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# **“ANTISEMITISM AS PERCEIVED BY THE JEWISH POPULATION OF RUSSIA”**

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## **RESEARCH REPORT**

MOSCOW  
2018

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# **1. ASSESSMENT BY THE RESPONDENTS OF THE ACUTENESS OF ANTISEMITISM IN RUSSIA, ITS LEVEL AND MANIFESTATION DYNAMICS.**

This research uses a considerable part of the questions of the European survey conducted by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) among the Jewish population of eight countries of the European Union in 2012<sup>1</sup> in order to monitor antisemitism and personal experience of the respondents in dealing with such manifestations.<sup>2</sup> Using the same questions enables comparing the opinions and assessment of the Russian Jews with similar assessments of the Jewish population from other countries, i.e., assessing the current scale of antisemitism in Russia within an overall European context. Let us mention that the European survey methodology is different and was conducted online, unlike the Russian survey conducted as face-to-face interviews. This means that the respondents were taking the decision to complete the questionnaire on their own. Despite such methodological differences, we consider it possible to draw a comparison of the data we have obtained with the European data, as such data points to some general tendencies.

All data presented in this report is provided as a distribution of answers (percentage of answers to the total number of people surveyed equal to 517 persons, older than 16 years, unless indicated otherwise).

The starting point for this research is the understanding that in recent years, there has been no evident growth of antisemitism observed, based on the deliverables of previous wide-scale surveys conducted across Russia as commissioned by the RJC. Given a rather high level of xenophobia growing since mid-1990s towards representatives of various ethnic and national communities, and primarily, to migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asian republics, mainstream negativism towards the Jews has been rather mild. But such were the mainstream attitudes of the entire Russian population registered in sociological surveys. A nation-wide representative sample, however, did not allow reaching a definitive conclusion on how the very same issues were perceived by the Jews themselves, and how grave their concern about the threat of aggressive nationalism, racism and antisemitism in Russia was. It was due to the need to get answers to these questions that this sociological survey was conducted.

<sup>1</sup> Graham, David; Boyd, Jonathan. Understanding Antisemitic Hate Crime: Do the Experiences, Perceptions and Behaviours of Jews Vary By Gender, Age And Religiosity? // Institute for Jewish Policy Research, February 2017.

<sup>2</sup> Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, doi:10.2811/70380

## **SURVEY OBJECTIVES:**

1. determine the nature of the perception by the Russian Jews of the threat of antisemitism in Russia, based, among other things, on the data of similar earlier surveys conducted by the Center; compare the deliverables obtained with similar surveys conducted in Europe;
2. reveal the scope of the Jewish population’s experience with manifestations of:
  - antisemitism.
  - prejudicial attitude in the areas of employment, education, etc.
  - discrimination, harassment and violence based on ethnicity/religion.
  - obtain an assessment of how common such phenomena are in the respondents’ immediate surroundings.
3. analyze the impact of the beliefs regarding the incidence and intensity of antisemitism in Russia on the preservation of the Jewish culture and identity, and on the emigration attitudes of the Jews;
4. consider the threat of antisemitism, racist and anti-Islamist sentiment in the Russian society in the context of present-day interethnic and interconfessional relations.

The issue of antisemitism is felt to be less acute than other social issues, such as corruption, unemployment, racism and influx of migrants. It is considered to be ‘very acute’ by 16% of respondents in Russia, although more than a half of the respondents (55%) are, to a greater or lesser extent, as concerned about this issue as they are about the existence of racism in Russia.

Table 1

## How serious is the issue of .... in Russia

	Very serious	Rather serious	Not very serious	Not an issue	Not sure
Unemployment	28	46	20	5	2
Racism	22	33	31	12	3
Antisemitism	16	39	33	10	2
Migrants	20	39	29	9	3
Corruption	66	27	3	3	1
Intolerance towards Muslims	10	38	30	17	6

In the European countries, concern about antisemitism is clearly more pronounced (Table 2). Besides, as evident from the data on other countries<sup>3</sup> (primarily, for Hungary, Poland and France, where the experience of dealing with antisemitism and its assessments are especially high), this is related to a growth of nationalist sentiment, the strengthening of the rightist populists in politics, and the strengthening of totalitarianism, especially in Poland and Hungary. In these countries, antisemitism is part of the overall negative context of wide-scale xenophobic response of the population to the influx of Muslim refugees. In France, where the share of Arab population is already high, this is combined with the threat of Arab antisemitism growth.

Table 2

## How serious is the issue of antisemitism for your country?

	A very serious issue	A rather serious issue	Not a very serious issue	Not an issue
Average for 8 countries of the EU <sup>4</sup>	28	38	30	4
Russia	16	39	33	10

This is clearly indicated by a very high level of the European population’s concern about the growth of antisemitism in their countries in the last five years. In European countries, 76% report the growth of antisemitism (including 44% reporting considerable growth), while in Russia, this figure reaches 17% (5% reporting considerable growth). Most Jews in Russia believe that the level of antisemitism has not changed or has diminished in the recent years (Table 3).

<sup>3</sup> Discrimination and Hate Crime Against Jews in EU Member States: Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2014, doi:10.2811/70380

<sup>4</sup> FRA research was conducted in 7 countries of the European Union – France, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Hungary, Latvia and in the eighth country – the UK.

Table 3

**In the last five years, have antisemitic manifestations in your country increased, remained at the same level or decreased?**

	<b>Massive increase</b>	<b>Slight increase</b>	<b>Same level</b>	<b>Slight decrease</b>	<b>Massive decrease</b>
Average for 8 countries of the EU	44	32	18	3	2
Russia	5	12	43	23	10

As perceived by most respondents, in recent years, there has been no significant growth in antisemitism. Express, violent manifestations of antisemitism (instances of defilement of Jewish cemeteries, vandalization of cultural and religious sites, manifestations of violence against the Jews in the street and in any other public place, antisemitic graffiti) were reported by a rather low share of respondents totaling 5-9%. But a noticeable share of respondents reported an increase in antisemitic sentiments on the Internet and on social media (33%). It evidences an active online presence of obviously antisemitic groups and communities promoting ideological antisemitism and antizionism. These are minor marginal groups (compared to the official statements of the country’s leadership, the policy they pursue and the majority of the Russian society) – minor nationalist ‘parties’ and associations, mostly of Orthodox nationalists, which, however, have their own online platforms and regular printed media. They are to a certain extent held in check by the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church and censored by the state. At the same time, 21% of the respondents have registered a growth of antisemitism in printed media as well, with another 17% of respondents paying attention to the growth of antisemitism in political and cultural life, which indicates that antisemitic attitudes, negative stereotypes, myths, conspiratorial antizionist ideas have leaked from the less controlled Internet domain into other media and the public domain (table 4).

Table 4

## In your opinion, how has the frequency of the following changed in the last 5 years?

	Significantly increased	Slightly increased	Stayed at the same level	Slightly decreased	Significantly decreased	Don't know / Not sure
Antisemitic graffiti	1	4	38	17	23	16
Desecration of Jewish cemeteries and tombs	1	7	37	21	19	16
Vandalization of buildings housing Jewish cultural institutes, organizations, communities, etc	1	8	37	20	21	14
Showing aggression towards the Jews in the street and in other public places	2	7	35	21	24	11
Antisemitism in printed media	4	13	37	20	13	13
Antisemitism in political and cultural life	4	13	37	19	16	12
Antisemitism on the Internet and on social media	16	17	32	14	9	13

Growing antisemitic manifestations were most often mentioned by males, young men of 16-24 years, residents of Moscow and Saint Petersburg. For instance, while the growth in antisemitism on the Internet and on social media was reported by 33% of respondents in the sample on the whole, this indicator reached 40% among the young, 38% in Moscow and 44% in Saint Petersburg. Growth of antisemitic manifestations in printed media was reported by 17% of all respondents on the whole, but in certain groups, it was reported by 21% of men, 25% of Saint Petersburg residents, 20% of Moscow residents and 19% of the young. These are the groups, in which, as revealed by the survey, the value of own Jewish identity and the need to assert and protect this identity is pronounced the most. These groups are in fact the most technologically advanced, well-informed and socially active ones, being made up of the most frequent users of the Internet, printed media readers and media news followers, who are involved in a certain way in social and political life and therefore, more sensitive to negative manifestations of xenophobic sentiment and antisemitism.

Concern about such phenomena is also higher in the two capital cities, where the respondents' preoccupation with antisemitic sentiment is especially highly pronounced compared to other localities.<sup>5</sup>

Comparison of Russian and European data evidences significant variance in how intensely and acutely the issues are perceived. Europe has much higher rates of threats and frequency of antisemitic excess compared to Russia, although the hierarchy of 'sore spots' is similar. European Jews are much more sensitive about antisemitic manifestations on the Internet, in printed media, and also in public places, in political and cultural life.

Table 5

### In your opinion, how grave are the following issues for the country at the moment?

		A very grave issue	A rather grave issue	Not a very grave issue	Not an issue	Don't know/Not sure
Antisemitic graffiti	Russia	4	16	41	36	3
	Average for 8 EU countries	15	30	41	9	5
Vandalization of buildings housing Jewish cultural institutes, organizations, communities, etc	Russia	11	24	37	25	3
	Average for 8 EU countries	19	31	37	8	5
Showing aggression towards Jews in the street and in other public places	Russia	10	15	38	34	3
	Average for 8 EU countries	24	30	35	9	2
Antisemitism in printed media	Russia	10	25	36	25	4
	Average for 8 EU countries	27	32	30	10	2
Antisemitism in political and cultural life	Russia	9	24	36	27	4
	Average for 8 EU countries	17	27	39	14	3
Antisemitism on the Internet and on social media	Russia	22	29	25	18	6
	Average for 8 EU countries	46	29	13	3	9

<sup>5</sup> Let us reiterate again that in terms of their social/professional status, the surveyed Jewish population constitutes the most socially advanced and active, socially and culturally rich part of the society.

## 1.1. PERSONAL EXPERIENCE WITH ANTISEMITIC MANIFESTATIONS AND SUSCEPTIBILITY TO SUCH MANIFESTATIONS

Despite the reported decrease in antisemitic manifestations in the last five years, many of the participants of the Russian survey have still witnessed various antisemitic pronouncements in the last year (table 6). For instance, in the last 12 months, the accusations most frequently heard by the respondents included the Jews having too much power in Russia: such opinions were reported by 73% of the respondents (33% - frequently or all the time, 40% - sometimes, with only 26% of the respondents having heard no such words). Furthermore, the majority of the survey participants (53%) happened to hear the assertions that the Jews are the ones to blame for antisemitism, and approximately 50% of the surveyed happened to hear that “the Jews are exploiting the subject of the Holocaust for personal gain” and “the Holocaust is a myth and its scale is massively exaggerated”.

Table 6

### During the last 12 months, have you happened to meet in Russia non-Jewish people claiming that ...

	All the time	Frequently	Sometimes	Never	Don't know / Not sure
Not sure	1	4	38	17	23
Jews in Russia hold too much power (in economy, politics, media)	11	22	40	26	2
Jews are exploiting the subject of the Holocaust for their personal gain	7	16	27	47	2
The Holocaust is a myth or its scale is massively exaggerated	5	14	30	49	3
Israelis behave as the 'Nazi' towards the Palestinians	6	16	28	46	4
The world would have been a better place without Israel	2	4	19	71	4
Jews are unable to integrate into the Russian society	1	4	16	75	3
The interests of Jews in Russia are very much different from the interests of the other population	3	10	27	57	3
Jews are the ones to blame for antisemitism	5	15	33	43	4

An important factor for the assessment of the Russian Jews’ self-identification is the distribution of data on what opinions or stereotypes prevalent in the society are considered “antisemitic” by the Jews themselves (Table 7). Russian respondents primarily regard as such the opinions and stereotypes denying or belittling the Holocaust (70% and 72% of the respondents, respectively, have chosen answers “definitely yes” and “rather yes”). This confirms yet again the point that the memory of the 20th century Holocaust, despite poor coverage of this historical event in the Russian public domain, constitutes one of the main pillars of the Jewish identity.

Table 7

## Do you consider the following statements made by a non-Jew to be a manifestation of antisemitism?

(answers are ranked according to the first column)

	Certainly yes	Rather yes	Rather no	Certainly no	Don't know /
Not sure	1	4	38	17	23
The Holocaust is a myth or its scale is massively exaggerated	49	23	14	9	6
The world would have been a better place without Israel	48	21	13	13	5
Jews are exploiting the subject of the Holocaust for their personal gain	42	28	15	11	5
Jews are the ones to blame for antisemitism	42	25	15	11	6
Jews in Russia hold too much power (in economy, politics, media)	28	37	22	11	2
Israelis behave as the “Nazi” towards the Palestinians	28	29	21	14	8
Jews are unable to integrate into the Russian society	23	28	25	18	7
The interests of Jews in Russia are very much different from the interests of the other population	22	26	30	16	6

Besides the Holocaust-related pronouncements, most of the Russian Jews consider antisemitic the opinions that the “world would have been a better place without Israel” (this is the opinion of 69%, but they are consider such utterances to be hypothetical and alien to the Russian reality, as 71% of the respondents have never heard any such rhetoric). These are followed by the accusations of the Jews themselves of being the reason for the spread of antisemitism (67%), which emerges as the response of the others to their behaviors and lifestyle, and by the statement that Jews hold “too much power” and influence in the world (65%).

A smaller number of respondents are irked by the statements that "the interests of Jews in Russia are different from the interests of the other population" (48%) and that "Jews are unable to integrate into the Russian society" (51%). Apparently, this is related to the fact that the survey participants have dealt with such utterances fairly rarely, with 75% of respondents reporting having never heard anything resembling the first statement, and 57% of respondents reporting having never heard anything resembling the second statement.

To a certain extent, such opinions may evidence the assimilation of the Jews in the Russian society, the weakening of their former social isolation in the country's day-to-day life. The rules of community life (in a traditional meaning) are nowadays not typical for a large part of the surveyed, mostly living in big cities (this is seen from the data on observance of Jewish traditions and ordinances, see the next section).

The obtained data correlates with the data of the all-Russian survey conducted in 2015 that looked into the structure of public attitudes towards the Jews among the Russians, and naturally, registering the parameters of antisemitism proliferation. Even though the all-Russian survey reported a weakening of antisemitic stereotypes and clichés compared to an earlier period, one could still say they persist in the minds of the Russian public, especially in the stereotypes about the qualities of the Jewish people<sup>6</sup>. Specifically, the opinion that the Jews demonstrate a particular mercenariness is highly persistent (according to 67% polled in the all-Russian survey, "the Jews are always better off than the others", with another 57% agreeing that "for the Jews, the money is more important the human relations"). Another 40% said that the Jews tend to exaggerate their own hardships, sufferings and sacrifices, and 32% of the surveyed noted that the "Jews have too much space in Russian cultural life".

As shown by the deliverables of the 2015 survey, negative stereotyping is particularly typical, on the one hand, of "social periphery" representatives (the elderly, people with only a secondary education or poorly educated, low-income citizens), and, on the other hand, it is typical of the Moscow residents, who are the best educated, well-off and best adapted population categories compared to residents of other regions. Therefore, the survey conducted among the Russian Jews quite predictably indicates higher concern about antisemitic manifestations reported in no other place than in the capital cities of Moscow and Saint Petersburg, in the most active and well-educated, advanced environment. Here, professional success of the Jews elicits envy and antipathy among the less capable population categories, labeling their social competitors with traditional characteristics to compensate for their own inferiority and deficiency.

