Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression

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Excellency,

I have the honour to address you in my capacity as Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 34/18.

In this connection, I would like to bring to the attention of your Excellency’s Government information I have received concerning the 2018 Anti-Fake News Bill (“the Bill”), which contains provisions that seemingly do not comply with international human rights standards on freedom of expression, and may lead to censorship and the suppression of critical thinking and dissenting voices.

According to the information received:

The Anti-Fake News Bill (“the Bill”) was tabled for first reading at the Malaysian Parliament on 26 March 2018. It is expected to be voted in the coming days, leaving little time for deliberation or consultation, including with media actors, the public, and civil society organizations.

Before discussing the provisions of the legislation, I would like to first draw your Excellency’s Government attention to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which protects the right of everyone to maintain an opinion without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers and through any media.

The right to freedom of expression is also protected under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), acceded by Malaysia on 5 July 1995; and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by Malaysia on 19 July 2010. It is also protected as part of the fundamental rights contained in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), acceded by Malaysia on 5 July 1995. While Malaysia is not party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the content of article 19 of the ICCPR is based on the UDHR and should inform Malaysia’s obligations under the above-mentioned treaties.

Under article 19(3) of the ICCPR, restrictions on the right to freedom of expression must be “provided by law” and necessary for “the rights or reputations of others”, or “for the protection of national security of public order (ordre public) or of public health and morals”. To meet the “provided by law” requirement, it is not sufficient that restrictions on freedom of expression are formally enacted as
domestic laws or regulations. In addition, the Human Rights Committee has stated that restrictions must also be sufficiently clear, accessible and predictable (CCPR/C/GC/34). This is moreover in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which in article 29, provides that limitations shall be determined by law and “solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society”.

While restrictions on freedom of expression may be established to protect a legitimate objective under the provision, they must also be “necessary”. The requirement of necessity “also implies an assessment of proportionality” of those restrictions. A proportionality assessment ensures that restrictions “target a specific objective and do not unduly intrude upon other rights of targeted person”. Finally, I would like to emphasize that “laws imposing restrictions or limitations must not be arbitrary or unreasonable and must not be used as a means of political censorship or of silencing criticism of public officials or public policies” (see for example A/HRC/14/23).

In the joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda”, the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression together with regional freedom of expression experts stressed that “the human right to impart information and ideas is not limited to “correct” statements, and “protects information and ideas that may shock, offend and disturb”.

The full texts of the human rights instruments and standards outlined above are available at www.ohchr.org and can be provided upon request.

In light of the above standards of international human rights law, I would like to bring to the attention of your Excellency’s Government aspects of the bill that raise concerns in connection with the right to freedom of expression:

1. **Definition of “fake news”**

The Bill defines “fake news” as “any news, information, data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false, whether in the form of features, visuals or audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas” (article 2).

I am concerned that the general prohibition on dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous definitions, such as “fake news”, is incompatible with international standards for restrictions on freedom of expression. Allowing for public officials to determine what is true and what is false may confer excessively broad discretion to prosecute criticism of the government, political campaigning or the expression of unpopular, controversial or minority opinions.

The vagueness of the Bill’s provisions raises specific concerns that it fails to meet the standard of “provided by law” under human rights law. In turn, individuals will have limited guidance as to what expression will run afoul of the law, leading many to self-
censor and for significant amounts of expression to be chilled. The Bill would thus suppress a wide range of expression essential to a democratic society.

2. **Offenses and penalties**

An offender under the Bill is “anyone who knowingly creates, offers, publishes, prints, distributes, circulates or disseminates any fake news or publication containing fake news”. The bill provides a punishment of up to 500,000 Malaysian Ringgit (MYR) fine or up to six years imprisonment, or both, and in case of a continuing offence, to a further fine of up to 3,000 MYR for every day during which the offence continues after conviction. The Court may also order the convicted to make an apology to the person affected by the commission of the offence (article 4).

The Bill also provides that it is the “duty of any person having within his possession, custody or control of any publication containing fake news to immediately remove such publication after knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that such publication contains fake news”. Failure to remove such publication, entails liability for a fine of up to 100,000 MYR, and in the case of a continuing offence, up to 3,000 MYR for every day during which the offence continues after conviction (article 6).

