



## Issue Brief #2

### **Addressing drivers of migration, including adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters and human-made crises, through protection and assistance, sustainable development, poverty eradication, conflict prevention and resolution**

#### **Introduction**

The factors that lead people to migrate, voluntarily or involuntarily, permanently or temporarily, and that perpetuate movement once it has begun, are commonly referred to as “drivers” of migration. A sound understanding of contextualized drivers of migration, of existing normative, policy and legal frameworks, and of tailored responses that consider these, is central to achieving safe, orderly and regular migration, founded in choice, not necessity, and organized in a manner that serves the needs and expectations of migrants and of communities and countries of origin, transit, and destination.

The scope of this paper is limited to international migration, examining the drivers of migration with a view to identifying ways and means to better manage international migration by facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration and ways of reducing the drivers that encourage, often out of necessity, unsafe, disorderly and irregular migration.

#### **Trends**

The number of international migrants reached 244 million<sup>1</sup> in 2015, the highest total in recorded history and a 41% increase since 2000.<sup>2</sup> However, as a percentage of global population, migrants today constitute just 3.3% of the global population, a percentage that has increased only slightly from 2.9% in 2000.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the numbers of people moving internally within their own countries exceeds by some 300% the number of people who have moved internationally across borders.<sup>4</sup>

Put another way, the overwhelming majority of the world’s people do not migrate to other countries but rather stay within their countries of birth.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the overwhelming majority of people who migrate to other countries do so through safe, orderly and regular

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<sup>1</sup> Of these, it is estimated that about 90 per cent migrated due to economic, social, political and environmental factors, and only 10 per cent were refugees fleeing violence, persecution, human rights abuse, and/or armed conflict according to J. Woetzel, A. Madgavkar, K. Rifai, F. Mattern, J. Bughin, J. Manyika, T. Elmasry, A. Di Lodovico and A. Hasyagar, *Global migration’s impact and opportunity* (London: McKinsey Global Institute, November 2016).

<sup>2</sup> [http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/Migration\\_increase\\_digitalcard.png](http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/Migration_increase_digitalcard.png)

<sup>3</sup> The share of the global stock of migrants from middle-income countries has increased while the share of migrants from low- and high-income countries has decreased.

<sup>4</sup> The large majority of global mobility occurs domestically within countries, with an estimated 763 million internal migrants worldwide, including persons displaced internally according to UNDESA, *Cross-national comparisons of internal migration: An update on global patterns and trends*, 2013.

<sup>5</sup> [https://publications.iom.int/system/files/global\\_migration\\_trends\\_2015\\_factsheet.pdf](https://publications.iom.int/system/files/global_migration_trends_2015_factsheet.pdf)

means, and as a matter of choice and not necessity. And the world is more productive, vibrant and stable as a result. Migration is a natural phenomenon in an inter-connected world and has beneficial impacts for migrants and their families, for the countries to which they go and the countries from which they came.<sup>6</sup>

In looking to address the drivers of migration, our primary focus should not be on stopping migration. Rather we must reduce the adverse factors that motivate people to move out of necessity in unsafe, often desperate and dangerous, conditions while enabling migration to be safe, regular and orderly, so that the beneficial impact of migration is maximised for migrants as well as the countries and communities of destination and of origin.

Government policy choices in both origin and destination countries are influential in driving migration as they shape individual perceptions of and the actual costs, benefits and risks of migration. Moreover, government policies affect which migration takes place through ‘regular’ authorized channels and which migration takes place through ‘irregular’ or unauthorized channels. This consequently influences the vulnerabilities associated with migration. The more regular migration channels are restricted, the more migration is diverted to irregular and often exploitative channels, especially for low-skilled migration flows.<sup>7</sup> Documented evidence indicates that well-governed migration brings substantial benefits for migrants and their families as well as for countries of origin, transit and destination of migrants. However, we cannot just assume that vulnerabilities are associated only with irregular migration. While the risks of abuses are indeed greater with irregular migration, this does not mean that regular migration is always “safe migration” in terms of treatment of migrants at destination.