<sup>6</sup> See the Report on the "Antisemitism in Present-Day Russia" Research, Moscow, 2016. pages 56-57.

However, if we compare the Russian survey with the European data we have, it is strikingly obvious that the Russian Jews are much less unanimous in their perception of the above negative pronouncements and their qualification as antisemitic, compared to the European Jews (as shown in Table 8). On the average, the Russian Jews are not as categorical (compared to the European Jews) about recognizing the antisemitic nature of the pronouncements proposed for assessment in the questionnaire. Variance in the answers of the Russians and the Europeans may reach 20-30 percentage points. Perhaps, this could indicate a different sensitivity threshold, and different susceptibility of the Russian and European Jews to discrimination, but also this could indicate a real upswing in antisemitism in many European countries.

Table 8

## Do you consider the following statements made by non-Jews to be a manifestation of antisemitism?

(sum total of “certainly yes” and “rather yes” answers)

	EU	Russia	Variance
The Holocaust is a myth or its scale is massively exaggerated	94	72	22
Jews (in the country) hold too much power (in economy, politics, media)	91	65	26
Jews are exploiting the subject of the Holocaust for their personal gain	90	70	20
The Jews are unable to integrate into the society [of the country]	84	51	33
Israelis behave as the “Nazi” compared to Palestinians	81	57	24
The interests of the Jews [in the country] are very much different from the interests of the other population	79	48	31

## 1.2. ASSESSMENT OF ANTISEMITIC NATURE OF CERTAIN OPINIONS OR ACTIONS OF NON-JEWS

Besides the negative pronouncements about the Jews, the conducted research also analyzed to which extent some of the behaviors or actions of non-Jews were perceived as antisemitic by the Jews. Respective questions covered, in particular, the opinions on the Jewish people and the state of Israel and the attitude to them (table 9).

It emerged that in most cases, the opinions and actions mentioned in the questions were perceived as “antisemitic” by a quarter to third of the people surveyed (27–32%). In other words, there is no obvious “collective opinion”, attitude standard or consensus among the Russian Jews on this account. An exception is the pronounced prejudice against marriage to a Jew (statements that a certain acquaintance of the respondent (male or female) is not ready to marry a Jew). In this case, there is a complete consensus regarding the antisemitic nature of such attitudes (expressed by 65% of the respondents).

Table 9

## Would you consider a non-Jew to be an antisemite, if he/she?

	Certainly yes	Rather yes	Rather no	Certainly no	Don't know/ Not sure
Would not marry a Jew	27	28	26	16	4
Always comments on who among his/her acquaintances is a Jew	8	24	43	20	4
Believes that the Jews have some specific traits of character	8	20	45	24	3
Does not consider the Jews living in Russia to be Russians	7	20	44	26	4
Criticizes Israel	5	22	49	21	3

### 1.3. SOCIAL MEDIA OF ANTISEMITISM PROLIFERATION

On the whole, if we compare the data of the Russian and European surveys, it appears that the European Jews are much more often exposed to antisemitism on various public platforms and in different institutional media. The only areas where opinions converge are the manifestations of antisemitism on the Internet, and public speeches by politicians and debates in mass media. In the first instance, 70% of the Russian and 75% of the European Jews have happened to be exposed to a certain kind of antisemitic pronouncements, and in the second instance, the figures are 40% and 47%, respectively. However, almost three-fourths (73%) of the surveyed European Jews and only 33% of the surveyed Russian Jews point to a growth in antisemitism on the Internet over the last few years. Perhaps, this indicates higher assimilation or integration rate of the Russian Jews, the blurred lines between the lifestyles, upbringing and mentality of the Jews and non-Jews, a long history of hiding their Jewish identity, or perhaps, it could also indicate a weakened influence of negative antisemitic stereotypes and myths on self-identification. One of the examples confirming this argument could be slight (but only slight) progress in the Jews' positive attitude to inter-ethnic marriage (Table 10). Approval rate of such couples has been up from 65 to 69% in the last 12 years, in other words, such opinion on a marriage to a goy has long become a standard rather than an exception (the share of opponents remaining the same – 22 and 21%).

Table 10

## Would you agree to your children (future or potential) marrying a non-Jew?

	2006 XII	2018 IV-V
Certainly yes	29	40
Rather yes	36	29
I would rather be against it	14	14
I would certainly be against it	8	7
Hard to tell, not sure	14	10

Comparison of the data on the frequency of antisemitic manifestations registered by the Jews in Russia and in European countries demonstrates this very clearly. The respondents mostly came across antisemitic pronouncements on the Internet (reported by 70% of respondents in Russia), in day-to-day communication (e.g., among the colleagues, acquaintances) – this was reported by some 40% of the surveyed, and in political speeches and discussions, in talk shows, on the radio and in newspapers. 28% have witnessed such reactions of the people around them in public places, in the street or in public transport (Table 11). But the meaning of such antisemitic attacks or pronouncements is way different in Europe and in Russia. Xenophobic, racist and antisemitic opinions, mottos and public pronouncements play an important role, being a means of mass mobilization of supporters of the far-right populist parties. Such movements are gaining force, and respective ideas are being openly streamed into the public and political space in a more or less explicit form.

Table 11

## In the last 12 months, where have you personally heard, seen or read any such pronouncements? (multiple choice)

	Russia	EU
On the Internet (blogs, social media)	70	75
In day-to-day communications (for instance, among the friends, colleagues)	41	51
In political speeches or debates, talk shows on TV, on the radio and in newspapers	40	47
In a public place (e.g., in the street, public transport)	28	47
At an educational facility (higher education institution, university, school)	11	25
In political speeches or debates, public gatherings you attended	10	35
At political events (e.g., at a demonstration)	8	42
At cultural events (e.g., at an exhibition, at the theater, cinema)	5	24
At sporting events	2	-
Other	2	10
Don't remember, not sure	4	5
Total answers	221	361

In Russia, xenophobia, and especially, racist ideas rarely have an openly political nature, they are censored and sometimes become subject to criminal persecution. But what is called "domestic" xenophobia, which is often accompanied by latent racism, is a rather wide-spread phenomenon. Xenophobia of this kind is primarily directed at representatives of the Caucasian and Central Asian peoples, Muslims. In most cases, it represents elementary protective forms of a blurred tribalist rather than civil identity of the population that has no institutional means for securing its social position and therefore, is perceiving all "strangers" as a threat. As an additional factor helping maintain or elicit domestic xenophobia, we can point out periodic "anti-terrorist" propaganda campaigns and calls to be vigilant and careful when dealing with migrants.

It should be noted that the European surveys of the last years, including the FRA research, actually register a considerable growth of antisemitic manifestations in Europe. However, this is not only about more intense manifestations of antisemitism in the European context, but also about the fact that the Europeans are better informed and socially sensitive to minority discrimination issues, and understand better social threats to democracy associated with the growth in xenophobia. In these countries with established "open" political systems, the experience of totalitarianism in its various forms – fascism, nazism, aggressive nationalism – has been deeply pondered, and these countries have a deep-rooted understanding of the need to combat any such phenomena. Therefore, in these countries, the threshold of tolerance to manifestations of ethno-national exclusiveness and xenophobia is much lower, and the means of countering them are more formalized and institutionalized, thus being available to all who might suffer from such aggression or realize the hazard of such phenomena. As may be supposed, this also has to do with the European Jews' unambiguous and acute response to express manifestations of antisemitic views and stereotypes (here, we should doubtless take into account the knowledge about the history of persecution of the Jews and the Holocaust in Europe, widely spread in the mainstream educational system and in politics).

## **2. ANTISEMITISM PARAMETERS. FACTS, EXTENT AND INCIDENCE**

In this survey, we are analyzing the perception by the Jewish population of antisemitism in Russia dependent on key social and demographic characteristics, such as: gender; age; level of education; place of residence and consumer status. As the research sample is not very extensive (517 respondents), it is only possible to draw a full-scale and statistically reliable comparison between groups based on such parameters as age, type of settlement, gender (in this case, education is not a differentiating element, as the overwhelming majority of the surveyed hold a university degree or several degrees). When considering small statistical groups, we may only talk about a certain trend and very carefully.

We have also included in this part of the Report a comparison of the data yielded by our research with some of the results of the survey conducted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) in eight countries of the European Union in 2013.

### **2.1. DISCRIMINATION**

The issue with studying discrimination<sup>7</sup> lies in its ambiguity and multiple latent or hidden forms of manifestation, which are at variance with the principles of impermissibility of incitement of international hatred, humiliation, prejudice of civil rights of certain ethno-national or ethno-confessional minorities declared in Russian regulatory acts. In Russia, present-day antisemitism is successor to both, the Soviet government-supported antisemitism and the earlier forms of agrarian xenophobia and religious Judophobia inherent in conservative powers during modernization processes. Even though after the collapse of the Soviet Union, institutional antisemitism disappeared, and discrimination of the Jews during employment and when entering into higher education institutions, etc, weakened considerably, if it not disappeared completely (at least, in the main spheres of social life of present-day Russia), the so-called "domestic antisemitism" still persists. It can be also said that there exists the ideological antisemitism of various nationalist groups, including religious groups. According to the official government authorities and their mass media outlets, top leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church and the administration of the Moscow Patriarchate, such groups and factions are solely marginal and not wide-spread, however, specialists of civic organizations, such as the Sova Information and Analytics Center and of the Institute of Ethnology of the Russian Academy of Sciences maintain that there are plenty antisemitic publications and communities able to exert a certain influence on the audience.


<sup>7</sup> Discrimination is defined as a negative attitude, prejudice, violence, unfair attitude and depriving people of certain rights due to belonging to a certain social group // Wikipedia - [https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%94%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F#cite\\_note-1](https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%94%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F#cite_note-1)

The survey of the Russian Jews has demonstrated that discrimination instances are mentioned rather rarely<sup>8</sup>. 10-12% of the surveyed Jews have stated that their rights have been prejudiced. Such forms of discrimination as limitation of the rights and capabilities based on religion (12%), gender (10%) and age (10%) were mentioned much more often (Chart 1). Discrimination based on sexual orientation, disability (or rights of handicapped people) and ethnicity has been mentioned the least.

Chart 1

## In the last 12 months, have you felt discriminated based on ... ?

(N = 517)



<sup>8</sup> Perhaps, this is about how we should qualify instances of virtual aggression in mass media or on the Internet – as manifestations of outright discrimination, or as specific instances of routine verbal disorderly behavior, poor upbringing, or as a non-targeted habitual rudeness factory/suburb style. The assumption of a lowered threshold of susceptibility to discrimination stemming from not being aware of one’s own rights or from routine tolerance, being used to the surrounding violence, both on the state and domestic level, has some substance behind it.

Manifestations of religious, not ethnic discrimination hurt more, according to the polled Jews. In case of free manifestation of their religious identity and beliefs by the Jews, this is likely to provide a reason for the people around them to express their negative antisemitic attitudes, contribute to perception of the Jews as aliens and misfits as regards the social network and behavioral pattern habitual for most of the Russians. A certain part of the population typically demonstrates aggressive and suspicious attitude to ‘being different’, people of this kind are not ready to process and accept cultural variety in the country.

Similar questions regarding discrimination asked in the FRA European research (Table 12) evidence that about a third of the surveyed have been discriminated in a certain form in the last 12 months. On the average, 19% of the surveyed were discriminated based on ethnicity, 13% - based on religion and another 13% - based on gender. The least mentioned by the respondents was discrimination based on sexual orientation, disabilities or for other reasons. Such results are way different from the ones we obtained in this research. Firstly, discrimination instances in Russia are mentioned by the surveyed much rarer than in Europe (whatever the nature or reasons for such discrimination may be), and secondly, the Jews in Russia are less discriminated on the grounds of ethnic origin.

Table 12

## Percentage of mentioned instances of the Jews discrimination in the FRA research

(average figures have been given for the 8 countries where the Jews were surveyed)

Discrimination was based on ...	
Religion or beliefs	19
Ethnic origin	13
Age	13
Gender	9
Disabilities	3
Sexual orientation	3
Other reason	2

In Russia, the respondents are being most often discriminated when searching for a job (this was reported by 23% of the respondents, of which only 9% explained it by the employer’s antisemitism (Table 13). However, half of workplace discrimination instances have to do with antisemitism. The same happens at educational facilities – half discrimination instances are based on the antisemitism of the surrounding people or administration. A third of discrimination instances occurring when searching for housing are also explained by antisemitic prejudice. We can see that although discrimination instances are not numerous, however, up to a half of such instances are still linked by the respondents to antisemitism and intolerance to the Jews. This is confirmed by our previous observations made in antisemitism research – grassroots antisemitism is widespread in Russia not only in its latent form, and manifests in informal social interactions, although it is absent on the state level and institutionally.

Table 13 presents absolute figures of the surveyed, who have been exposed to discrimination in the above listed situations (search for a job, leasing an apartment, workplace discrimination, etc). The table provides a number of respondents (of 517 polled), who have faced discrimination when searching for a job, and the number of instances when such discrimination was antisemitic.

Table 13

**In the last 12 months, have you felt discriminated for any reasons ...**  
(absolute figures, N = 517)

When looking for a job?	33
Did you feel that this discrimination occurred due to the fact that you are a Jew?	3
On the job?	34
Did you feel that this discrimination occurred due to the fact that you are a Jew?	17
When searching for an apartment/house to rent or buy?	9
Did you feel that this discrimination occurred due to the fact that you are a Jew?	3
By the people working at paid or free medical institutions?	31
Did you feel that this discrimination occurred due to the fact that you are a Jew?	5
By employees of a school, university or courses?	29
Did you feel that this discrimination occurred due to the fact that you are a Jew?	15

Therefore, the parameters of outright discrimination of antisemitic nature are rather limited – such instances were reported by 0.5% to 3% of all respondents, but they certainly exist, which makes them much more impactful in the minds of the Jews who remember the many years of state-supported antisemitism of both the Soviet and pre-revolution times.

As our data is rather scant, we cannot draw a direct comparison with the data of the European survey. However, the European data indicates that the level of discrimination in similar situations is lower than in Russia. This is particularly visible in the situations where educational services are provided and on the job. Among the Jews living in European countries, discrimination in such above mentioned social interactions is much less pronounced than in similar situations in Russia. Most often, discrimination happens when a person is looking for a job or on the job, with 11% and 10% reporting such instances, respectively (Table 14).

Table 14

## Have you felt that some of the discrimination instances you mentioned occurred due to the fact that you are a Jew?

(% of those who have reported discrimination on such grounds)

	Average for 8 countries of the EU
When looking for a job	10
On the job	11
Looking for an apartment/house to rent or buy	4
By the people working at a medical institution	3
By employees of a school, university or courses?	8

We need to handle the data we have obtained with utmost care. The number of the respondents who have faced antisemitic discrimination in the last 12 years is very low in the overall sample. This prevents us from conducting a more detailed and mathematical analysis of the distributions we have obtained, and therefore, we present absolute figures and not percentages.