A person affected by a “fake news” publication may apply ex parte to the court to remove a publication containing such news. Failure to comply with the court order is liable to a fine of up to 100,000 MYR (article 7).

Part IV of the Bill also provides that if a corporate body commits the offence, the director, chief executive officer, manager, secretary or similar officer or any person acting in such capacity may be charged severally or jointly in the same proceedings with the corporate body unless the officer can prove that the offence was committed without the officer’s knowledge or consent, and the officer had taken all reasonable precautions and due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence under the bill. The bill allows for criminal liability to attach to its directors and officers, but it can also attach to anyone “to any extent responsible for the management of any of the affairs of the corporate body or was assisting in such management”.

I am concerned at the heavy penalties imposed by the bill, including hefty fines and/or up to 10 years of imprisonment. This constitutes very harsh punishment and would be inconsistent with conditions of necessity and proportionality. Furthermore, I am concerned at the Bill’s imposition of liability on intermediaries such as social media platforms or search engines. I would encourage Your Excellency’s Government to reconsider the Bill and revise it in accordance with the standards identified in the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability.

3. **Extraterritorial application**

Part I of the bill provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction. The bill will apply if the “fake news concerns Malaysia or the person affected by the commission of the offence is
a Malaysian citizen”. Therefore neither the complainant nor the person affected by the commission of the offence needs to be present in Malaysia for the offence to have been committed.

I am concerned at the Bill’s extended personal scope, which would appear incompatible with international human rights standards on freedom of expression which protect the right to seek, receive and impart information “regardless of frontiers”.

4. **Drafting process of the bill**

Finally, I am concerned that reportedly, the drafting process of the bill has lacked transparency, and key stakeholders from civil society and the media were not consulted on the contents of the legislation. As observed by the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No. 25, citizens also take part in the conduct of public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their representatives. As such, and following the principle of participation, the contents of draft laws should be made accessible not only to those directly concerned, but to the general public. In addition, the public should also have the possibility of freely debating the draft law and having their say on their adoption.

In light of the above concerns, I urge your Excellency’s Government to reject the Bill and consider alternative measures to counter problems of disinformation and propaganda. Such alternative measures could include the promotion of independent fact-checking mechanisms, State support for independent, diverse and adequate public service media outlets, and public education and media literacy, which are all recognized as less intrusive means to address disinformation and propaganda. In particular, I would urge your Excellency’s Government to take into account the principles identified in the 2017 Joint Declaration described above and contained herein as an Annex.

As it is my responsibility under the mandate provided to me by the Human Rights Council to seek to clarify all cases brought to my attention, I would be grateful for any additional information or comment you may have on the above.

Finally, I would like to inform that this communication will be made available to the public and posted on the website page for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of expression: [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/LegislationAndPolicy.aspx](http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/FreedomOpinion/Pages/LegislationAndPolicy.aspx)

Your Excellency’s Government’s reply will be posted at the same page as well as in the report to the Human Rights Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

David Kaye
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression
Annex
Reference to international human rights law

JOINT DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND “FAKE NEWS”, DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA


Having discussed these issues together with the assistance of ARTICLE 19 and the Centre for Law and Democracy (CLD);


Taking note of the growing prevalence of disinformation (sometimes referred to as “false” or “fake news”) and propaganda in legacy and social media, fuelled by both States and non-State actors, and the various harms to which they may be a contributing factor or primary cause;

Expressing concern that disinformation and propaganda are often designed and implemented so as to mislead a population, as well as to interfere with the public’s right to know and the right of individuals to seek and receive, as well as to impart, information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, protected under international legal guarantees of the rights to freedom of expression and to hold opinions;

Emphasising that some forms of disinformation and propaganda may harm individual reputations and privacy, or incite to violence, discrimination or hostility against identifiable groups in society;

Alarmed at instances in which public authorities denigrate, intimidate and threaten the media, including by stating that the media is “the opposition” or is “lying” and has a hidden political agenda, which increases the risk of threats and violence against journalists, undermines public trust and confidence in journalism as a public watchdog, and may mislead the public by blurring the lines between disinformation and media products containing independently verifiable facts;
Stressing that the human right to impart information and ideas is not limited to “correct” statements, that the right also protects information and ideas that may shock, offend and disturb, and that prohibitions on disinformation may violate international human rights standards, while, at the same time, this does not justify the dissemination of knowingly or recklessly false statements by official or State actors;