### *What are ‘drivers of migration’?*

Drivers of migration include economic, demographic factors and environmental factors, and social and political dynamics.<sup>8</sup> People may migrate to access better economic, employment and educational opportunities for themselves and their families. Some migrate due to lack of access to fundamental human rights such as health, food or basic education, and due to discrimination, poverty or separation from family. They may move in response to crisis – both natural and human-made – and, increasingly, in response to environmental change. How drivers interact in different dimensions (scale, location, distance and duration) affects how governments and the international community can respond in order to effectively protect migrants, govern migration and harness its benefits.

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<sup>6</sup> Castles, Stephen, Hein De Haas, and Mark J. Miller. *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.; <https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/19176/>

<sup>7</sup> S. Castles ‘Migration and community formation under conditions of globalization’, *International Migration Review* 36, Vol 4. (2002) pp. 1143–68; Hein De Haas. "The determinants of international migration." *International Migration Institute, Working Paper* 32 (2011); F. Düvell. "Paths into irregularity: The legal and political construction of irregular migration." *European Journal of Migration and Law* 13, no. 3 (2011) pp. 275-295. J. Doomernik (2013) *Migrant Smuggling between Two Logics: Migration Dynamics and State Policies*, *The International Spectator*, 48:3, 113-129, DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2013.815027

<sup>8</sup> A. Geddes, W. Neil Adger, N. W. Arnell, R. Black, and D. SG Thomas, ‘Migration, environmental change, and the ‘challenges of governance’, *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 30, no. 6 (2012), pp. 951-967.

The drivers of migration interact in complex ways to contribute to individuals' migration decision-making.<sup>9</sup> Some drivers primarily influence migration decision-making in areas of origin (such as environmental and demographic pressures; lack of employment and livelihood opportunities; lack of access to fundamental human rights and basic services; poor/inadequate governance and security), while others are more associated with sites of journey and destination (such as the potential for employment and education opportunities, family unification and adventure -- and most fundamentally the prospect of living a safer, more dignified and productive life for oneself and one's family), as well as relative income differences between areas of origin and destination.<sup>10</sup> Some drivers operate at the individual, household or familial scale (such as relationships, tourism, visa overstay); others at the city, sub-state, national or regional scale (such as environmental degradation and instability). Some drivers are acute and involve sudden onset (such as natural) disasters and crises, while others unfold more slowly (such as demographic, environmental and climate change). Some drivers run deep (including cultural and social drivers, the attraction of an existing diaspora, as well as governance and political factors), while others are more easily influenced by punctual policy choices and programming interventions.

More than at any previous point in human history, revolutions in transportation and communications have increased both the awareness about and access to opportunities abroad. Today's instantaneous flow of communications between potential migrants and friends, families and diaspora communities – as well as with migrant smugglers and unscrupulous labour recruiters – are some of the most powerful enablers of international migration, regardless of whether the information is factual.

The exact form, location, duration and result of these interactions is thus highly context-specific, and contingent on individual and community resilience to stresses and shocks as well as to opportunities, perceived or real, authorized or not. Significantly, when migration is undertaken as a necessity rather than a choice, migrants may be at a greater risk of human rights violations throughout their journey.

## Issues

### a. *Economic and demographic drivers*

Economic opportunities, demographics, and poverty/food insecurity are prime influencers in the migration decision-making process and inter-act to greater or lesser degrees, depending on the specific context, to drive migration.

The search for livelihoods and economic opportunities, whether out of choice or necessity, are decisive factors for many in migration decision-making, which is reflected in the fact that

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<sup>9</sup> See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change *Climate Change 2014 – Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Regional Aspects* (Cambridge University Press, 2014); IOM, *Making Mobility Work for Adaptation to Environmental Changes*, 2017; R.A. McLeman and L.M. Hunter, 'Migration in the context of vulnerability and adaptation to climate change: insights from analogues', *Climate change 2010*, no.1, pp 450-61; S. Lonergan, *The role of environmental degradation in population displacement*, Environmental Change and Security Project Report no 4, pp.5-15; and van Hear et al., op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> O. Stark and J. E. Taylor. "Relative deprivation and international migration." *Demography* 26, no. 1 (1989): 1-14.

migrant workers comprise over 70 per cent of all international migrants.<sup>11</sup> Migrants go where the jobs are or are perceived to be. In some cases, these are jobs that nationals are reluctant to take and governments are unwilling or unable to regulate properly. Employers and sometimes even whole industries (such as in large parts of the agriculture, hospitality and care sectors) benefit from migration as their labour market and skills needs are met, including through irregular migration meeting the demands of the informal labour market. However, there are also large costs: for governments in knowing who is entering and staying; for the labour market by creating two tiers – one formal and regulated and the other informal and unregulated with its attendant risks, including of putting downward pressure on wages and working conditions; and for migrants, who are at far greater risk of exploitation and abuse, and are excluded from social protection systems.