Table 15

## Absolute figures of the instances of discrimination related to Jewish origin

(N = 517)

	Absolute figures
Did you feel that discrimination when you were looking for a job was related to the fact that you are a Jew?	3
Did you feel that the workplace discrimination (by the people you work with) was related to the fact that you are a Jew?	17
Did you feel that discrimination when you were looking for a house/apartment to rent or buy (on the part of a real estate agent or apartment/house owner) was related to the fact that you are a Jew?	3
Did you feel that discrimination by the people employed at paid or free medical institutions (doctor, nurse, receptionist) was related to the fact that you are a Jew?	5
Did you feel that discrimination by the people working at a school, university or courses (this could have happened to you as a school pupil, student or a parent) was related to the fact that you are a Jew?	15

## 2.2. ANTISEMITIC ATTACKS EXPERIENCE

Antisemitism in Russia in the last 20-30 years may not be regarded separately from other types and forms of xenophobia (ethnic, social or politically motivated aggression and hostility to migrants, religious intolerance). This is a particular type of ethno-national prejudice and antipathy, although not isolated from other types of xenophobia. Today, antisemitism appears to be a part (and not the most pronounced part) of a broad range of xenophobic views and sentiments, having a varying degree of incidence, and – what is even more important – varying intensity of manifestation of antipathy or outright aggression, typical of the Russian people's mentality in the last 10-15 years.

According to the results of previous antisemitism research in Russia (the Levada Center, 2011, 2015, etc), it may be said that in the current conditions, antisemitism persists primarily in the functional role within the overall xenophobia paradigm, as a means of expression for any other types of xenophobia, and secondarily – as targeted outright aggression and expression of hatred towards the Jews. This conclusion is confirmed by the data on xenophobic attacks<sup>9</sup>.

In this survey, the respondents were asked about the instances of violent actions or threatening behavior towards them registered in the last 5 years and 12 months preceding the survey.

The first block of questions on the situations, in which the respondents experienced antisemitic outbursts and manifestations with a varying level of aggression, includes six questions aimed to report such incidents taking place in the last five years (Table 16). These questions describe the following situations:

- insulting or threatening letters or messages;
- calls meant to insult or threaten;
- harassment, threats;
- insulting and threatening comments made in the presence of the respondent;
- insulting gestures being made at the respondent;
- insulting comments towards the respondent on the Internet and on social media.

<sup>9</sup> Xenophobia by Numbers: Hate Crimes and Countering Hate Crime in Russia in 2017, January 2018, Edited by A. Verkhovskiy, <https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2018/01/d38732/>

Table 16

## In the last 5 years, have you faced someone ...

(N = 517)

	Once	Twice	3-5 times	6-10 times	More than 10 times	Constantly	Never
Make insulting or threatening comments in your address in your presence?	10	7	9	4	3	2	65
Make insulting gestures at you?	6	6	6	3	2	3	73
Post insulting comments about you on the Internet or on social media?	5	5	7	2	5	3	73
Send you insulting or threatening letters or messages?	6	4	4	1	4	1	80
Call you with insults or threats?	3	1	2	0	1	0	92
Track you down, wait for you, or stalk you?	3	0	1	0	0	0	94

We would like to stress that the table presented here covers all types of aggression, not only those with an underlying antisemitic motif.

The most wide-spread type of aggression faced by the respondents in the last 5 years is insulting and threatening comments made in their address; with second and third most frequent types of aggression being insulting gestures and publication of insulting comments on the Internet. Aggression varieties that are more “serious” as regards the life and health of the people are much more seldom, and most respondents have virtually never had any such experience (we are talking about harassment and stalking<sup>10</sup>).

Males face the above listed types of threats and attacks somewhat more often than women, by an average of 5-7%. Verbal abuse and threats are reported, more frequently than other categories, by young people aged 16-24 years, and such violence is of repetitive nature. At least 25% of the young have faced threats and insults one to five times in the last five years. Elderly people almost do not face any such types of psychological abuse, in particular, due to having a much more narrow communication circle and low level of social activity, very limited online presence, etc.


According to the respondents who have experienced any of the above listed violence types, almost a half of the respondents (44%) believe that these incidents were caused by antisemitism (Chart 2).

<sup>10</sup> Stalking means undesired persistent attention to a person on the part of another person or a group of people. Stalking is a form of harassment and intimidation; as a rule, is expressed as harassing/following the victim. Typical stalker behavior includes constant phone calls and insults on the phone, sending unwanted gifts, tracking down and spying on the victim...

Chart 2

## **Do you believe this happened due to you being a Jew?**

(N = 236)



When analyzing social and demographic structure of the respondents experiencing antisemitism, we can see that only 31% of the respondents aged 16-24 years link to antisemitism the violence they have experienced in the last 5 years. In middle age groups, 41% of attacks are linked to antisemitism, and in the elder group (55 y.o. and older), already 65% of the surveyed are positive about the antisemitic nature of the attacks, although in the last five years, no more than 15% of the respondents have faced the above listed types of aggression.

In other words, qualification of such incidents as manifestations of antisemitism increases with age.


Of 517 respondents surveyed, only 104 persons have experienced antisemitic insults, which is about each fifth of the surveyed. The most popular methods employed by antisemitism include threats and insults, which rarely evolve into any real actions – tracking down, harassment and physical attacks. Let us mention that such antisemitism manifestations are not systemic in nature and do not happen regularly.

As we noted before, antisemitic aggression is a means of expressing xenophobia on the whole, and not necessarily expressing targeted aggression towards the Jews; at least this is what the answers of the respondents themselves indicate (Chart 3). In 74% of such attacks, antisemitic wording was used, but it was only possible to identify the victim as a Jew in 1/3 of the instances, as reported by the surveyed. The percentage of using antisemitic insignia is conspicuously low. The occurrences are almost unrelated to the Jewish holidays or organizations.

Chart 3

## Was anything of listed below related to the incident?

(N = 104)




The respondents themselves consider insults and threats made in real-life situations to be the most serious. Most often, such incidents consist in using antisemitic expressions. It is not necessary that the person being the target of such comments should be identified as a Jew. The respondents are less cautious about antisemitic incidents that occurred online or did not involve any direct contact with the attacker, and do not consider such instances to be dangerous.

Publication of insulting antisemitic materials online is most concerning for people aged 25-29 years (almost 40% of the respondents), and women are concerned about it more than men (34% and 25%, respectively). Over a half (64%) of the young people aged 16-24 years are concerned about verbal aggression and threats made in their presence, while in other age groups, the level of concern about this type of aggression is 44%.

Chart 4

## **Which of these incidents that occurred in the last 5 years due to the fact that you are a Jew do you consider to be the most serious?**

(N = 103)



As in the instances of routine domestic aggressions with no underlying xenophobic motifs, most often antisemitic outrage is implemented by someone not known to the victim. As assessed by the respondents, such people often have nationalist views. Acquaintances and colleagues come second among the “aggressors” (Table 17).

Table 17

## Who was insulting you in this situation?

(N = 104)

	Total	GENDER	
		male	female
Someone I don't know	44	44	44
Someone having nationalist Orthodox views	28	30	26
An acquaintance or a friend	25	30	20
Someone I know	22	22	22
A colleague/fellow student	16	15	18
Someone having rightist political views	16	22	10
A teen or a group of teens	14	13	14
Someone having radical Islamist views	8	7	8
Someone having leftist political views	4	6	2
A customer at work	1	0	2
A policeman	0	0	0


The venue where it happened confirms this supposition. Most often, such verbal aggression takes place in the street or at a public place, and more seldom – at home or at a place with many other people (cafes, restaurants). Such a character of antisemitic instances evidences the presence of diffused antisemitism in the cities where the survey was conducted, but the one that is in a “dormant”, latent state (Chart 5). There are some slight differences in antisemitism experienced by males and females, but they are not important for the big picture of the existing level of violence towards the Jews.

It may be said that the intensity of antisemitic attitudes has weakened considerably. Relevance and importance of antisemitism have been ousted to the periphery of the public consciousness, and it is the people with pre-existent xenophobic or judophobic attitudes that are its proponents.

Chart 5

## Venues where the respondents have experienced antisemitic outrage and other incidents

(N = 85)




## 2.3. VANDALISM

Let us proceed to the more serious incidents based on nationalism and xenophobia. Vandalism includes causing damage to cemeteries, monuments, cultural sites and various property owned by the Jews or Jewish organizations. Russian Criminal Code qualifies such crimes under various Criminal Code articles and normally categorizes them as vandalism, but, as noted by the Sova Center, such articles are not always consistently applied to perpetrated crimes, and do not describe all possible types of such attempts to cause damage to property.

Chart 6

### Instances of vandalism

(N = 517)



\* sum total of answers “once”, “twice”, “3-5 times”, “6-10 times” and “over 10 times”.

Although the data of the Sova Center registers an absolute growth of vandalism instances, our research cannot confirm this observation. An overwhelming majority of the respondents have not faced vandalism in the last five years. Of the 10% who have had such experience, only 16% are positive that the incident occurred on the grounds of antisemitism (Chart 6). Within the scope of the surveyed people sample, this is a vanishingly small number of instances. These figures do not provide grounds for any reliable assessment of the threat of vandalism. Variance with the Sova assessments is related to the fact that we register antisemitic attacks, while the Sova Center registers all property damage attempts, including attacks on the property of “ideological opponents”. Such opponents include both, state institutions and the “fifth column” buildings, not only religious and or Jewish organizations.


In the last five years, physical violence has also been experienced by 10% of the respondents (46 people) (Chart 7). Within this number, 13 persons from the entire sampling (2.5%) have experienced physical violence, motivated or rationalized by antisemitic arguments and grounds.

Chart 7

## In the last five years, have you experienced physical attacks?

(N = 517)

### How many of these cases happened in the last five years due to the fact that you are a Jew?



\* sum total of answers “once”, “twice”, “3-5 times”, “6-10 times”, “more than 10 times”.

- Have you experienced a physical attack in the last five years?
- How many of these instances occurring in the last five years were related to the fact that you are a Jew?

Despite the low number of such incidents, it is conspicuous that in an overwhelming majority of instances, the victim could be identified as a Jew (male or female) (distinctive clothes, attributes and other features), and the attacker used antisemitic expressions and insults. But these attacks are not organized, as in most instances, there is only one aggressor and he/she does not know the victim, which confirms the previous observation that the attack was “spontaneous”, happened at a public venue, the attacker was acting on his own and did not know the victim, the attack was not organized in most instances and consisted in antisemitic insults and yells.

Importantly, the victims are not seeking to make such instances public or contact law enforcement authorities. As an explanation for such behavior, the respondents give the following reasons: “managed it on my own” and “it is inconvenient/too much hassle”.

Awareness percentage of law enforcement authorities or other organizations in Europe is somewhat higher than in Russia – on the average, 24% of the victims reported antisemitic incidents. Motivation of the respondents is also different. For instance, the people polled in the European survey stated the following factors among the reasons for not contacting the authorities - “this incident is not serious enough” and “it wouldn’t have changed anything”. Only 18% of the victims said that filing an application with the police or another organization is too complicated (Table 18).

Russian law enforcement authorities need to facilitate the procedure of receiving applications from the citizens, otherwise, a large number of violations related to incitement of hate to other persons/groups “on nationality grounds” will stay beyond their control, which, of course, is not helpful for combating such crimes.

Table 18


## Why did not you report the incident to the police?

	Average for 8 countries of the EU
This is not serious enough	27
This is inconvenient /too much hassle	18
Nothing would have happened/this would not have changed the situation	27
I don't trust the police	10
I reported this to other organizations	7
I handled this on my own	23
I am scared there might be a revenge	5
Other reasons	14

Chart 8

## In the last 12 months, have you witnesses any of the following antisemitic incidents?

(Russia, N = 517)




Insults or attacks witnessed by relatives or acquaintances of the respondents in the last 12 months are only reported by 13% of the respondents or 67 persons (Chart 8). Of this number, 64% of the instances are antisemitic insults, and only a third of the instances are physical attacks. Recalculated on the basis of the entire sampling, this is 8% and 2%, respectively.

Chart 9

## **In the last 12 months, have you witnesses any of the following antisemitic incidents?**

(Russia, N = 517)



Compared to the FRA data, the Russian Jews face antisemitic manifestation more seldom (both personal, and targeted at their relatives). Thus, the level of antisemitic manifestations reported by the Jews in the European survey was 27% (average figure for the countries where the survey was conducted). But only a fourth of all surveyed (average for the countries where the survey was conducted) reported such antisemitic incidents faced by their relatives.

## 2.4. CONCERNS AND APPREHENSION ABOUT ANTISEMITIC ATTACKS AND ASSAULTS


The Jews have always been distinguished as a standalone community by the surrounding people from other ethnic communities, and by the Jews themselves. Not all types of such distinction (and self-isolation) were related to a negative stigmatization or threats to the Jews’ safety, but in any case, their separate status compared to the surrounding people could not but affect the Jews’ concerns about their future safety and heightened expectations of aggression from the others. The entire historical experience of the Jews’ discrimination and prosecution only served to validate such concerns.

Among the polled Russian Jews, the fear of becoming a target of aggressive antisemitism is currently rather weak, with only 9% reporting having such fears (Chart 10). And concern about the lives of their relatives and loved ones is at a different level already. Almost a third of the surveyed (27%) fear that their relatives and loved ones may become a target of a physical attack, 41% fear that their relatives may become a target of verbal attacks and insults. Such a projection of heightened anxiety onto the relatives and loved ones indicates a higher level of background and irrational anxiety and fears that are harder to articulate and may not be explained by any specific reasons or facts of antipathy or enmity to their own selves. Overall diffused anxiety is projected onto others and is objectified as concern about the loved ones (which on the whole is typical for the people, but in this case, it is important to remember that we are talking about antisemitic threats).

Chart 10

### To what extent have you feared, in the last 12 months, becoming a target of ..., when you are in the street or at another public place?

(sum total of “fear a lot” “fear” and “do not fear too much” + “do not fear” answers, N = 517)




Such concerns are much higher than the number of real assaults and antisemitic attacks registered in Russia, or than the number of the respondents informed of such instances of aggression. This is an important indicator of the level of anxiety in the Jewish environment, poor level of the Jews protection from antisemitism manifestations. Furthermore, chronic fear of antisemitic attacks has become an important component of the Jewish identity. In case of a high level of antisemitism, the fear of becoming a target for an attack grows, which prompts a declared rejection of the Jewish identity and assimilation with the title ethnicity, or, on the contrary, enhances the togetherness, reinforces the intragroup identity of the Jewish communities, readiness for solidarity and mutual willingness to help. One's high levels of anxiety caused by negative attitude of the people around him to his own self, group, community may cause reactive identity, where the minority being discriminated against uses hypertrophied forms of asserting themselves in the world, e.g., fundamentalism.

Chart 11

**How much have you been concerned in the last 12 months that your family member or another of your loved ones will become ... due to being a Jew, when he/she is out in the street or at another public place?**

(a sum total of answers "very much concerned" + "concerned" and "not very much concerned" + "not concerned, N = 517)



Subsequent analysis of the answers provided by the respondents evidences that such concerns have no bearing on wearing or demonstrating in public items that could prompt the people around such person to recognize him as a Jew (slightly more than a half of the people polled (52%) wear such items of clothing always or sometimes). Such concerns only constitute a valid argument for refusal from demonstration of religious or ethnic markers for 14% of the people surveyed. Such concerns are most pronounced among the young people from small and middle-size towns.

In the European countries, the level of anxiety, fear of antisemitic outrage and attacks turned out to be higher than in Russia. According to the FRA report, an average of 46% are afraid of verbal insults, and 33% are afraid of physical attacks (Table 19), while in Russia, such occurrences are only feared by 9% of the surveyed.

Table 19

**In the last 12 months, how much have you feared becoming a target of the following incidents due to being a Jew, in the street or at a different public place?**

(% of respondents)

	<b>Russia</b>	<b>EU average</b>
Verbal insults*	9	46
Physical attack*	9	33

\* Sum total of answers “fearing” and “fearing very much”


A high level of antisemitic attacks in Europe causes high levels of anxiety among the Jews living in Europe. On the average, half of the people surveyed there fear that their relatives could become victims of verbal abuse, and around 40% fear that they could become victims of a physical attack.