Highlighting the importance of unencumbered access to a wide variety of both sources of information and ideas, and opportunities to disseminate them, and of a diverse media in a democratic society, including in terms of facilitating public debates and open confrontation of ideas in society, and acting as a watchdog of government and the powerful;

Reiterating that States are under a positive obligation to foster an enabling environment for freedom of expression, which includes promoting, protecting and supporting diverse media, something which has come under growing pressure due to the increasingly difficult economic environment for the traditional media;

Acknowledging the transformative role played by the Internet and other digital technologies in supporting individuals’ ability to access and disseminate information and ideas, which both enables responses to disinformation and propaganda, while also facilitating their circulation;

Reaffirming the responsibilities of intermediaries, which facilitate the enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression through digital technologies, to respect human rights;

Deploring attempts by some governments to suppress dissent and to control public communications through such measures as: repressive rules regarding the establishment and operation of media outlets and/or websites; interference in the operations of public and private media outlets, including by denying accreditation to their journalists and politically-motivated prosecutions of journalists; unduly restrictive laws on what content may not be disseminated; the arbitrary imposition of states of emergency; technical controls over digital technologies such as blocking, filtering, jamming and closing down digital spaces; and efforts to “privatise” control measures by pressuring intermediaries to take action to restrict content;

Welcoming and encouraging civil society and media efforts aimed at identifying and raising awareness about deliberately false news stories, disinformation and propaganda;

Concerned about some measures taken by intermediaries to limit access to or the dissemination of digital content, including through automated processes, such as algorithms or digital recognition-based content removal systems, which are not transparent in nature, which fail to respect minimum due process standards and/or which unduly restrict access to or the dissemination of content;
Adopted in Vienna, on 3 March 2017, the following Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and “Fake News”, Disinformation and Propaganda:

1. General Principles:

   a. States may only impose restrictions on the right to freedom of expression in accordance with the test for such restrictions under international law, namely that they be provided for by law, serve one of the legitimate interests recognised under international law, and be necessary and proportionate to protect that interest.

   b. Restrictions on freedom of expression may also be imposed, as long as they are consistent with the requirements noted in paragraph 1(a), to prohibit advocacy of hatred on protected grounds that constitutes incitement to violence, discrimination or hostility (in accordance with Article 20(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).

   c. The standards outlined in paragraphs 1(a) and (b) apply regardless of frontiers so as to limit restrictions not only within a jurisdiction but also those which affect media outlets and other communications systems operating from outside of the jurisdiction of a State as well as those reaching populations in States other than the State of origin.

   d. Intermediaries should never be liable for any third party content relating to those services unless they specifically intervene in that content or refuse to obey an order adopted in accordance with due process guarantees by an independent, impartial, authoritative oversight body (such as a court) to remove it and they have the technical capacity to do that.

   e. Consideration should be given to protecting individuals against liability for merely redistributing or promoting, through intermediaries, content of which they are not the author and which they have not modified.

   f. State mandated blocking of entire websites, IP addresses, ports or network protocols is an extreme measure which can only be justified where it is provided by law and is necessary to protect a human right or other legitimate public interest, including in the sense of that it is proportionate, there are no less intrusive alternative measures which would protect the interest and it respects minimum due process guarantees.

   g. Content filtering systems which are imposed by a government and which are not end-user controlled are not justifiable as a restriction on freedom of expression.

   h. The right to freedom of expression applies “regardless of frontiers” and jamming of signals from a broadcaster based in another jurisdiction, or the withdrawal of rebroadcasting rights in relation to that broadcaster’s programmes, is legitimate only where the content disseminated by that broadcaster has been held by a court of law or
another independent, authoritative and impartial oversight body to be in serious and persistent breach of a legitimate restriction on content (i.e. one that meets the conditions of paragraph 1(a)) and other means of addressing the problem, including by contacting the relevant authorities of the host State, have proven to be demonstrably ineffective.