In developing countries, lack of job opportunities, wage differentials, and aspirations propel young people away from home in search of employment and income opportunities. The informal economy accounts for 33-90 per cent of total employment<sup>12</sup>, which often means low pay, hazardous working conditions, and limited access to legal and social protection and resources, driving people towards opportunities abroad.

Demographic change is closely related to economic opportunity, and also serves to drive migration. If current demographic trends continue, around 520-560 million people will join the global labour force by 2030. Seventy-five to 90 per cent of this growth will be in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>13</sup> Employment shortages in some regions therefore will coincide with labour shortages in others, driving younger, unemployed and under-employed people towards regions with older, wealthier populations and labour shortages.<sup>14</sup> For example, in the next 15 years, the working-age population in Sub-Saharan Africa is projected to increase by 55 per cent, while Europe is expected to experience a fall in working age population of 9 per cent.<sup>15</sup> However, it is critical to underscore that the potential supply of persons desiring to migrate and the demand for labour, skills and population stabilization through migration are not balanced, with supply likely to outstrip demand for generations to come. Governments retain the sovereign discretion, within the confines of international law, to determine which non-nationals may enter and stay on their territories and therefore are likely to create selective migration policies to do so in a manner that addresses national labour market, economic and social needs.

International migration is also becoming an increasingly important source of population growth and stability in developed countries, which have witnessed an annual growth rate of migrant populations of 3 per cent since 2000.<sup>16</sup> In several industrial economies, migration is

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<sup>11</sup> ILO Global estimates on migrant workers, 2015, page 6, [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms\\_436343.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_436343.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> ILOSTAT, [http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pagehierarchy/Page3.jspx?MBI\\_ID=3&\\_afLoop=269487583238010&\\_afWindowMode=0&\\_afWindowId=ohx8ae2hv\\_1#!%40%40%3F\\_afWindowId%3Dohx8ae2hv\\_1%26\\_afLoop%3D269487583238010%26MBI\\_ID%3D3%26\\_afWindowMode%3D0%26\\_adf.ctrl-state%3Dohx8ae2hv\\_33](http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/oracle/webcenter/portalapp/pagehierarchy/Page3.jspx?MBI_ID=3&_afLoop=269487583238010&_afWindowMode=0&_afWindowId=ohx8ae2hv_1#!%40%40%3F_afWindowId%3Dohx8ae2hv_1%26_afLoop%3D269487583238010%26MBI_ID%3D3%26_afWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3Dohx8ae2hv_33)

<sup>13</sup> ILO World Employment Social Outlook Trends 2017; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2015). World Population Prospects: The 2015 Revision.

<sup>14</sup> ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: Non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration.

<sup>15</sup> DESA, World Population Prospects,

[https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key\\_findings\\_wpp\\_2015.pdf](https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/files/key_findings_wpp_2015.pdf)

<sup>16</sup> G.P. Tapinos, 'Development Assistance Strategies and Emigration Pressure in Europe and Africa'

helping to stem negative population growth rates and buffer aging with young, working age migrants who can ensure contributions to the tax base and social security systems needed to support growing ranks of retirees. These trends seem set to continue. Between 2009 and 2016, the share of the working-age population expressing a desire to migrate abroad on a permanent basis increased in every region of the world except for Southern Asia and South-Eastern Asia and the Pacific.<sup>17</sup>

Poverty and food insecurity influence both the inception of migration and, if food insecurity is not alleviated, the continuation of movement once started. Despite unprecedented levels of economic development, technological advances and financial resources, millions are still living in extreme poverty. And around 108 million people in the world were severely food insecure in 2016, a dramatic increase compared with 80 million in 2015.<sup>18</sup> However, due to the cost of migration, the ‘poorest of the poor’, and particularly the less skilled, are often unable to migrate, either domestically or across borders, and may be less able than other migrants to access regular channels of migration. If they do access irregular migration channels, it can be even more costly as they become indebted to those in control of such channels.