## 2.5. FIGHT AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

A key aspect for understanding discrimination existing in the Russian society is the application of the effective laws, awareness and behavior of citizens related to informing law enforcement authorities. Most of the surveyed (69%) report not being aware of any organization involved in helping people who have been discriminated based on any grounds (Chart 12).

Chart 12

**Do you know any competent specialist or an organization offering help or advice to people who have been discriminated based on any grounds?**  
(N = 517)




There is a wide circle of organizations dealing with such issues. Most often, the respondents mention law-enforcement organizations, Jewish structures and communities, the human rights council and the ombudsman institute. Least mentioned are the government legislative and executive authorities – local and federal legislative assemblies, police and the public chambers. This indicates that the government has revealed its total incompetence in protecting the citizens from all kinds and types of discrimination it was meant to provide under the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Distrust of the police in the matters of informing the police of hate crime indicates that the citizens are totally skeptical about the ability of the police to resolve such matters, and that the beliefs on the established law enforcement practice are rather negative on the whole.

Chart 13

## Who would you name as a competent specialist or organization offering help or advice to the people discriminated based on any grounds?

(N = 517)



The surveyed have very little awareness of the effective laws. The Russian Federation has no dedicated legal framework regulating antisemitic manifestations, apart from Article 29 of the Russian Constitution and Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code; in all other instances, the motif or national, racial and inter-ethnic strife is an aggravating circumstance. Despite such scant legal framework, a third of the surveyed believe that the laws prohibiting antisemitism and diminishing the Holocaust do exist in Russia (with another third answering "Not sure") (Chart 13).


Chart 14

## Does Russia have in place a law prohibiting the denial or diminishment of the Holocaust?

(N = 517)

## Does Russia have in place a law prohibiting the incitement of violence or hatred against the Jews?

(N = 517)



Comparative questions on the legislation in the area of protecting the citizens from ethnic discrimination, including protection from antisemitism, and the law prohibiting the diminishment of the Holocaust reflect the overall awareness about the legislation of a country where the respondents live. The EU binds all of its members states to take legislative action to fight antisemitism, including having in place national laws, protecting their citizens against antisemitism. Therefore, over a half of those surveyed in the EU reported having such legislation in place in their countries (Table 20 and Table I2I1I). Russia, as we have already noted, has no specialized legislation containing antisemitism.

Table 20

## Does [the country] have in place a law prohibiting denial or diminishment of the Holocaust?

(% of respondents)

	Russia	EU average
Yes, it does	9	54
No, it doesn't	48	31
Don't know	44	15

Table 21

## Does the [country] have in place a law prohibiting the incitement of violence or hatred towards the Jews?

(% of respondents)

	Russia	EU average
Yes, it does	26	74
No, it doesn't	40	14
Don't know + perhaps, it does	34	12

Our sample was designed so as to ensure that it includes the respondents selected using two different means: 1) “from the list” of the Jews provided by the Russian Jewish Congress and cooperating Jewish organizations and communities, and 2) using the “snowball” technique, with contacts of the respondents provided by the “people from the list”.

Irrespective of the selection method, all respondents identify themselves as Jews, whether on the basis of the origin or religion.

We have conducted an analysis of the respondents’ answers distribution in these two groups in relation to the attacks and discrimination they have experienced. On the whole, the answers of the respondents from the two groups do not conflict with the patterns described above. Among the differences we have captured, we consider it necessary to point out that the respondent “from the list” have much more often experienced or witnessed insults or attacks on the grounds of antisemitism, and tend more often to believe that the attack/assault experienced constituted a manifestation of antisemitism. They or their loved ones have more often experienced antisemitic manifestations in public places and have been discriminated for their religious beliefs, and they wear, twice more often than the respondents selected using the “snowball” technique, symbolic items and marks from which the others can guess that they are Jews. It is important to mention that these two groups of respondents are experiencing two different kinds of antisemitism. The respondents from the list experience more often verbal threats and attacks on the Internet, i.e., targeted antisemitism, while the respondents sourced using the “snowball” technique are more exposed to domestic antisemitism, not targeting them as the Jews.

The level of fear of becoming a victim of discrimination or attack of the respondents selected as per the list is not higher than that of the respondents selected using the “snow ball” technique. The experience with the manifestations of antisemitism does not affect the practices of wearing items or clothes indicating that the person wearing them is a Jew.

We believe that such differences are related to the fact that the respondents selected from the list are more involved in the operation of the Jewish communities and organizations and can be more religious, which is why they experience antisemitism more often and respond more acutely to manifestations of antisemitism than the people not directly related to the community or non-religious people.

## **2.6. INCIDENCE OF VIOLENCE IN RUSSIA COMPARED TO THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES**

For this research, we have analyzed the reports of the Sova information and analytics center<sup>11</sup>, the Kantor Center report<sup>12</sup>, and the FRA report mentioned above. The differences in the legal framework, the form of registering crime on the grounds of ethnic origin, the timing difference of conducting surveys in different countries make it complicated to compare the situation in Russia and the EU countries. However, we can describe the current trends in Europe and in Russia.

The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights reports a lowering in the number of antisemitic crime in Europe. However, the number of such crimes in the European Union varies greatly from country to country (Table 22). According to the report authors, the number of antisemitic crime strongly depends on the existent law enforcement practice and on the legislation aimed to prevent hate crime, and on how the government is actually informed of such incidents. Let us remind you that 85% of the respondents taking part in this survey never reported the incidents they experienced to law enforcement or any other organizations. This prevents the collection of proper statistics on such crime.

The largest number of crimes is registered in Germany – 1,275 cases, followed by France with 450 cases registered. The UK comes third as regards the number of registered antisemitic crime – 318 instances in 2013. It is not clear from the report what the incidents involved, what number of such cases was vandalism, physical attacks, threats, harassment or verbal calls to action and incitement of hate. Based on the analysis presented, we assume that most often, such crimes involve verbal insults, threats and publication of antisemitic materials in mass media and on the Internet.

<sup>11</sup> Xenophobia by Numbers: Hate Crime and Combating Hate Crime in Russia in 2017, January 2018, Edited by A. Verkhovskiy, <https://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2018/01/d38732/>

<sup>12</sup> Antisemitism in the World in 2017 (main points of the annual report of the Kantor Center), <http://www.moshekantor.com/docs/127/>

Table 22

## Antisemitic hate crime in the OSCE region in 2013<sup>13</sup>

EU member state	Number of registered antisemitic hate crime instances	National contact center for dealing with hate crime
Austria	37	Federal Ministry for European Affairs, Federal Chancellery of Austria
Czech Republic	1	Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Agency for State Protection and Combating Terrorism
France	450	Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Policy Department
Germany	1275	Ministry of Justice
Ireland	2	Federal Ministry of Internal Affairs
Poland	25	Garda, intercultural and variety
Spain	3	Ministry of Internal Affairs, Department of Control, Complaints and Petitions
Sweden	79	The Spanish Observatory for Racism and Xenophobia
UK	318	National Council for Prevention of Crime

According to the Sova Center, on average, about 5 physical attacks have been performed in Russia in the last five years<sup>14</sup>. Violent antisemitism levels are very low in the entire post-Soviet area. In Russia, antisemitism is reduced to its oral form, but not acts of violence or vandalism. Of the 48 vandalism instances reported in 2017 by the Sova Center, only 5 cases involved vandalization of Jewish organizations, and it is conceptual, not religious strangers who are the main target. The Kantor Center reports only 2 vandalism cases in Russia in 2017, and does not present any data on physical attacks of the Jews (Table 23).

<sup>13</sup> Antisemitism. Overview of data available in the European Union 2004–2015, European union agency for fundamental rights, October 2015

<sup>14</sup> Vedomosti, Antisemites Turned Nationalists, <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2017/04/23/686981-antisemiti-perekvalifitsirovalis>

Table 23

## Comparison table of antisemitic crime committed in Russia in 2017

	The Sova Center data, 2017	The Kantor Center data, 2017
Physical attacks	5	N/A
Vandalism and property damage	5	2
Insults and threats at public places	N/A*	N/A
Insults and threats on the Internet	N/A	N/A

\* N/A – not available

Antisemitism in Russia rarely manifests as physical attacks, vandalism and harassment. It is concentrated in the media and public domain and manifests in the verbal form as insults, publication of antisemitic multimedia materials and posting antisemitic content on social media. The Report on Antisemitism in Russia in 1H 2018 prepared by the European Congress jointly with the Sova Center describes in detail the law enforcement practice regarding antisemitic hate crime in the last half year. The authors of the report are aware of several sentences passed for antisemitic propaganda during the above-mentioned period; they were all about the comments made on the Internet. In half the instances, the offenders were given actual prison terms.

Three persons were convicted for publication of antisemitic materials under Part 1 Article 282 of the Russian Criminal Code (incitement of national hatred). Another three persons were punished for propaganda of antisemitism along with other types of hatred.

Although state-supported antisemitism in Russia has shrunk to zero after the collapse of the Soviet Union, nowadays, we are cautiously watching as it is making a comeback in Russia’s political life, and the same is reported by our respondents. Even if we acknowledge that antisemitism is currently rather holding marginal positions<sup>15</sup>, the fact that it still persists in the political domain should still be viewed as concerning, and in the long term, further propagation of antisemitism to the Internet and social media could bring about an increase in the levels of antisemitism and its aggressive manifestation forms.

<sup>15</sup> Antisemitism in the World in 2017 (main points of the annual report of the Kantor Center), <http://www.moshekantor.com/docs/127/>

Even though the survey participants were divided in their assessment of how efficient the fight of the Russian government against antisemitism is, the majority (47%) still consider this fight to be unproductive. In this matter, once again we are seeing the previously mentioned groups of the youngest respondents and big city citizens stand out: as shown in Table 24, the share of those considering the Russian government to be efficient in combating antisemitism reaches 60% among the young and almost 70% among the Saint-Petersburg Jews.

Table 24

### **Do you believe that the Russian government is efficiently combating antisemitism?**

I do ("certainly yes" + "rather yes")	40
I don't ("rather no" + "certainly no")	47
Not sure	13

## **2.7. ANTISEMITISM AND EMIGRATION ATTITUDES**

Most of the people surveyed clearly identify themselves with Russia (as the country of birth and permanent residence). 98% are citizens of Russia, and another 7-8% have a second citizenship (Israel), and 1% have second citizenship of other countries. 87% were born in Russia (which is higher than respective share of Russian natives among their parents: 64-68%), 12% were born in republics of the former Soviet Union (their parents having a respective figure of 29-33%).

On the average, the surveyed have rated rather high the level of their attachment to Russia: 3.74 of the five possible points. According to their own reports, 61% are "very much attached" to Russia (23% feel a not so meaningful and strong connection to Russia, and 15% feeling no dependence or inner connection to Russia on the whole). The respondents gave a very similar assessment to their connection to the place of their permanent residence (3.76 points of the five possible). No special factors (education, income, city) may be pointed out here affecting the connection to one's country or "lesser motherland", place of residence, except for age: the older the respondents, the more intense their emotions about this inner connection – average points for the young Jews equaled 3.1 – 3.2, and 4.2 -4.3 points for older Jews.

According to the main bulk of the respondents (53%), most of the Russian Jews are staying in Russia, although the prospects of maintaining their Jewish identity seem complicated for such respondents: 32% of them believe that they will be able to maintain their Jewish identity, while 21% believe that they will assimilate and lose their culture and Jewish identity.

Unlike this majority, another 30% believe that most Russian Jews will leave Russia (among them 14% believe that the Jews will leave for Israel, 16% believe that they will emigrate to the USA or Europe, to such countries, as Germany, for instance). 17% found it hard to give any definite answer; they are not sure what will happen to the Jews in Russia in the future. In other words, there is no clearly prevailing opinion or complete certainty about the future of the Jews in Russia.

The surveyed divided into two comparable parts (Table 25) on the question of whether they considered emigration: some of them (56%, including 5% of those who have left and returned to Russia) do not plan for any radical changes to their lives and are not considering emigration (at least, antisemitism will not be the main reason of their departure, if it happens at all). Others (a sizeable group of 42%) are considering emigration, with two thirds of them (and specifically, 28%) explaining such contemplations by being concerned about a possible rise in antisemitism.

Table 25

### **In the last five years, have you considered emigrating from Russia due to not feeling secure being a Jew?**

I'm considering emigration, but have not left yet	28
I was considering emigration for a different reason	14
I wasn't considering emigration	51
I have emigrated but returned to Russia	5
I'd rather not answer, decline to answer	2

Let us stress that compared to the data of all-Russian surveys on emigration sentiments, among the Russian Jews surveyed, the share of people for whom the matter of emigration is fairly relevant is much higher. On the average, in Russia, a desire to leave the country was voiced at different periods in time by 10 to 20% of the Russians (irrespective of nationality). These were mostly young citizens. However, we should not compare the described category of the surveyed Jews considering emigration to the entire population of Russia, but rather to a group having identical social and demographic parameters (education, income, social status, type of residence, etc). If we take this consideration into account, the differences in this case between the Jews and other categories of potential emigrants totally disappear: such emigration attitudes are typical of the entire Russian "middle class" – better educated, qualified, successful and well-to-do young and middle-aged residents of major cities.

In this respect, the parameters and types of motivation for leaving (emigration potential) are typical of the entire social, cultural and moral environment of the advanced Russian population groups, not only the Jews.

A fair share of those considering emigration (which is roughly a third of the surveyed) have already taken certain steps to get ready for leaving. And this is the difference of the Jews from other groups of the Russian population who have expressed their desire to leave Russia for good. Unlike the sentiments of the Russian public, rather characterized in this respect by their Manilov-style dreaminess and uncertainty (as in this case, only 1-2% of all those who have declared their willingness to leave for permanent residence in another country, are actually preparing for leaving – sorting out documents, collecting information about the future work place and place of residence, etc), emigration conversations among the Jews, if they do start, are of a rather realistic and practical nature. While with the Russian youth on the whole, the desire to move to another country (to work, study and live) is more of a dream of a “different life” - more comfortable, easy and well-off (with low chances of realization), we feel that for the Jewish youth, it is mostly about seeking a fuller realization of their ethno-national identity. In Russia on the whole, conversations about moving are more of an indicator or expression of being unhappy with life and lack of prospects in life, without actual willingness to take action. Such a conclusion is also confirmed by other data obtained in this survey: young Jews are more concerned about their Jewish identity, have more interest to religious culture and Jewish traditions.

Residents of the capital cities (Moscow and Saint Petersburg) have been revealed to have a higher-than-average desire to emigrate, with small towns having a minimal rate. This desire to move weakens with age, reaching its minimum in older age. The youngest (16-24 years) respondents have the strongest desire to emigrate from Russia (53%), 13% among senior citizens. The question about preparing for emigration was also mostly positively answered by the youngest respondents (54%) (with an average indicator in most groups equal to roughly a third). The only exception is the elderly and impoverished Jews, for whom these figures are visibly lower. As a matter of principle, in Russia, the young display a stronger desire to emigrate as well, but such desire rarely translates into real action.