2. **Standards on Disinformation and Propaganda:**

   a. General prohibitions on the dissemination of information based on vague and ambiguous ideas, including “false news” or “non-objective information”, are incompatible with international standards for restrictions on freedom of expression, as set out in paragraph 1(a), and should be abolished.

   b. Criminal defamation laws are unduly restrictive and should be abolished. Civil law rules on liability for false and defamatory statements are legitimate only if defendants are given a full opportunity and fail to prove the truth of those statements and also benefit from other defences, such as fair comment.

   c. State actors should not make, sponsor, encourage or further disseminate statements which they know or reasonably should know to be false (disinformation) or which demonstrate a reckless disregard for verifiable information (propaganda).

   d. State actors should, in accordance with their domestic and international legal obligations and their public duties, take care to ensure that they disseminate reliable and trustworthy information, including about matters of public interest, such as the economy, public health, security and the environment.

3. **Enabling Environment for Freedom of Expression:**

   a. States have a positive obligation to promote a free, independent and diverse communications environment, including media diversity, which is a key means of addressing disinformation and propaganda.

   b. States should establish a clear regulatory framework for broadcasters which is overseen by a body which is protected against political and commercial interference or pressure and which promotes a free, independent and diverse broadcasting sector.

   c. States should ensure the presence of strong, independent and adequately resourced public service media, which operate under a clear mandate to serve the overall public interest and to set and maintain high standards of journalism.

   d. States should put in place other measures to promote media diversity which may include, as warranted by the situation, some or all of the following:
i. Providing subsidies or other forms of financial or technical support for the production of diverse, quality media content;
ii. Rules prohibiting undue concentration of media ownership; and
iii. Rules requiring media outlets to be transparent about their ownership structures.

e. States should take measures to promote media and digital literacy, including by covering these topics as part of the regular school curriculum and by engaging with civil society and other stakeholders to raise awareness about these issues.

f. States should consider other measures to promote equality, non-discrimination, inter-cultural understanding and other democratic values, including with a view to addressing the negative effects of disinformation and propaganda.

4. Intermediaries

a. Where intermediaries intend to take action to restrict third party content (such as deletion or moderation) which goes beyond legal requirements, they should adopt clear, pre-determined policies governing those actions. Those policies should be based on objectively justifiable criteria rather than ideological or political goals and should, where possible, be adopted after consultation with their users.

b. Intermediaries should take effective measures to ensure that their users can both easily access and understand any policies and practices, including terms of service, they have in place for actions covered by paragraph 4(a), including detailed information about how they are enforced, where relevant by making available clear, concise and easy to understand summaries of or explanatory guides to those policies and practices.

c. In taking actions covered by paragraph 4(a), intermediaries should respect minimum due process guarantees including by notifying users promptly when content which they created, uploaded or host may be subject to a content action and giving the user an opportunity to contest that action, subject only to legal or reasonable practical constraints, by scrutinising claims under such policies carefully before taking action and by applying measures consistently.

d. The standards outlined in paragraph 4(b) should, subject only to legitimate competitive or operational needs, also be applied to any automated processes (whether algorithmic or otherwise) run by intermediaries for taking action either in relation to third party content or their own content.

e. Intermediaries should support the research and development of appropriate technological solutions to disinformation and propaganda which users may apply on a voluntary basis. They should cooperate with initiatives that offer fact-checking services to users and review their advertising models to ensure that they do not adversely impact diversity of opinions and ideas.
5. **Journalists and Media Outlets**

   a. The media and journalists should, as appropriate, support effective systems of self regulation whether at the level of specific media sectors (such as press complaints bodies) or at the level of individual media outlets (ombudsmen or public editors) which include standards on striving for accuracy in the news, including by offering a right of correction and/or reply to address inaccurate statements in the media.

   b. Media outlets should consider including critical coverage of disinformation and propaganda as part of their news services in line with their watchdog role in society, particularly during elections and regarding debates on matters of public interest.

6. **Stakeholders cooperation**

   a. All stakeholders – including intermediaries, media outlets, civil society and academia – should be supported in developing participatory and transparent initiatives for creating a better understanding of the impact of disinformation and propaganda on democracy, freedom of expression, journalism and civic space, as well as appropriate responses to these phenomena.