#### *b. Environmental drivers*

A great number of countries identified as ‘climate vulnerable’ tend to experience high rates of emigration<sup>19</sup>, so it is critical to consider existing environment and climate-related evidence when analyzing current migration patterns and estimating future flows.

Environmental factors, including those related to climate change and natural disasters, directly and indirectly impact the resilience and vulnerability of individuals, households and communities, and may lead to migration. How climate change drives migration depends heavily on its interaction with other factors, including the perception of risk by affected communities, and varies among and within communities.<sup>20</sup>

Most people displaced by disasters remain within their own countries<sup>21</sup>, but cross-border disaster displacement also occurs due to drought, floods, storms, as well as non-climate related disasters (e.g. earthquakes and nuclear disasters).<sup>22</sup> The effects of slow onset climate

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(Washington DC: Commission for the Study of International Migration and Co-operative Economic Development, 1990); UNDP, *Human Development Report. Overcoming barriers: human mobility and development* (New York: UNDP, 2009);

<sup>17</sup> ILO World Employment Outlook Trends 2016

<sup>18</sup> FAO/FSIN, 2017, Global report on food crises 2017 (<http://www.fao.org/3/a-br323e.pdf>)

<sup>19</sup> Emily Wilkinson, Lisa Schipper, Catherine Simonet, and Zaneta Kubik, ‘Climate change, migration and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Overseas Development Institute: London, 2016); V20 Ministerial Communiqué 2nd Ministerial Dialogue of the Vulnerable Twenty (V20) Group (14 April 2016 – Washington)

<sup>20</sup> *Atlas of Environmental Migration* (2016), <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/projects/atlas-environmental-migration>

<sup>21</sup> An average of 25.4 million persons are displaced in the context of sudden onset disasters each year, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (<http://www.internal-displacement.org/globalreport2016/>)

<sup>22</sup> See The Nansen Initiative, Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Person in the Context of Disaster and climate Change, available at <http://disasterdisplacement.org/the-platform/our-response>; IDMC (2016); El Niño-driven drought in the Horn of Africa resulted in increased displacement of people in 2015 and 2016.

and environmental change are also key drivers.<sup>23</sup> People migrate when confronted with extreme temperatures, desertification or sea-level rise. These slow-onset changes undermine the sustainability of local livelihoods, especially those linked to the primary sector of the economy (agriculture, farming, livestock, forestry, and fishery). They can also have adverse impacts such as increasing food insecurity or the risk of health-related crises<sup>24</sup>, as well as on the effective enjoyment of a broad range of human rights, such as the right to water, sanitation, food, housing, health and self-determination, all of which can lead to migration.

### *c. Human-made crises*

Human-made crises, are today among the primary root causes of refugee flows and have an important impact on population movements more generally.

Civil wars have tripled over the past decade and are protracted in nature.<sup>25</sup> The lack of respect for international human rights and humanitarian law has compounded growing displacement of many as a consequence of their deteriorating living conditions. The vast majority of people displaced by conflict stay within their country.<sup>26</sup> People displaced across borders by conflict are refugees, rather than migrants, and their situation will be addressed in the Global Compact on Refugees.<sup>27</sup> But even outside of refugee flows, the negative socio-economic impacts of war, and its legacies, or permanent unrest, may drive migration through negative impacts on labour markets, livelihoods, food and health security, social service delivery and through political instability and social tensions (including the psychological pressure on people living near conflict situations) and the growth of criminal networks.<sup>28</sup> And where migrants reside in countries that descend into conflict, they can be among the most vulnerable, as was the case for nearly two million migrants living in Libya in 2011 when the civil conflict erupted.<sup>29</sup>

Countries where there is a high perception of corruption tend to be ‘net-emigration’ countries, while countries where there are lower perceptions of corruption tend to be ‘net-immigration’ countries. While corruption does not necessarily ‘cause’ migration; it is more accurately seen