Table 26

**In the last five years, have you been actively preparing for emigration (e.g., looking for an apartment/house, a job, getting ready to move to another country)?**

(% of those considering emigration, N=216)

Yes, I have	33
No, I haven't	67
I'd rather not answer	0

It is understood that, starting from the post-Soviet times, repatriation to Israel has become fully available to the Jewish population. In the Soviet and post-Soviet times, emigration waves (especially from the capitals) were largely motivated by the shared desire to leave, especially given the perceived growth of antisemitic manifestations in social and political life in late 1980s-early 1990s. Today, it appears, identification with Israel as a second motherland plays a somewhat greater role in motivating the departure. 61% of the respondents answered that the support of Israel is important for their identity; these surveyed are distinguished by being well aware of the life in Israel, also related to their personal experience of visiting this country. Most of the respondents have relatives in Israel, with only 23% of the surveyed having no relatives there. It is easy to guess that an even greater share of the surveyed have a lot of friends and acquaintances in Israel.

Table 27

**Have you ever been to Israel?**

I have never been to Israel	29
I've visited Israel briefly/for vacations	62
I spent over a year in Israel	9
I was born in Israel	0

Table 28

**Do you have family or relatives living in Israel?**

Yes, almost all my relatives	8
Yes, many of them	20
Yes, some of them	46
No	23
Not sure	3

And yet, only slightly more than half of the people considering emigration would like to emigrate to Israel, with roughly the same share wanting to move to the US, Canada or European countries.

Table 29

## Which country would you like to emigrate to, or have you emigrated to and returned?

(as a % of those considering emigration, N=240)

Israel	54
USA	12
Canada	8
Australia/New Zealand	5
UK	3
Another EU state	14
Another country	4

Such a situation is largely due to the ratio between the so-called “expulsive” and “attracting” factors of emigration. As clear from Table 29, the most important reasons for emigration, same as 12 years ago, include wanting a better future for the children and seeking a happy and civilized life. Respondents also believe that their desire to reunite with relatives and family, on the one hand, but also “disbelief that the social and political conditions of life in Russia will ever improve”, on the other hand, are “very important” reasons. A “desire to live a fully Jewish life” remains stable compared to mid-2000s.

Let us also stress that “antisemitism and hostility of the surrounding people” as the most important reasons for leaving have largely lost its acuteness and meaning, although it would be wrong to say that they have fully lost their relevance: the share of such answers given by the surveyed Jews has shrunk from 45% in 2006 to 29% in 2018 (on the contrary, the number of those stating that this circumstance is not a key or decisive motif for the decision to emigrate has risen from 16% to 29%)<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> The 2006 research was conducted by the Levada Center as commissioned by the Steinzal Institute for Jewish Studies in the CIS; respondents selection methodology (as per the lists provided by the customer and using the snowball technique), same as the surveying technique (face-to-face interviews) are similar to those of this survey.

Table 30

## Assessment of the importance of the reasons for emigration of the Jews from Russia

(the answers are ranked based on the date of the last estimation, given as a % of the number of surveyed)

	A very important reason		A not very important reason		A totally unimportant reason		Hard to tell, I don't know	
	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V
Wanting to secure the kids' future	85	86	10	10	2	2	3	1
Seeking a happy and civilized life	80	77	15	18	3	4	2	1
Desire to reunite with family	70	66	23	29	5	5	2	1
Disbelief about any social or political improvements in Russia	69	64	21	25	7	7	3	4
A desire to live a fully Jewish life	44	42	37	42	15	15	4	2
Antisemitism and hostility towards the Jews	45	29	36	41	16	29	3	1

Therefore, general opinion of the Jews on the reasons of possible emigration from Russia is made up of the attractiveness of the conceived life style in other countries, which should be secured primarily for the kids, of the ideas about a happy and comfortable life surrounded by family, which seems impossible in the present-day Russia. But primarily, this is about wanting to secure the future of the kids.

Compared to the European countries, their willingness to emigrate is similar in terms of incidence, although it could be assumed that in the more socially and economically comfortable Europe, the expulsive factor is a high assessment of the incidence of antisemitism and a fear that its manifestations could grow, considering that the Europeans have already registered a considerable personal experience with antisemitic aggression.

Table 31

## In the last 5 years, have you considered emigrating from Russia as you are not feeling secure here as a Jew?

	I have emigrated but returned to Russia	I'm considering emigration, but have not left yet	I haven't considered emigration	I've considered emigration for a different reason	I'd rather not answer, decline to answer
Russia	5	28	51	14	2
An average for 8 EU countries	2	29	61	--	8

## 3. RELIGIOUSNESS AND TRADITION

### 3.1. CHILDREN'S EDUCATION: SECULAR VS RELIGIOUS

A quarter of the surveyed Jews (24%) have kids (infants to 18 years old). If we look at these children's distribution by type of learning, we will get the following picture: 38% of the respondents have small kids who do not go to school yet. Three out of four children of the school-going age go to regular schools, and others go to Jewish comprehensive schools (this is not a heder, at least for extracurricular activities). The differences between the people who have kids going to a Jewish school and the people whose kids go to a regular school are statistically insignificant (in terms of income, parents' education level or the place of residence), which points to the fact that both options are equally accessible (or, on the contrary, to the fact that proper Jewish education is inaccessible)<sup>17</sup>. These distributions (despite the fact that the sample is not extensive) may be extrapolated onto the entire Jewish population. It has to be noted that Jewish schools are attended by a small number of kids (in absolute terms, Jewish schools are attended by the kids of only 17 respondents, which is 3% of the entire sample). If we recalculate such data on the basis of the respondents having children of the school-going age, the share of kids going to Jewish schools will be higher (14%).

<sup>17</sup> Based on the data of this survey, we may not make an inference on the issues of the Jewish schools or the current practice of Jewish education.

29% of respondents answered the question of: "Why have you chosen a non-Jewish school for your kid?" by saying that "a Jewish school was not accessible as an option". Such answers were most frequently given by the respondents living in small towns (61% of parents; or 15% of the surveyed), where the number of the Jews is very limited, and therefore, such schools simply do not exist there. Thus, the choice of a school for the kid's education is governed for most parents by the fairly obvious considerations: predominantly pragmatic – close to home, convenient (financial considerations – it is cheaper to go to a regular school, is completely irrelevant). Other most frequently given reasons – inaccessibility of a Jewish school (mentioned by slightly less than a third of the surveyed parents) and wanting kids to fit with the surrounding society, not feel isolated, and confined to a solely Jewish environment (the threat of a kid facing antisemitism in a regular school was mentioned almost five times as rarely). Practically, it might be said that Jewish schools are accessible in Moscow and major cities only. The reasons of the small number of parents who sent their kids to a Jewish school are mostly seeking to secure a high quality education for their kids and consciously wanting their kids to be raised with Jewish values. But this does not require any special explanations.

## **3.2. RELIGIOUSNESS AND TRADITIONS IN THE JEWISH IDENTITY STRUCTURE**

As revealed by questions about the factors of Jewish identity, "faith in God" ranked last in a list of 10 proposed answer options. Answers of the respondents that religious factor is "very important" to them or "rather important" total 48%, with exactly the same percentage of "not very important" and "totally unimportant" answers (47%). More frequent, and thus, more meaningful are the answers "celebrating Jewish holidays with family" (sum of "very important" and "rather important" answers is 60%). Therefore, preservation of Jewish traditions in the family circle, among the loved ones, in an atmosphere of emotional intimacy and warmth turned out to be a more important factor for propagation of the Jewish identity than religiousness itself. In other words, with substantially secularized present-day life and the Jews being not very involved in the synagogal or community life, maintaining general rituals and holidays becomes a prerequisite for maintaining a Jewish identity. 53% of the respondents have answered that they are Jews but are not following any religious traditions, do not identify with any Judaism trends or other religions. The most numerous group among the Jewish believers or religious Jews are the Chabad Jews, with a slightly less numerous group of Reform Jews, with every eleventh of the pollees considering himself to be a follower of this group. A sizable group of 7% consider themselves to be Jews but are practicing a different religion, presumably Christianity.

Among the believers, there are slightly more people younger than 40 years, among those who do not care about religion there are slightly more elderly people, which points to the inertia of the Soviet atheist upbringing or the young searching for their own belief system. Religious-minded respondents include citizens of medium-sized towns (100-500 thousand residents), making up 20% with a sample average of 13%. Residents of Moscow and major cities are equally present in both groups. It is only possible to draw any conclusions in this regard (extrapolate these distributions onto the entire totality of the Jewish population of Russia) with great care as this could have been affected by the technique of selecting respondents for the survey. But in any case, those who stressed the importance of religion in their lives revealed themselves to be stronger and more determined believers in the value and importance of Jewish identity, and therefore, were trying to accentuate and demonstrate their belonging to the Jewish world, the importance of observing traditions and rituals (Table 31). In this case, we are talking about the extent of symbolic importance of their belonging to the Jewish world, and not about whether they are Jews or non-Jews (absolute majority have expressed a shared point of view on this matter: both, those who care about religion a lot and those who do not, have the same level of realizing the unity of the Jews in the world: 92% and 88%).

Table 32

## Importance of religion in the lives of the surveyed and the Jewish identity

(as a percentage of a respective group, sums of positive and negative answers, without the 'not sure' option)

	Religion		The important/ not important difference
	Important	Not important	
Certainly yes	63	41	+22
Rather yes	29	47	-18
Rather no	7	8	=
Certainly no	1	1	=
Not sure, hard to tell	0	2	=

Table 33

## To what extent do you believe that the Jewish people are the chosen people?

	Religion		The important/ not important difference
	Important	Not important	
Believe with all my soul	43	25	+18
Believe but have doubts sometimes	24	18	+6
Usually have doubts but sometimes have moments of believing	11	17	-8
Do not believe at all	9	30	-21
Hard to tell, don't know	14	11	+3

Table 34

## Are you proud of being a Jew?

	Religion		The important/ not important difference
	Important	Not important	
Certainly yes	58	39	+19
Rather yes	33	35	-2
Rather no	4	9	-5
Certainly no	2	4	-2
Don't know, hard to tell	3	14	-11

Table 35

## How important is the celebration of Jewish holidays with family for your Jewish identity?

	Religion		The important/ not important difference
	Important	Not important	
Very important	32	7	+25
Rather important	49	30	+19
Rather not important	12	36	-24
Completely unimportant	6	25	-19
Not sure	1	1	=

It might be seen from the last table that those who have a high regard for religion in their lives have a much more pronounced “Jewish identity”, while the celebration of Jewish holidays with family is considered “very important” by only a third of this group.

Table 36

## How well do you know the following Jewish concepts?

(answers ranked based on the last estimation date)

	Have a solid knowledge of this concept		Rather well aware of this concept		Only have a broad idea of this concept		Only heard about this concept, but don't know what it means		Never heard about it	
	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V
Sabbath	50	61	22	23	18	12	5	3	5	1
Purim	45	51	22	22	18	17	8	6	8	4
Mezuzah	44	49	19	21	16	15	8	7	14	8
Bar Mitzvah	40	47	20	20	17	18	8	8	15	7
Kashrut	38	46	22	24	19	19	11	5	11	6
Rosh Hashanah	46	46	19	22	15	17	7	8	12	7
Yom Kippur	45	45	19	23	16	17	9	9	11	6
Simchat Torah	42	42	18	19	16	19	10	11	15	8

The awareness of the surveyed of the Jewish holidays and traditional culture concepts is rather high: an overwhelming or relative majority are well aware or fairly well aware of them (Table 36).

Comparison with the 2006 data is demonstrative: nearly for all items, the knowledge of respective concepts, artefacts and sacred objects has grown, and the share of those who “know nothing about it” has shrunk twice on the average and does not exceed 7-8%. It is clear that among those, for whom

religion is important these figures will be higher, which could indirectly indicate a more rigorous observance of religious traditions and rituals. The knowledge of traditions and precepts does not in itself mean their observance yet, this fact rather points to the respondents being well educated and knowledgeable about the Jewish culture. However, education is not a differentiating factor in this case (given that over 80% of the surveyed hold a university degree).

Generationally, once again the young stand out here: the group of 16-24 year olds is most often well aware of what such concepts as Sabbath, Purim, kashrut, Bar Mitzvah, Mezuzah mean (respectively, 68, 57, 50, 57%), and the 25-39 year olds are most often aware of what Rosh Hashanah and Simchat Tora means (48% and 46%); 40-54 year olds are most often aware of the Yom Kippur holiday (47%). But solid awareness of the concepts of the Jewish history or traditions on almost all items is even higher in the moderate income group. Presumably, this group is older and lives in poorer towns, and perhaps, in this case, it is also a factor that such peripheral towns have stronger memory of the Soviet times, when such holidays were popular in the Jewish environment.

In the 2006 and 2018 surveys, the respondents were asked to give an assessment of how much the young (13-17 year olds) were interested in the Jewish tradition compared to older generations.

Table 37

**In your opinion, are the present-day Jewish teenagers (13-17 years old) interested in the Jewish religious tradition to a greater or lesser extent, compared to the older generation of Jews in Russia?**

	2006	2018	The more/less difference
Much more than the older generation	25	18	-7
Slightly more than the older generation	19	22	-3
Both are equally interested	11	18	+7
Slightly less than the older generation	14	15	+1
Way less than the older generation	22	14	-6
Don't know, hard to tell	9	13	+4

The share of respondents who believe that the young are to a certain extent interested in the Jewish religious tradition has somewhat shrunk in the last 12 years from 44 to 40%, as well as the share of those who believe that the “young are less interested” – from 36 to 29%. But importantly, during all this time, a relative majority notes a heightened interest of the young. According to this survey’s deliverables, this figure is basically equal for all groups, i.e., this is a shared opinion. It is only slightly higher in the 40-54 year old group (48% with an average figure of 40%) – potential parents of the young group, and in the Moscow residents group – 46%.

In the 2006 survey, 34% of the surveyed were not observing any religious traditions at all (another 49% reporting observing such traditions “to a limited extent”); only 17% were observing “most of traditions or all traditions”. If we select attending a synagogue as a criterion for comparison purposes, it may be assumed that the share of religious Jews has at least not become smaller over this period.

### 3.3. OBSERVANCE OF RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS AND PRECEPTS

Today, just like in the past, Pesah (Passover) appears to be the most widely celebrated holiday. Sabbath (Shabbat) is also celebrated by many (about one fourth) in one way or another in their daily life. 18% are regular synagogue attendants.

Table 38

#### Which of the following Judaic practices do you observe? (%, responses are ranked)

The Passover Seder almost every year or every year	40
I light candles (almost) every Friday	26
I fast on Yom Kippur (almost) every year	24
I attend a synagogue weekly or more often	18
I eat only kosher meat at home (observe kashrut laws)	14
I do not turn lights on on Sabbath	10
None	41
Not sure	4

As we see, despite the widely spread knowledge about Judaic practices and traditions, two fifths of the respondents do not follow any of the religious precepts.

Synagogues are attended more regularly, one could say systematically, in medium-sized towns (not in the capitals and largest cities). In such towns, the share of the people who never attend synagogue is the smallest, 13% (36% on average).

Table 39

## Attending synagogue once a week or more frequently...

On average	18
<b>Gender</b>	
Men	21
Women	15
<b>Age</b>	
16-24	13
25-39 years	20
40-54	19
55 years and older	17
<b>Education</b>	
Higher	18
Secondary vocational education	22
Secondary and below	8
<b>Type of locality</b>	
Moscow	15
City	17
Medium-sized town	29
Small town	13

Table 40

## How important is it for you that each of the following traditions be observed in your family?

	Very important		Fairly important		Not very important		Not important at all		It is hard to tell, I do not know	
	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	2006 XII	2018 IV-V
A boy born into your family must be circumcised according to the Jewish religious tradition	18	17	16	18	23	23	36	35	8	7
A boy born into your family must undergo Bar Mitzvah at the age of 13	17	16	21	19	18	22	36	35	8	9
Weddings in your family are to be conducted according to the Jewish tradition.	14	13	17	18	25	26	39	37	4	6
The deceased in your family are to be buried according to the Jewish custom	21	20	19	23	22	19	35	31	4	8
Avoid eating pork as customary for the Jews	18	19	15	16	23	20	42	39	2	5

The above religious traditions are significant for about a third of all respondents. One may assume that this is the very share of Jewish families who are inclined to observe them in their lives one way or another. Knowledge of traditions (their value for respondents) significantly surpasses their willingness to observe and uphold them. It is telling that in this case (as opposed to the question as to their knowledge of concepts of the religious culture) we do not observe any significant dynamics as compared to the survey of 2006. The differences are in most cases insignificant for the main socio-demographic groups and stay within the margin of statistical error. The only factor systematically affecting their answers is the type of locality.

