para 7: ‘entering into contractual relations does not in itself engage the responsibility of Contracting States’.
ISO 18788 ‘provides a means’ for PMSCs and for ‘those who utilize security services’ to ‘demonstrate commitment to the relevant legal obligations, as well as the good practices provided’ in the Montreux Document; and conformance with the ‘principles and commitments outlined’ in the International Code of Conduct. ‘It is the sole responsibility of the user of this International Standard to determine the applicable laws and abide by them’.  

It becomes clearer in ISO 18788 that unless there are any national human rights laws applicable to PMSCs that international human rights law does not apply to PMSCs, so that the human rights references found throughout the document are not based on obligations but on ideas of corporate social responsibility. However, at some points ISO 18788 comes close to stating that some core human rights obligations are applicable to PSCs: prohibition on torture, sexual exploitation, human trafficking and corruption, but it fails to include other core rights to life (not to be taken arbitrarily), to freedom from arbitrary detention, and core socio-economic rights such as food, water, shelter, education and health.

‘Self-defence’ is defined as the ‘protection of one’s person or property against some injury attempted by another’, and is seen as ‘inherent’ in ISO 18788, when it should be based on the national laws of the host state and on standards found in human rights laws, for example on the right to life. There is also an assumption that a contract by itself gives a right to carry weapons to contractors and that those weapons can be used for lethal and non-lethal purposes. In addition to ‘inherent’ self-defence and defence of others, lethal force seems to be envisaged when absolutely necessary to protect dangerous property, but this is a standard allowed under the law of armed conflict (which the standard correctly states is not normally applicable to contractors except when they directly participate in hostilities) not human rights law. The carrying of weapons by private actors must at least accord with national laws and cannot be based solely on a contractual right. ISO 18788 states that in the absence of authorised Rules on the Use of Force (RUF), PMSCs shall base their operations on the UN’s Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials of 1990, a document that is indeed widely used by states and the UN, but it constitutes a direction to state police (and by extension UN police) not to private actors. ISO

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42 Ibid 6.1.2 ‘legal and other requirements’; 8.1.3. ‘respect for human rights’; but see 8.1.1. ‘operational planning and control’.  
43 Ibid 7.2.2 ‘competency identification’.  
44 But see ibid 8.1.4.(c) ‘prevention and management of undesirable or disruptive events’  
46 Ibid, 8.3.4. and 8.3.5. ‘less-lethal force’ and ‘lethal force’.  
47 Ibid 8.3.5 ‘lethal force’.  
48 Ibid, 8.3.1 ‘use of force’
18788 does restrict PMSCs to law enforcement only when authorised by a state, but this should have been confined to host state authorization, besides which the standard also envisages contractors having a right to apprehend and search individuals even when not operating as authorised law enforcers, surely powers that only a state can have or delegate. There is a statement in the ‘Guidance’ to ISO 18788 that PMSCs help protect the ‘human right of people to be secure’ and that, in the absence of an effective government, recourse may be had to ‘commercial providers of security services’. As a basis for private actors to have and use weapons this statement returns us to the problems of private violence identified in the Green Paper of 2002.

- There is no obligation on the PMSCs or the auditors to report their evaluations to the host state or home state.
- Human rights risk analysis (HRAA) is not proscribed and no model for HRRA is provided.
- There is very little detail on the complaints system that a PMSC should have in order to comply with the standard, nor on any remedial mechanisms, nor the standards by which reparations to victims are to be measured.

While the UK system of ‘robust voluntary self-regulation’ is progressing, and is certainly better than the previous laissez-faire approach, the lack of transparency and clear governmental oversight mean that it is not possible to conclude that the UK has provided a complete system to prevent, address and remedy human rights abuse by PMSCs. There must be considerable doubts raised as to whether a system, in which state involvement at the international level in the ICoCA is confined to those having such industries and does not extend to host states, and at the national level where the role of government (in the SCEG) is unclear, demonstrates that the UK is fulfilling its obligations under the UN’s Guiding Principles or, more accurately, under international human rights laws.

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49 Ibid, 8.3.6 ‘use of force in support of law enforcement’.
50 Ibid, 8.4 ‘apprehension and search’.
51 Ibid Annex A, A.1 ‘general’.
52 Ibid 9.1.2 ‘evaluation of compliance’; 9.2 ‘internal audit’.
54 Ibid, 7.4.4. ‘communicating complaint and grievance procedures’; 8.8.2 ‘incident monitoring, reporting and investigations’; 8.8.3 ‘internal and external complaint and grievance procedures’. Annex A, A.8.8.3 ‘internal and external complaint and grievance procedures’.