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<sup>23</sup> There were over 220 million people living in the low-elevation coastal zones of the world’s 11 largest river deltas in 2011. It is estimated that, worldwide, 520 million people each year are affected by flooding in coastal zones; whilst 120 million persons are exposed to tropical cyclone hazards. Every year, 12 million hectares of productive land become sterile due to desertification and drought and three billion people, or 40 per cent of the world’s population, live on degraded lands. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projects that increasing temperatures and the reduction of precipitations due to climate change in Africa will expose between 75 and 250 million people to increased water stress by 2020. If global temperature rise reaches 1.5°C by the end of the century, 30 to 60 million people are projected to live in hot areas where the average heat in the hottest month is likely to be too high for a human body to physiologically function.

<sup>24</sup> Barry S. Levy, Jonathan A. Patz, ‘Climate Change, Human Rights, and Social Justice’, *Annals of Global Health* (2015), vol. 81(3), p. 310.

<sup>25</sup> Sebastian von Einsiedel, et al., ‘Major Recent Trends in Violent Conflict’, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, Occasional Paper No. 1, November 2014.

<sup>26</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2016/6/5763ace54/1-human-113-affected-forced-displacement-hits-record-high.html>

<sup>27</sup> See UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection No. 12: Claims for refugee status related to situations of armed conflict and violence, op. cit.

<sup>28</sup> World Food Programme. *At the Root of Exodus: Food security, conflict and international migration*, Rome, (publication forthcoming, 2017).

<sup>29</sup> Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster, June 2016, <https://micicinitiative.iom.int/guidelines>

as a contributing factor.<sup>30</sup> The same appears to be broadly true of governance patterns generally: better governance leads to higher immigration. Yet, again, there are important variations within this general result. For example, the governance differential between a migrant's origin and destination country seems to have a larger impact on net migration flows for higher-skilled portions of the migrant population. In other words, tertiary-educated migrants are more likely to migrate to better-governed countries.<sup>31</sup>

Large-scale industrial accidents and economic collapse can also be considered human-made crises with the potential of driving migration but are addressed, respectively, in the above section on environmental and economic drivers.

## Ways forward

Overall, efforts to address the drivers of migration need to focus on what drives people to move, as well as what directs that movement into unsafe and irregular channels. Efforts should be focused on facilitating safe, orderly and regular migration through better governance in ways that align the interests of all those affected, building on existing legal and policy frameworks with the aim of maximizing the beneficial impact of migration and with the aim of reducing the adverse factors that motivate people to move out of necessity in unsafe, often desperate and dangerous, conditions.

In line with the New York Declaration and the Sustainable Development Agenda, the below outlines a way forward in three broad areas for action:

### *a. Addressing drivers in countries of origin*

The factors driving migration away from countries of origin, regardless of whether by choice or necessity, include to a large extent economic and demographic factors as well as human-made and environmental crises. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development provides the critical framework for understanding and organizing efforts that would minimize the causes of displacement and drivers of irregular migration.<sup>32</sup> Inclusive and sustainable development that leaves no one behind, access to justice for all and effective, accountable and inclusive institutions will make countries and communities more resilient to many of the slow- and sudden-onset causes that drive migration and displacement, and allow individuals to live and work in a healthy, safe and security environment at home or to choose to migrate safely.

The prevention of conflict is critical in reducing adverse drivers. By recognizing the inherent interdependence of peace and development, the 2030 Agenda also provides a blueprint for a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention that evolves around inclusive politics and good governance. The international community needs to supplement this comprehensive

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<sup>30</sup> Jørgen Carling, Erlend Paasche, and Melissa Siegel, 'Finding Connections: The Nexus between Migration and Corruption', *Migration Policy Institute*, 12 May 2015, available at <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/finding-connections-nexus-between-migration-and-corruption>.

<sup>31</sup> Anrea Ariu, Frédéric Docquier and Mara P. Squicciarini, 'Governance quality and net migration flows', *Regional Science and Urban Economics*, vol. 60 (2016), pp. 238-248.

<sup>32</sup> Commitments on ending poverty (SDG 1) and hunger (SDG 2), improving health systems (SDG 3), ensuring quality education for all girls and boys (SDG 4), promoting decent jobs for all (SDG 8), reducing inequalities (SDG 5&10), strengthening resilience to climate-related hazards and natural disasters (SDG 13), and creating more peaceful, just and inclusive societies (SDG 16).

approach through sustained and coordinated efforts at the political level to prevent the emergence of armed conflict.