Table 41

**How important is it for you that a boy born into your family should be circumcised according to the Jewish religious tradition?**

	Total	Saint Petersburg	Moscow	Cities with over 1 million population	Medium-sized and small towns
Very important/fairly important	35	23	32	41	44
Not very important	23	23	25	20	21
Not important at all	35	51	41	26	25
It is hard to tell, I don't know	7	3	2	12	10

Table 42

**How important is it for you that boys born into your family should undergo Bar Mitzvah at the age of 13?**

	Total	Saint Petersburg	Moscow	Cities with over 1 million population	Medium-sized and small towns
Very important/fairly important	35	25	32	34	48
Not very important	22	22	24	25	15
Not important at all	35	47	42	26	23
It is hard to tell, I don't know	9	6	2	14	15

Table 43

**How important is it for you that the deceased in your family be buried according to the Jewish custom?**

	Total	Saint Petersburg	Moscow	Cities with over 1 million population	Medium-sized and small towns
Very important/fairly important	31	25	30	31	42
Not very important	26	24	24	31	26
Not important at all	37	45	44	31	26
It is hard to tell, I don't know	6	6	2	9	7

Table 44

## How important is it for you that the deceased in your family be buried according to the Jewish custom?

	Total	Saint Petersburg	Moscow	Cities with over 1 million population	Medium-sized and small towns
Very important/fairly important	43	35	38	48	53
Not very important	19	18	19	21	15
Not important at all	31	41	40	19	23
It is hard to tell, I don't know	8	6	4	13	9

We see in all of the above tables that high values of importance of observance of religious traditions (a sum of two positive responses is provided) are recorded noticeably more frequently than the sampling average in medium-sized and small towns. One may say with a certain degree of caution that the significance of following religious traditions is mostly preserved in small-sized peripheral towns where people live in close personal communication with each other, where other people's opinions are felt stronger, where the environment is more personalized than in cities; here people are more involved with local communication networks. The entire diverse range of opportunities and benefits of contemporary life in cities and capitals does not reach such towns; life here feels monotonous and routine, without an abundance of “big world” events. One may assume that communal religious life here constitutes one of the centers of local identification, events occurring in a community stand out much more against the backdrop of everyday minutiae. It is no coincidence that attendance of a synagogue is noticeably more frequent here than in other localities. In a certain sense, life is more real in the social periphery than in the rather virtual Jewish life of city dwellers.

Table 45

## How serious is for you as a Jew the problem of not being able to perform circumcision?

	Very /fairly serious/ problem	Not important
Circumcision	24	76
Unavailability of kosher products, and primarily, meat	21	79

As we see, at least a fifth to a fourth of the respondents (which correlates to other questions about religiosity and Jewish traditions) make up that portion of all Russian Jews, for whose identity Judaic religious traditions as such are important. However, the vast majority of polled Jews adhere to more secular views.

## **4. JEWISH IDENTITY**

Our research has also included most of the questions, reiterating a poll of Russian Jews in 2006 conducted pursuant to a similar methodology. This allows us to make a number of conclusions of fundamental importance. Certain trends have emerged in the last 12 years, allowing us to talk about changes in the structure of the Jewish identity taking place under the influence of both external factors and comprehension by the Russian Jews of their position as a special ethno-national group in Russia. Such changes are not radical (the structure of collective identity is mostly fairly stable), but point to a direction in which the transformation of the Jewish consciousness in Russia is moving and apparently will be moving (understanding themselves as related to other groups of people, prospects of the Jews' life in Russia, motives for emigration, etc.) This conclusion is based on an analysis of opinions held by young Jews who, due to some demographic reasons, will become dominant in the mainstream Jewish population as time goes by. Since the sampling (survey organization) was made to a significant extent based on the lists provided by Jewish organizations, on the one hand, and on the other hand – using the "snowball" technique (realized ratio of 40 to 60%), the research findings reflect the opinion of those Jews who are more involved in the life and problems of a more consolidated part of the Jewish community. Disappearance of the government-supported antisemitism and new opportunities for the Jewish civic life provided an impetus to the growth of the Jewish self-awareness.

### **4.1. FORMAL AND ASRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JEWISH IDENTITY**

The formal (passport-based) identification of the Jewish identity (recording their "ethnicity" in their passports as a rigid government ethno-national certification, life-long ethnic labeling) is primarily preserved by older people who lived in the Soviet time. Only a half of the respondents remember that they had a record in their passport – "Jewish" (31%) and the same number of respondents had "Russian" (27%) or another nationality (for example, "Ukrainian", etc.) - 4% (the latter mostly happened in small towns). The passport-based Jewish identification prevails among people over 40 years old (prior to the repeal of "paragraph 5" after the demise of the Soviet system); "Russians" among the Jews are primarily the children of those Jews who experienced antisemitic pressure in the late Soviet era and registered them as Russian to avoid potential complications in their lives (primarily people aged 40 to 55), or older Jews. In the first case, they are 41%. In the second – circa 30% while such practices occur in the province rather than in the capital cities, especially major cities, where the inertia of the erased government-supported antisemitism lingers longer than in Moscow and Saint Petersburg (table 46).

Table 46

## What ethnicity was recorded in your passport?

	Jewish	Russian	Other	My passport
On average	31	27	4	38
<b>Age</b>				
16-24 years	5	15	3	77
25-39 years	8	19	1	71
40-54 years	40	41	8	11
55 years and older	63	30	4	3
<b>Type of locality</b>				
SPb	29	21	1	49
Moscow	31	22	3	44
City	31	37	2	30
Small town	28	31	9	33

In any case, elderly people (over 55 years) reported the highest percentage of passport records (63%, in the next age cohort this figure is 1.5 times less – 40%). This could have dual explanation: an aspiration to abandon the Soviet practices of discrimination based on paragraph 5, on the one hand, and rapidly growing assimilation and international marriages, on the other hand.

If the law on mandatory registration of ethnicity was restored, 60% of the respondents would register as "Jews" (among young people – 67%), 21% would take another ethnicity (mostly "Russian", 19%). In the last 12 years, the aspiration for even a formal passport-based identification of oneself as a Jew has grown (by 7 percentage points) while the well understandable fear of the "paragraph 50-based" discrimination has decreased by the same amount. This shift is occurring due to young people living in capital metropolitan cities where hostile attitudes toward the Jews disappear faster than in peripheral cities (table 47).

Table 47

## If the law compelled to register ethnicity in the passport, what ethnicity, in your opinion, would most of the Russian Jews you personally know have written in their passports?

	2006 XII	2018 IV-V
Jewish	53	60
Russian	26	19
Other	2	3
It is hard to tell, I don't know	20	19

Table 48

**If the law compelled to register ethnicity in the passport, what ethnicity, in your opinion, would most of the Russian Jews you personally know have written in their passports?**

	<b>Jewish</b>	<b>Russian</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>My passport</b>
On average	60	19	2	19
<b>Age</b>				
16-24	67	20	0	13
25-39	61	19	0	20
40-54	55	19	2	24
55 years and older	61	17	6	15
<b>Type of locality</b>				
Saint Petersburg	62	23	2	13
Moscow	60	17	2	21
City	63	18	2	18
Small town	59	17	3	20

98% of the respondents only have the Russian citizenship while another 8-9% have a second citizenship (primarily Israeli - 7%, citizenship of other unnamed countries – slightly above 1%).

87% are Jews by birth, 3% have undergone the ritual of becoming a Jew, 6% do not know and 4% do not consider themselves to be Jews, renounce their Jewishness due to assimilation or for other reasons. That said, 72% have a Jewish mother by birth (including 12% who are only half-Jew; 24% have a mother who is not Jewish, primarily 21% have a Russian mother), 68% have a Jewish father by birth (including 10% who are only half-Jew; 29% have a father who is not Jewish, primarily 23% have a Russian father). 3% of the respondents do not know what ethnicity their parents had (father or mother). Fluctuations in various socio-demographic groups (age groups living in different cities with different educational background, income, etc.) are not significant and practically do not exceed the permitted statistical fluctuations.

The share of interethnic marriages among the Jews (which is also known from the Russian census data) is the largest in Russia. According to this poll, it accounts for 52%. Among our respondents who are or were married but divorced at the time of the survey, only 34% had a Jewish spouse. Another 14% had spouses who are half Jewish. Most of them were married to Russians (44%), another 8% – to people of a different ethnic background.

At the same time, in the last 12 years, the share of the Jews who certainly would be against if their children married a non-Jew has grown significantly: the share of those against this idea has remained the same - 22-21%. This means that tolerance toward interethnic marriages has become stronger.

Table 49

**Would you accept it if your children (future, potential children) married a non-Jew?**

	<b>2006 XII</b>	<b>2018 IV-V</b>
Certainly yes	29	40
Rather yes	36	29
I would rather be against	14	14
I would definitely be against	8	7
It is hard to tell, I don't know	14	10

Let us reiterate that unwillingness to marry Jews of other ethnic backgrounds (primarily Russian) is seen as a serious manifestation of antisemitism, as 57% of the respondents reported.

## 4.2. THE HOLOCAUST AND THE JEWISH IDENTITY

An idea of a special historic role of the Jewish people that have been living among other nations and experienced severe persecution and hostile external attitudes is the basis for the Jewish identity. This consciousness is primarily structured by the memory of the Holocaust in the XX century. The tragic and unjust nature of such a position is compensated by the belief, on the one hand, in the faith that the Jewish people have been chosen and have preserved their unity despite all hardships of life, and on the other hand – by the ability of the Jews to achieve recognition of their merits thanks to the high level of their education and culture as testified by their undoubted success in various fields of human endeavor. Furthermore, their achievements are seen as common for all of the Jews wherever they might live (and not only as the source of pride for the Russian Jews). This awareness is what instills in the Jews the understanding of their unity and allows them to consider themselves a unique people in the world (“the people of diaspora”), surpassing individual states and historical eras.

Table 50

**Do you think the Jews in Russia, the Jews in America, the Jews in Israel and the Jews in any other countries are one and the same people or completely different people that have a lot more differences than things they have in common?**

**Which of the opinions below is closest to your own?**

	<b>2006 XII</b>	<b>2018 IV-V</b>
All of the Jews, even those living in different countries, are part of one and the same people	51	49
The Jews living in neighboring countries or countries with like cultures are similar (for example, East European Jews, Jews from the North America). But the Jews living in different parts of the world are different from each other	15	23
The Jews living in the same country (for example, Russian Jews) are similar to each other. But the Jews living in different countries are different from each other	19	16
The Jews living in different countries have nothing in common, each has their own individual particularities	10	8
It is hard to tell, I don't know	6	4

The structure of the distribution of opinions in the two surveys that have more than a decade between them is very similar: the prevailing majority (one half of the respondents) agree that the Jews living in different countries are one and the same people. Statistical differences (insignificant) are noted in 2018. The differences are that somewhat more respondents than in 2006 agree with the statement that the European and American Jews are close to each other, but they are significantly different from the Jews living on other continents (15% and 23%; such responses are given somewhat more frequently by respondents in Moscow). The opinions that the Jews living in different areas of the world are radically different from each other are more characteristic of the respondents surveyed using the "snowball" technique and that means more often for the respondents living in peripheral cities, in a more secluded environment and, accordingly, sensing their isolation and specialness to a greater extent. But all of these are very weak social differences and their contents should not be overestimated.

In other words, the realization of historical and cultural commonality of the Jewish people is expressed (in a way) much stronger than the feeling of citizenship or belonging to Russia. This component of self-identification of the Jews in Russia has been also dominant in the past (such an opinion was then shared by a relative majority of the respondents), but by now it has become absolutely prevailing if not practically universal (in 2006, 79% shared this opinion, in 2018 – 91%). It is important that such responses are expressed by respondents with increasing confidence and power. The emergence (and existence) of the Jewish state as such – Israel – does not alter the structure of this self-identification as Israel to a certain extent is seen as a symbol of this historical global commonality and destiny, but does not replace the diversity of meanings ascribed to the "people of diaspora". The values and achievements of the Jews in the world and history are more significant than the success of the State of Israel per se (the latter is included for the first time).

Proud of being a Jew – 83% (in 2006, similar responses were given by 79% of the respondents). Furthermore, among the youngest respondents (16-24 years) such a response was selected by practically everyone – 91%, this is the highest value among all age groups; the same age category has the lowest percentage of negative responses – only 4% of those "not proud" of being a "Jew" (for comparison: in the oldest age categories the percentage of negative responses ("not proud") is 10-11%). As a result, a double identity of the Jews has emerged and is replicated: this is a separate ethnic group of individuals within Russia, but these are the people living with the consciousness that they are part of the one Jewish people dispersed throughout the world, preserving themselves, their culture, their dignity in spite of the "evil of this world".

Table 51

## What is important for your Jewish identity? (responses are ranked by the first column)

	Important*	Not important*	+/-
Memory of the Holocaust	91	8	11
Self-consciousness (identity): I am Jewish	89	10	9
My parents are Jewish	80	18	4.4
Fighting antisemitism	76	20	3.8
Jewish culture (music, literature, art)	76	23	3.3
Donations to Jewish charities	65	32	2
Supporting Israel	61	34	1.8
Jewish holidays, rituals	59	40	1.5
Faith in God	49	48	1.0
Attitude of others (you are a Jew)	41	57	0.7

\*The sum of responses "very important"+ "rather important" and "rather not important"+ "not at all important"

The memory of the Holocaust represents in this range not simply a testimony of yet another (historically "one-off") tragedy which has almost annihilated the Jewish people, but rather a condition of experiencing the unity of all of the Jews in the world, the inseparability and commonality of the destiny of all Jews wherever they might live. This is the perception (more important for identity than kinship of the Jews) that constitutes the bearing structure of the Jewish consciousness, a consolidating conviction of practically all respondents (there are no more common values integrating the Jewish communality in Russia). Such opinions are shared by many more respondents that those convinced that the "Jews are the chosen people" (53-55% of the respondents believe in this) or the opinion that only he or she is a Jew whose parents are Jews (57%) or those emphasizing their religious affiliation as evidence of their own Jewishness. Faith in God as the most important component of their Jewish identity has been indicated by 49% of the respondents.

Table 52

## To what extent do you believe that the Jewish people are the chosen people?

	2006 XII	2018 IV-V
Believe with all my soul	37	34
Believe but sometimes doubt	16	21
Usually doubt but sometimes believe	16	14
Do not believe at all	20	18
It is hard to tell, I don't know	11	13

55% believe that the Jews are the "chosen people"; 31% do not believe, the rest would like to believe to varying degrees, but have strong doubts in this regard. Such an allocation of opinions about themselves and the Jews as a special people is very persistent, it has not changed over the last 12 years, indicating that the values and concepts that depend on the respondents' own, conscious personal choices are being reinforced (and will continue to be reinforced in the future) in the structure of the Jewish collective identity. This means that the previous norms of maintaining the commonality characteristic of the life of the Jews in local communities, where everyone knows each other, are governed by the same social forms of organization of their lives – synagogue, holidays, etc. as well as external forcible forms of identification and preservation of identity. The Soviet passport system, discrimination on the basis of "paragraph 5" (ethnicity) are succeeded by more general and, importantly, contemporary rather than traditional forms of internalization of the Jewish history and culture – through the Internet, reading, mass media, mass communication systems.

This complex of ideas and rather general cultural values as the basis or the axial structure of the Jewish identity plays a more important role than the earlier meanings of the Jewishness as secluded kindred, tribal and religious commonality. This is understandable, given the universalism of the culture of contemporary highly educated Jews (in the sampling, respondents with higher education represent 89%) and independence in the search for and selection of information about the history, culture and lifestyle of traditional Jews (holidays and their meaning, precepts regarding daily behavior, etc.).

In the last 12 years, the significance of various sources of knowledge about the Jews has radically changed: the leading role shifted from Jewish newspapers and books to the Internet and interpersonal peer networks. Radio (apparently primarily Israeli radio) and television have faded into the background. The coming into prominence of the Internet and social media indicates the independence and activeness of the respondent himself in the search for information they consider important regarding various aspects of the Jewish life, history, culture and religion. All of the other mechanisms of identity reproduction – holidays, rituals, system of kinship, etc. – still play a very important but secondary role, rather being additional meaningful components of the imaginary world of the Jewish culture that respondents take into account in their daily lives but the mandatory precepts of which are not always followed by them and not by all of them.

Table 53

## What or who is today the primary source of information about the Jewish life for you?

	2006 XII	2018 IV-V	+/-
Internet	32	73	+39
Friends	30	43	+13
Family	24	30	+6
Rabbis	20	19	=
Radio and television	27	19	-8
Books	38	18	-20
Jewish newspapers	42	10	-32
Teachers	9	3	-6
Other	-	6	

It is indicative that the memory of the Holocaust and self-affirmation of oneself as a Jew is expressed very intensively and strongly (more than a half emphasize that it is “very important” to them whereas in all of the other response choices (participation in charity, solidarity with Israel, Jewish holidays, faith in God, etc.) only each fourth or fifth respondent considers it “very important”; even the options “My parents are Jewish” or “antisemitism” as a condition of the Jewish identity are seen as “very important” by just slightly more than a third of respondents, which cannot be compared to the first two factors).

There is a certain contradiction found in the different values respondents attach to options “fighting antisemitism” (important – 76%) and “attitudes of others towards me as a Jew” (important – 41%). If one considers that behind the “attitude of others” are “positive values”, philosemitism or solidarity of fellow Jews, then we get some overreaction from respondents; it would make more sense to consider that the attitudes of others are negative a priori, but its significance for identity of the Jews is strongly denied; on the contrary, the power of positive moments for the Jewish self-identification, active self-affirmation are emphasized (whereas antisemitic stigmatization and external coercion, discrimination of the Jews imply the passive nature of identity preservation, which depends on other people or circumstances). Dependency on external factors gives rise to a well-known internal resistance in the respondents, as if somewhat devaluing the significance of their own choice and pride of being a Jew. Nonetheless, this aspect (external stigmatization and, consequently, negative identity) is preserved, however, it is expressed and reproduced in a different modality and form – the “need to fight antisemitism”. In other words, the duplicity of such reactions demonstrates a profound trauma inflicted (or being inflicted) on the Jews by their social environment and reproduced from one generation to another. The hidden meaning of the negative historical experience of discrimination of the Jews or the memory of it is expressed more strongly in most elderly people or the generation that follows them. It is this point that requires an “explanation”; it turns into the main factor constituting the Jewish self-awareness, pulling up all of the other components – tradition, holidays, inner community ties among Jews, particularities

of their religion as arguments to explain the tragedy. Even the fact that “My parents are Jewish”, i.e. presence of unconditional characteristics of identity (“ascriptive” qualities of an individual as sociologists call them which do not change during their lifetime [as opposed to the status, education, income, family status, residence, etc.]), judging by the allocation of responses, is exceeded in its significance by other reasons of cognizing oneself as a Jew (table 54).

Such an inference is supported by socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, which have emphasized more often than average the inherited experience of the Jews’ survival: specifically, “Memory of the Shoah” has been noted by elderly people (over 55 years of age, residing in Saint Petersburg, a city where tensions between the Jews and others are felt stronger) more often than by any other categories of respondents, “fighting antisemitism” is noted by the same categories of respondents, but apart from Saint Petersburg residents such responses are also given more often by dwellers of small and medium-sized towns); also the “attitude of others”. On the contrary, such responses as “feeling proud of being a Jew”, involvement in Jewish charities, “solidarity with Israel”, “faith in God”, “Jewish holidays” have been given more frequently by young people.

This new, post-Soviet generation of Russian Jews now lives in a freer world than the preceding age cohorts, with more choices, mobility, in a country where state-supported antisemitism and discrimination of the Jews by government authorities no longer exist. For these age cohorts, their own choice, positive self-affirmation as Jews (even with some defiance against antisemitic surroundings), faith in God and involvement in Jewish civic organizations take center stage. This is not passive identification with the Jews, it is the activity, action-driven self-confirmation of their Jewishness.

Table 54

## What is important for your Jewish identity?

	Responses “very important”	Groups of respondents with maximum values of responses
Memory of the Holocaust	64	55 years and older; specialized secondary education, St Petersburg
Self-identity: I am Jewish	56	16-39 years, higher education; St Petersburg
My parents are Jewish	35	55 years and older; specialized secondary education, small towns
Jewish culture (music, literature, art, etc.)	30	55 years and older; specialized secondary education, St Petersburg
Fighting antisemitism	38	55 years and older; higher education; Saint Petersburg
Donations to Jewish charities	24	25-39 years; specialized secondary education, cities
Supporting Israel	23	40-54 years; specialized secondary education, small towns
Celebrating Jewish holidays	19	40-54 years; specialized secondary education, small towns
Faith in God	18	25-39 years, specialized secondary education, small towns
Attitude of others (you are a Jew)	13	55 years and older, higher education; Moscow

Finally, one may also point to the symbolic role of Israel as a strong Jewish state, which has succeeded in resisting repeated aggressions and attempts of its annihilation by the Arab countries and Palestinian terrorists. This conceptual component is more important to the people who preserve (due to their peripheral location and a lower level of education) the inertia of the memory of the Soviet times, a sharply negative attitude of the Soviet government towards policies of the Israeli leadership.

Their aspiration to not just preserve their values as a foundation for their Jewish identity but to place them above the “malevolent fate” and the hostile environment force the respondents to most illogically downgrade the meaning of antisemitism as a factor of negative consolidation, on the one hand, and exaggerate the “real number of the Jews in Russia”, consider that there are more of them than according to the census (explanation – “Jews hide their ethnicity because of antisemitism.” Such a reaction of the majority points to a growing potential of the Jewish movement which is not limited to just its reaction to the external environment but is increasingly motivated by internal values and, importantly, by positive values of their own achievements. Actually, this is what instills the sense of ethnic pride in the respondents (and fundamentally differentiates the polled Jews from the cultural self-consciousness of the most Russian population, the culture of their surrounding environment whose national self-awareness is built on negative identification/aversion, jealousy toward the West, resentment toward the rich and the successful, democratic countries/).

Table 55

### To what extent do you agree with the statement... ? (2018, without the undecided)

	Fully agree + rather agree	Partially agree, partially disagree	Rather disagree + fully disagree
The Russian Jews have lost their ties with Jewish traditions, their roots because of antisemitism	23	22	53
Were it not for antisemitism, the Jews would have long been dissolved among other nations	19	24	52
The real number of the Jews is much higher than according to the census, the Jews hide their identity because of antisemitism	52	21	24
The key reason behind the Jews’ aspiration for education does not lie in antisemitism that forces the Jews to be better than others, but in that the Jews are the “people of the book”, education is one of the main values of the Jews	74	15	9

Table 56

## To what extent do you agree with the statement... ? (2006)

	Fully agree + rather agree	Rather disagree + fully disagree	Undecided
The Russian Jews have lost their ties with Jewish traditions, their roots because of antisemitism	39	44	7
Were it not for antisemitism, the Jews would have long been dissolved among other nations	34	54	12
The real number of the Jews is much higher than according to the census, the Jews hide their identity because of antisemitism	72	19	9
The key reason behind the Jews' aspiration for education does not lie in antisemitism that forces the Jews to be better than others, but in that the Jews are the "people of the book", education is one of the main values of the Jews	83	11	6

Previously, in 2006, a more rigid scale of responses was used (without the middle position of the undecided – “partially agree, partially disagree”). Comparison of 2006 and 2018 research data shows that given more differentiated response options in 2018, a certain (and rather substantial) percentage of the respondents is inclined to give less peremptory statements about the “consolidating” role of antisemitism, but the specific weight of the respondents denying this factor of the resilience of the Jewish people remains practically unchanged.

However, there is no clear unanimity as to the role of antisemitism in the preservation of the Jewish identity; rather one could say that there is an internal contradictory attitude toward this problem, which is a source of internal workings of the Jewish self-consciousness of sorts.

Most of the respondents in 2006 tended to believe that the “assimilation of the Jews in Russia was not taking place due to the influence of antisemitism as much as because the Jews were voluntarily accepting the values and culture of the country in which they were living” (82% of the respondents agree with this statement). But somewhat in contradiction to this “agreement”, there is a similarly widely spread opinion that the “Jews’ aspiration to have education is primarily due to the fact that antisemitism forces them to be “better than others”, take higher positions in life” (51% is also absolute majority though less pronounced).

In our report, we are not striving to present any particular view as “indisputably true”, our objective is to show that such a contradiction is an extremely productive impetus for the Jews’ internal workings and the strengthening of the significance of their motives for positive achievements, the accumulated effect of which demonstrates special qualities of the Jewish people among other nations.

But if the problems of antisemitism are equated to other life problems of a more day-to-day and practical nature, it would appear that the former (antisemitism in Russia) demonstrably pales compared to others as regards their significance. The Russian Jews are much more worried about such issues as corruption, crime or threat of unemployment than racial, ethnic or religious discrimination (table 57).

Table 57

### Hierarchy of the problems significant to the Jewish self-consciousness

	Very serious problem	Rather serious problem	Sum of responses "serious problem"	Groups of respondents with maximum values of responses
Corruption	66	27	93	16-24 years, Saint Petersburg
Crime	27	50	77	Senior age (over 40 years)
Unemployment	28	46	74	16-39 years, specialized secondary education, Moscow
Migrants	20	39	59	specialized secondary education, Saint Petersburg
Racism	22	33	55	16-25-39 years; specialized secondary education, Saint Petersburg
Antisemitism	15	39	54	16-24 years, 55 years and older, poor or under-privileged; Saint Petersburg
Intolerance toward Muslims	9	38	47	16-24 years; specialized secondary education,

We have already noted in the religiousness section that a relative majority (40%, the largest group of respondents in the range of potential choices) do not follow any Jewish traditions and precepts seen at least as family traditions (for example, Sabbath). To the question “If you follow any Jewish religious traditions, which branch of Judaism do you affiliate yourself with?”, 59% of the respondents answered “none”. The other 40% identify themselves with various particularistic religious groups and movements: 14% consider themselves Chabad Jews (predominantly residents of small and medium-sized towns, elderly, low-income and poorly educated people), 11% consider themselves Reform Jews (predominantly young residents of Moscow, cities), 3-4% – Mountain Jews, 2% – Litvaks.

## 5. METHODOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SURVEY

The survey of the Jewish population was carried out in April and May 2018, based on a two-stage stratified sample, which represented the urban Jewish population of Russia.

All calculations necessary for identifying the sampled population were made based on the data of the 2010 all-Russian population census regarding the ethnic composition of the population by Russia's constituent entities.

At the first stage of identifying the sampled population, the total number (500 respondents) was divided among 8 Russia's federal circuits pro rata to the number of Jews living on the territory of respective federal circuit. In addition, according to the data of the 2010 all-Russian census, 15.3% and 33.7% of the Jews live in Saint Petersburg and Moscow, respectively. Therefore, in the first place, the sampled population included Saint Petersburg and Moscow as self-representative units, the sample size for which was 77 and 169 respondents, respectively.

Table 58

### Sampled population

Federal circuit	Number of the Jews (people)	Share of the Jews in the population of Russia (%)	Number of respondents (people)	Number of survey points
Central	16,264	10.32	52	4
Moscow	53,145	33.73	169	1
North-Western	4850	3.08	15	1
Saint Petersburg	24,132	15.31	77	1
Southern	7,570	4.80	24	2
North-Caucasian	5,358	3.40	17	1
Volga	20,968	13.31	67	5
Urals	11,023	7.00	35	3
Siberian	9,642	6.12	31	2
Far-Eastern	4,626	2.94	15	1
Total	157,578	100.00	502	21

The official statistics of Goskomstat (the Federal State Statistics Service) lack data on the number of the Jews in other Russian cities; however, according to the common opinion of experts, in Russia, the Jews mainly live in big cities.

In view of this, on agreement with the customer, big cities with the total population of over 100,000 people were included in the sample selection, with the only exception made for Birobidzhan, the center of the Jewish Autonomous Region, with 74,000 inhabitants. The next step was to select, in each of the federal circuits, irrespective of each other, from one to five cities, depending on the number of respondents attributed to the given federal circuit.

The sample size in a federal circuit (excluding the number of respondents attributed to Moscow and Saint Petersburg) was divided equally among the cities selected. 21 cities were included in the sample selection in total; a full list of the cities, specifying the number of respondents in each of them, is provided in table 59.

Table 59

## Sample size in the federal circuits

Fed. cir.	Reg. Dept.	Region	Populated area	Number of respondents
				Total
1	17	87	Saint Petersburg	77
1	48	86	Kaliningrad	15
2	27	88	Moscow	169
2	44	16	Zelenograd	13
2	52	21	Yaroslavl	13
2	50	30	Lipetsk	13
2	72	15	Kostroma	13
3	29	34	Samara	13
3	20	22	Nizhny Novgorod	14
3	0	39	Kazan	14
3	43	55	Ufa	13
3	47	50	Orsk	13
4	37	44	Rostov-on-Don	12
4	46	33	Volgograd	12
9	79	45	Derbent	17
5	22	53	Ekaterinburg	12
5	22	54	Chelyabinsk	12
5	22	54	Zlatoust	11
6	23	60	Novosibirsk	15
6	63	70	Irkutsk	16
7	25	78	Birobidzhan	15
Total				502

The survey was based on a two-stage methodology for selecting the respondents: based on the lists of potential respondents in the cities where the survey was conducted, provided by the Russian Jewish Congress (RJC) and, afterwards, using the “snowball” technique: the respondents surveyed provided to the interviewer contact information of potential respondents. Initially, the ratio of the first selection technique to the second selection technique was planned as 60% to 40%; however, the number of the contact persons provided by the RJC did not suffice. As a result, of the 517 surveyed, only 206 respondents were from the lists and 311 respondents were found using the snowball technique. The ratio of those surveyed using various techniques by city is provided in the methodological report. Respondents surveyed were aged 16 years and older. Respondents were selected according to the relevant gender and age characteristics based on statistical data.

## 5.1. SOCIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS IN GENERAL

An overwhelming majority (59%) of the surveyed have a university degree, further 18% of the respondents have two degrees, a completed postgraduate program, or a higher doctorate degree (excluding incomplete higher education degrees); this indicator for Russia as a whole is only 27%. The gender and age composition is comparable to the Russia-wide data.