To reduce adverse drivers of irregular migration, three aspects of prevention are key: (i) early action to address the political differences that lead to or perpetuate violent conflict; (ii) ensure that no one is left behind, including in peace agreements, development programmes and humanitarian assistance so as to avoid further instability and violence; and (iii) ensure the sustainability of peace through strengthening democracy and rule of law, building stronger, more resilient, accountable state institutions with adequate checks and balances and working to establish effective democratic control over the armed forces.

While, in the short-term, and where other alternatives are insufficient, durable peace and enhanced development often leads to higher levels of emigration (the so-called “migration hump”<sup>33</sup>), as people are better able to access migration opportunities, there is also downward pressure towards unsafe, irregular and disorderly migration.

#### b. *Addressing drivers in countries of destination*

The factors driving migration towards particular countries include but are not limited to labour needs at all skill levels (real and perceived) in countries of destination, poorly regulated informal labour markets, positive migration policies and protection regimes for migrants, existing diaspora, or family links. Coordinating global, regional, national and local efforts to enhance regular migration channels coupled with sustainable development efforts aimed at providing alternatives and capabilities for communities to remain and by reducing the drivers that cause irregular migration, in the longer term could lead to better outcomes.

To manage these pull factors at the regional level, states must provide more effective governance of labour markets in the form of harmonized labour policies, strengthened human rights protection for all migrant workers without discrimination (especially women migrant workers), and coordinated implementation of International Health Regulations (IHR) and social security coverage (for example through the coordination of national social security administrations, including portability)<sup>34</sup>.

At the country level, inter-sectoral, inter-ministerial, and inter-governmental cooperation is critical. It is essential to enhance policy dialogue and coordination among key government ministries and relevant stakeholders, for instance by integrating migration in sectoral policies and strategies, and include migrants themselves and diaspora associations in such conversations. The UN system may be able to assist in this regard, through the mainstreaming of migration into its development assistance frameworks, as is being done already at the national level in several countries through the IOM/UNDP pilot project on mainstreaming migration in national development planning.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> H. De Haas. Turning the tide? Why development will not stop migration. *Development and Change* 38 Vol. 5, 2007, pp.819-841.

<sup>34</sup> The efforts made, especially in Asia, by countries that provide significant labour migration to strengthen governance of these migration flows, and of resulting remittances, through coordinated national policy development and bilateral and regional agreements, may be instructive.

<sup>35</sup> See Global Migration Group (GMG), ‘Summary Note: Integrating Migration and Displacement into United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks’, International Organization for Migration, Geneva (2016). Available from: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/summary-note-->

### *c. The need for better data*

To be effective, efforts to address the drivers of migration must be tailored to different populations and contexts. This will only be possible with better, more comprehensive, comparable and disaggregated data. This is a particular challenge in the developing world and in contexts of protracted crises.<sup>36</sup> Data collection efforts should account for the need for longitudinal data to adequately grasp longer-term processes and evolutions driving migratory patterns, such as climate change, demographic transitions, and structural transformation.

### **Commitments / Possible actions to address drivers of migration**

The following represent a non-exhaustive set of practical and action-oriented commitments, in line with the New York Declaration and the Sustainable Development Agenda, which could be made by States and other stakeholders within the global compact:

#### *Sustainable development and poverty eradication*

1. Invest in the elements of the Sustainable Development Goals that drive people to migrate and impede their ability to live and work safe and lead productive lives at home, including poverty alleviation, conflict prevention and reduction, creating inclusive societies with effective, accountable and inclusive institutions that provide access to justice for all, enjoyment of human rights protection, including access to social protection, quality education, health care and decent work, amongst others.
2. Strengthen efforts to promote the transition from informal to formal employment in line with ILO Recommendation 204.
3. Maximize the impact of remittances for development through the promotion of financial inclusion in order to spur investment and stimulate creation of decent jobs.
4. Promote the conclusion and application of bilateral and multilateral coordination frameworks and agreements aimed at ensuring organization of migration for employment and coordination and portability of social security rights and benefits.
5. Enhance opportunities for safe, orderly and regular migration for both high and lower skilled migrants, as well as for education and family unification purposes.
6. Adopt a comprehensive approach in the review of the migration-related aspects of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to ensure coherence. Introduce incentives to retain high skilled professionals, such as in the health and education sectors, to enable them to stay in their country of origin or return.<sup>37</sup>
7. Dedicate investments to addressing the drivers of migration in sectoral programmes and local development initiatives, including through programmes for youth job creation and skill development.
8. Encourage the establishment of national ministries of diaspora to strengthen engagement with diaspora organizations to invest in local economic opportunities and enterprises in countries of origin, including on disaster recovery and risk reduction as well as climate change adaptation.

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[integrating-migration-and-displacement-into-united.html](#)

<sup>36</sup> Few countries conduct nationally representative migration surveys, which capture the reasons and impacts of migration, the inter-linkages between the drivers, the characteristics of migrant households and the conditions in the areas of origin from which migrants are moving.

<sup>37</sup> The WHO Global Code of Practice on the International Recruitment of Health Personnel  
<http://www.who.int/hrh/migration/code/practice/en/>

9. Establish a national social protection floor, in line with SDG 1.3 and the Social Protection Floors Recommendation, 2012 (No. 202), to ensure at least access to essential health care and basic social protection for all.

#### *Conflict prevention*

10. Reduce adverse drivers of irregular migration, through conflict prevention by:
  - early action to address the political differences that lead to or perpetuate violent conflict;
  - ensure that no one is left behind, including in peace agreements, development programmes and humanitarian assistance so as to avoid further instability and violence;
  - ensure the sustainability of peace through strengthening democracy and the rule of law, through building stronger, more resilient, accountable state institution with adequate checks and balances promoting the rule of law, and by working to establish effective democratic control over the armed forces.

#### *Protection and Assistance in Crisis Situations*

11. Promote strategic, multi-donor approaches, including flexible funding instruments and multi-year funding cycles, to support responses to large movements of migrants.
12. Prioritize the provision of emergency assistance and human rights protection regardless of migration status, and commit to implement the results of a state-led process to develop non-binding principles and voluntary guidelines on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations, as called for in paragraph 52 of the New York Declaration, drawing upon the existing comprehensive guidance.<sup>38</sup>
13. Strengthen engagement in disaster risk reduction and management, including through the use of interlinked national disaster risk reduction and management strategies and national climate change adaptation plans, developed in close consultation with communities at risk, as envisioned in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Support schemes to facilitate migration as an adaptation strategy in the context of slow-onset environmental degradation to secure better livelihoods for individuals and communities whilst contributing to lifting pressures on overstretched ecosystems and filling labour shortages at all skill levels in destination areas.<sup>39</sup>

#### *Improve data collection and analysis towards effective and informed policies*

14. Systematically collect comprehensive sex- and age-disaggregated data, by strengthening all available data sources, including population censuses, labour force and household surveys and administrative sources.
15. Strengthen cooperation between and among States and other stakeholders on data collection to better predict, understand and address the drivers of migration by:

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<sup>38</sup> By drawing on the Global Migration Group's draft Principles and Guidelines on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations as well as other related initiatives such as the Migrants in Countries in Crisis and the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change resulting from the Nansen Initiative.

<sup>39</sup> Joint submission to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) On National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) Advisory Group 2014 ; Warner et al, Integrating human mobility issues within national adaptation plans UNU, Nansen Initiative ; IOM Migration as an Adaptation Strategy to Climate Change (2015) <https://weblog.iom.int/migration-adaptation-strategy-climate-change>

- Implementing the recommendations of the Center for Global Development's Commission on International Migration Data for Development Research;<sup>40</sup>
  - Targeting investments in institutional capacity-building for collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of migration data; and
  - Reviewing best practices and lessons in the use of big data at national and/or regional levels and identification of an action plan for big data usage.
16. Promote international repositories of analysis on migration drivers and enhance the use of evidence for policy formulation and programme design, including in monitoring and evaluation systems.

*As of 1 May 2017*

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<sup>40</sup> <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/migrants-count-five-steps-toward-better-migration-data>