Based on all characteristics showing the financial, consumer and social status, the urban Jewish population is closest to the Russian proto “middle class” in big Russian cities, for which we obtained data during specialist targeted surveys, where we selected respondents who had a high per capita income and represented the most socially and economically active age groups, who were highly qualified and held one or two higher education degrees.

Table 60

### Occupation of those surveyed

	2018 Russian Jews	2018 Russia
Individual entrepreneur, self-employed	10	3
Head, manager	19	3
Specialist without managerial functions (with a specialist degree)	39	19
Employee without a professional degree	4	11
Worker (including a foreman or team head), including in agriculture	2	22
Student	8	4
Retired person (unemployed) due to age/seniority	12	24
Retired person (unemployed) due to disability	1	2
I take care of the house/child	1	4
Unemployed and looking for a job	2	5
Unemployed and not looking for a job	3	3

The high social status of the Jews in Russia is confirmed by comparative all-Russian data. Let us note the most important aspects: each tenth respondent is an individual entrepreneur; a fifth of those surveyed hold a managerial position; two fifths of those surveyed are highly qualified specialists; and these are the most important differences from the all-Russian data.

Such distribution of social positions is reflected in the way people attributed themselves to a specific social class.

Table 61

### To which social class you would attribute yourself?

	2006 Jewish population	2018 Jewish population	2012 Russia
To the lower class	3	1	13
To the lower part of the middle class	24	17	29
To the middle part of the middle class	56	60	51
To the upper part of the middle class	11	15	5
To the upper class	2	1	1
Hard to tell	8	6	3
Number of the surveyed	406	517	1,600

As compared to 2006, we see that the number of respondents who classify themselves as the lower class or the lower part of the middle class has considerably reduced (from 27% to 18%); there were 42% of such respondents in 2012 in Russia on average (we do not have more recent data on a comparable scale). Similarly to Russia, the majority of people classify themselves as the middle part of the middle class (this indicator has grown among the Jews; it is higher than the all-Russian indicator by 9 points); moreover, a considerable group (15%) classify themselves as the upper part of the middle class, which is three times higher than the all-Russian figure.

A comparison of data based on the consumer status of the Jewish population and the Russians on the whole is even more representative (table 62). In the first case, only 3% of those surveyed classify themselves as the marginal population (compared to 24% in the Russian population). While the majority of the Russians (52%) are people who find it difficult to buy relatively expensive household appliances (while among those surveyed there are only 24% of such respondents), a relative majority (44%) of the Jewish population have the upper middle consumer status (while only 20% of such people in Russia on the whole); and over one fourth of those surveyed (27%) can afford buying a car (only 3% of such people in Russia).

Table 62

## To which of the following groups of population would you rather attribute yourself?

	2018 Jewish population	2018 June, Russia
We hardly have money for food	1	6
We have enough money for food but not for clothes	2	18
We have enough money for food and clothes, while buying more expensive things, such as a TV set or a refrigerator, is a problem for us	24	52
We can buy some expensive things, such as a refrigerator or a TV set, but we cannot afford a car	44	20
We can afford a car but we cannot say we are people of unlimited means	27	3
We can afford everything	3	1

Table 63

## If you compare your family to an average Russian family, how would you assess the financial position of your family?

	2006 XII	2018 IV-V
Much better	2	4
Somewhat better	18	25
Same	55	56
Somewhat lower	15	8
Much lower	5	2
Difficult to say, I don't know	6	5

However, a comparison of the surveyed Jews to a statistically average Russian family shows that, same as twelve years ago, the majority of those surveyed believe that their financial position is the same; although the share of those who believe that their position is better has increased from 20% to 29%, while the share of those who believe that their position is lower has decreased two times (from 20% to 10%). We note that, since the majority of those surveyed live in "metropolitan" or big cities, the point made is that the income here is higher than in the province.

As one of the signs of a considerable cultural and educational capital, one can regard the knowledge of foreign languages, first and foremost, English, which shows that the Jewish population is included in a more complex and diverse social interaction and cultural context.

Although the knowledge of Hebrew and even more so of Yiddish is far less widespread; however, as much as around a third of those surveyed are more or less familiar with Hebrew (if we sum up all the positions), while only as little as 16% are familiar with Yiddish, the language of the disappearing culture of the East-European Jewry. Moreover, while the knowledge of English shows positive dynamics; that of Hebrew and Yiddish is negative. Those who fluently speak Hebrew can be considered to be the nucleus of the total Jewish people who are keen on keeping traditions and following Judaism principles.

Table 64

### How would you estimate your knowledge of English?

	2006	2018
I speak, read and write fluently	22	37
I translate with a dictionary but do not speak the language	37	30
I can speak the language but cannot read	10	13
I don't know it at all	32	20

Table 65

### How would you estimate your knowledge of Yiddish?

	2006	2018
I speak, read and write fluently	4	2
I translate with a dictionary but do not speak the language	4	5
I can speak the language but cannot read	9	9
I don't know it at all	84	84

Table 66

### How would you estimate your knowledge of Hebrew?

	2006	2018
I speak, read and write fluently	11	6
I translate with a dictionary but do not speak the language	16	12
I can speak the language but cannot read	11	15
I don't know it at all	63	67

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Despite that, in the Jewish environment, the ideas that antisemitism is declining are predominant, the survey has generally shown that the issue of antisemitic manifestations still persists in Russia.<sup>18</sup> This problem is especially acute on the Internet and in mass media. Although no specific monitoring of the Russian Internet and social networks has been carried out yet to see how widespread antisemitic manifestations are (however, in the Russian mass media, the tendency of increased antisemitic statements by officials has been noted on numerous occasions<sup>19</sup>), the conclusions of the investigation "Antisemitism 2.0 and the culture of hate on the Internet" performed by the Technical University of Berlin and published at the beginning of July 2018 may highly likely be extended to our country: "Today's Internet is the main place not only for shaping up public opinion and making information available but also for spreading antisemitism. <...> The speed, free access, global audience and anonymity foster virtually boundless promotion of antisemitic ideas without any filters".<sup>20</sup> The investigation, during which over 300,000 texts published on the Internet were examined, in particular, those posted on the popular social media Twitter and Facebook, has shown that, from 2007 to 2018, the number of antisemitic comments has increased almost three times.<sup>21</sup>

As noted earlier, over a third of the respondents of the survey carried out by the Levada Center noted a rise in antisemitism on the Russian Internet, while this figure reached as much as 40% among the young population. Although the expansion of antisemitism on the Internet is a global trend, it is clear that, in the Russian context, this problem has its specifics associated with the long-term practice of Russian and Soviet government-supported antisemitism. This is why this problem requires further analysis.

1. In Russia, the problem of antisemitism is less acute than other social problems, such as corruption, unemployment, racism or influx of migrants. 16% of those surveyed find the problem "very acute" in Russia, although over half of the respondents (55%) express concern over the potential influence of antisemites in the public life; which is the same as the number of those concerned with the existence of racism in Russia

<sup>18</sup> Who benefits from stirring up antisemitic sentiments // Investigation of RAPS (Russian Legal Information Agency), February 21, 2017. <[http://rapsnews.ru/incident\\_publication/20170221/277831139.html](http://rapsnews.ru/incident_publication/20170221/277831139.html)>

<sup>19</sup> E. Mukhametshina Russian political leaders began to take liberty of being antisemitic. This can lead to making antisemitism legal in the public space, experts believe // Vedomosti, February 28, 2018. <<https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2018/02/28/752211-politiki-antisemitizm>>

<sup>20</sup> Quotation according to: Investigators are concerned with the growth of antisemitism on the Internet // DW, July 19, 2018. <<https://p.dw.com/p/31ePD>> The report itself "Antisemitism 2.0 and the culture of hate on the Internet" (Antisemitismus 2.0 und die Netzkultur des Hasses)" (Monika Schwarz-Friesel), Technical University of Berlin, Berlin, July 2018, can be found at: <<https://www.unwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/The-United-Nations-and-Antisemitism-2008-2017-Digital.pdf>>

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

2. The majority of those surveyed believe that, in the recent years, the influence of antisemitic groups has been minor. Among the Russian Jews surveyed, the fear of being a target of aggressive antisemitism is not very much pronounced today, with only 9% respondents noting such concerns with respect to themselves. Facts of direct and violent manifestations of antisemitism, including violation of Jewish cemeteries, vandalization of cultural and religious facilities, aggression towards the Jews in the street and in other public places and antisemitic graffiti were noted by 5-9% of those surveyed. However, a noticeable part of the respondents (33%) noted that antisemitic manifestations on the Internet and social media have increased.
3. Instances of discrimination have been mentioned rather rarely. 10-12% of those surveyed said that their rights were prejudiced; however, virtually in all such instances the rights were prejudiced for a reason other than their Jewish origin. Such forms of discrimination as limitation of rights and opportunities based on religion (12%), gender (10%) and age (10%) were mentioned relatively more often. Discrimination based on sexual orientation, disability (or the rights of disabled persons) and ethnicity was mentioned the least.
4. The data of the Jews' survey correlates with the data of the all-Russian survey of 2015, which studied the structure of public views with respect to the Jews to register the parameters of antisemitism incidence. Although during the all-Russian survey, a weakening of antisemitic stereotypes and clichés was recorded as compared to an earlier period, nevertheless, one can say that such stereotypes and clichés are persistent in the Russian public perception, especially as regards the perception of the qualities of the Jewish people.
5. The majority of the respondents clearly identified with Russia (as the country of their birth and residence). 98% are Russian citizens and 7-8% have dual citizenship, namely, Israel, with 1% accounting for citizenship of other countries. 87% of them were born in Russia (which is higher than the corresponding share of native Russians among their parents: 64-68%), 12% – in one of the republics of the former USSR (this figure for their parents is 29-33%). According to their own statement, 61% of them "are strongly linked" to Russia (23% do not feel a meaningful or strong link to Russia, while 15% feel no dependence on or spiritual association with Russia on the whole). 98% of those surveyed only have Russian citizenship, 8-9% have dual citizenship (mainly, of Israel – 7%, a little over 1% accounts for the citizenship of other countries, which were not named).
6. 87% of those surveyed are born Jews, 3% underwent the ceremony of joining Jewry, 6% do not know and 4% do not consider themselves to be Jews, and have abandoned Jewry due to assimilation or for other reasons. That being said, only 72% have a native-Jew mother (including 12% – a half-Jew mother; 24% have a non-Jewish mother, mainly Russian (21%)), 68% have a native-Jew father (including 10% – a half-Jew father; 29% have a non-Jewish father, mainly Russian (23%)). 3% of the surveyed do not know who their parents (father or mother) were in terms of nationality.

- 7.** The majority of the respondents (53%) believe that the majority of the Russian Jews will remain in Russia although those surveyed found the perspectives for the remaining Jews to preserve their national identity problematic. 32% of them believe that they will keep their Jewry; 21% believe that they will assimilate and lose their culture and Jewish identity. Unlike this majority, other 30% of the respondents believe that the majority of the Russian Jews will leave Russia (including 14% who think that the Jews will go to Israel, 16% that they will emigrate to the USA or such European countries as, for instance, Germany). 17% found it difficult to give a clear answer; they do not know what is to happen to the Jews in Russia. In other words, there is no predominant opinion or total certainty about the future of the Jewry in Russia.
- 8.** 56% of the respondents do not plan any radical changes in their lives and do not think about emigration (at least, the main reasons for them to leave, if that is to happen, will not be antisemitism). 42% of the respondents are considering emigration, including among them a substantial part (namely, 28%), who justify these thoughts with concerns of antisemitism worsening in the future. However, the main reasons for potential emigration include: a desire to secure the future of their children (86%), seeking a happy and civilized life (77%), wanting to reunite with close relatives (66%), disbelief in the possibility of social and political improvements in Russia (64%), and willingness to live a fully Jewish life (42%).
- 9.** Half of those surveyed believe that the Jews living in different countries are one and the same nation. The basis of the Jewish identity is formed by the perception of a special historic fate of the Jewish nation who lives among other nations and who has suffered grave persecution and hostility from outside. This perception is, first and foremost, structured by the remembrance of the 20th century Holocaust. The tragedy and unfairness of the situation is compensated with the belief and faith, on the one hand, that the Jewish people are chosen and preserve their unity despite any hardships and, on the other hand, that the Jews are able to achieve recognition of their merits due to a high level of their education and culture, which is evidenced by their indisputable success in various spheres of human activities. Moreover, these merits are considered to be common for all Jews, no matter where they live (and not the source of pride for the Jews in Russia only). It is this perception that makes the Jews feel their unity and consider themselves to be a unique nation in the world ("the nation of diaspora"), which is carried through individual countries and historical epochs.
- 10.** The survey data makes it possible to say that the Jewish young people are experiencing a new wave of interest towards the Jewish culture and traditions associated with the desire to find one's own identity.
- 11.** 55% of the respondents believe that Jews are the "chosen people". This prevailing opinion is in itself very sustainable; it has not changed in the last 12 years. Within the structure of the Jewish collective identity, the values and perceptions that depend on one's own conscious personal

choice of the respondent are strengthening (and will continue to strengthen in the future). This means that the previous forms of maintaining the unity, which are characteristic of the life of the Jews in local communities, where everybody knows each other and follows the same social forms of life organization: synagogue, feasts, etc. and external forced forms of identification and identity maintenance: the Soviet passport system, have been losing their position to more general forms and, importantly: up-to-date and non-traditional forms of internalizing the Jewish history and culture: through the Internet, reading, mass media and mass communications systems.

- 12.** A relative majority (40%, the largest group of the respondents in terms of the number of potential choices) do not follow any Jewish traditions or directions, which would be considered, at the very least, a family tradition. 59% of the respondents do not observe any Jewish religious traditions. The remaining 40% identify themselves with various religious groups and tendencies: 14% of those surveyed consider themselves to be Chabad Jews, 11% identify themselves as Reform Jews (mainly, the young residents of Moscow and big cities), 3-4% consider themselves as Mountain Jews and 2% – as Litvaks (Lithuanian Jews).
- 13.** Antisemitism in Europe and in Russia is similar in terms of several parameters:
- antisemitism is more often manifested verbally: obscenities, threats, publications of antisemitic materials in the mass media, antisemitic propaganda;
  - a great number of antisemitic crimes are never registered because they are not reported;
  - the main venue for showing antisemitic manifestations is the Internet. Punishment for a private person for publishing antisemitic content is mild and is not a restraining factor in terms of repeated publications of this kind. Russia differs from the European countries in a number of important aspects:
    - the origin and nature of antisemitism. As the Soviet state-supported antisemitism disappeared, the position of the Jews in Russia improved; they can enroll in universities, hold managerial positions, the borders are open, the activities of the Jewish communities are allowed;
    - unlike other countries, Russia has no legal framework for registering and investigating crimes of this kind;
    - antisemitism in Russia is part of xenophobia and is often manifested at the domestic level. It is supported by common people rather than members of certain (neo) Nazi organizations. In its turn, xenophobia in Russia is targeting "ethnically different" people rather than the Jews, who are still considered to be "one of us". The main targets for mobbing are the natives of the Caucasus, Central Asia and black people. In Europe, however, antisemitism is promoted by the supporters of the right-wing parties, Muslims and antizionists;
    - Russian antisemitism has no antizionist component, unlike in the European countries, where the waves of antisemitism are closely related to the policy of Israel towards the Middle East.



**Russian  
Jewish  
Congress**

**WE WOULD BE HAPPY  
TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS:**

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