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A submission to Mr. Pedro Arrojo-Agudo, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation for his first thematic report on water commodification, dedicated to the 48th session of the Human Rights Council and the 76th session of the UN General Assembly.

**Introduction**

1. This submission to the Special Rapporteur on the human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation informs his first thematic report on water commodification. It reviews the legislations and policies of the Israeli occupation and the Palestinian Authority related to water commodification and their impact on the human rights to water in the occupied Palestinian territory consisting of the West Bank including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip.
2. Israel acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 1966. Legislations and practices of the Israeli occupation related to water, especially commodification violate the Palestinians human rights to water and sanitation. They also weaken their resilience and capacity for coping with crisis including Covid-19.
3. While Israel plans to formally annex parts of the West Bank are on temporary hold, demolition of private property -including WASH structures- of Palestinians in Area C to advance forcible transfer has increased significantly. Covid-19 has been an opportunity for the Israeli occupation to increase their violations of the Palestinian water rights.
4. The State of Palestine acceded to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2014. Legislations and practices of the Israeli occupation related to water, especially commodification violate the Palestinians human rights to water and sanitation. They also weaken their resilience and capacity for coping with crisis including Covid-19. Moreover, they further increase inequality in the Palestinian society including between men and women.
5. With Covid-19, the Palestinian Authority’s violations of freedom of expression increased. In addition, the weak to absent engagement of the civil society in the development and monitoring of their water related policies and projects has worsened despite the potential for remote participation which the technology provides

**The Israeli occupation violations of the Palestinians human rights to water and sanitation – turning Palestinians into customers for the occupation.**

1. Israel as the occupying power is obligated by the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to provide for the Palestinian human rights to safe drinking water and sanitation including water services as indicated in the general comment No.15 (2002). This obligation has been repeatedly emphasized by the UN including after signing interim peace agreement in 1993 - 1995 and after Israel's disengagement plan in 2005[[1]](#footnote-1), and Israel constantly denied it has this obligation[[2]](#footnote-2). Israel continues to violate the Palestinians human rights to water and sanitation on daily bases. Through military orders, it has been the sole controller of all aspects related to water management in the occupied Palestinian territory since the 1967 occupation. Consequently, it deprives the Palestinians from a huge economic potential and severely restricts their water development. It turned them into customers for the occupation. Apparently, the only segment growing is purchases from the Israeli National Water Company, Mekorot.
2. The occupied Palestinian territory’s total production of fresh water in 2020 was 142 mcm/yr[[3]](#footnote-3), while as a rough estimate the regional resources alone[[4]](#footnote-4) could produce 668 mcm/yr[[5]](#footnote-5) should it have access to its equitable water share[[6]](#footnote-6).
3. Immediately after the 1967 occupation, Israel has de-facto annexed all water. It issued a series of military orders stating that all the water resources that have been occupied are the property of the state of Israel[[7]](#footnote-7), forbidding any act of water development without official permit[[8]](#footnote-8) and cancelling all existing regulations[[9]](#footnote-9). Consequently, Israel became the sole controller of all aspects related to water management including: extraction, storage, transportation, use, treatment and inspection. It established a permit regime, which requires the Palestinians to seek the permission of the Israeli Military Commander for any act of water development[[10]](#footnote-10).
4. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Peace Agreement: Oslo II 1995 transferred all responsibilities for supplying and providing the occupied Palestinian population with water and sewage to the Palestinian Authority, which was established by the Oslo agreements in 1993. However, Israel maintained full control over the physical water resources by long-standing illegal routines, including the permit regime and through the establishment of a new, so-called Joint Israeli-Palestinian Water Committee (JWC)[[11]](#footnote-11). In other words: “responsibility” but without control nor sovereignty. In 2017, a new Israeli-Palestinian agreement was signed concerning the Joint Water Committee. This agreement allowed Palestinians to implement water projects without the permission of the joint committee in Areas A and B[[12]](#footnote-12), as long as they do not involve access to any additional quantities of water. However, in 61% of the West Bank (Area C), these projects still require approval of the Israeli Civil Administration. Thus, this agreement did not reduce the intentional severe constraints[[13]](#footnote-13) on water development. The new agreement also permitted Israel to expand water provision for settlements without requiring the joint committee’s approval, withdrawing from the Palestinian Authority the single veto card which before, it held in its hands (but never used) – although only on paper - to oppose water projects in the illegal Israeli settlements[[14]](#footnote-14). It should be noted that Israel consistently implemented projects in the West Bank without submitting projects for approval to the Joint Water Committee.
5. In April 2020, new military orders and policies have been issued concerning the permit regime. They enable the Israeli authorities to circumvent procedures enshrined in planning legislation and execute demolitions / seizures without, or with very short, prior notice in Area C. While in East Jerusalem, the Israeli government has narrowed the judicial courts’ discretion to postpone demolitions and instead have enabled the municipality to impose more pressure on Palestinians to self-demolish their property[[15]](#footnote-15).

The Oslo Accords is an interim agreement which left division of the joint Palestinian-Israeli water resources to the permanent status negotiations[[16]](#footnote-16) which was supposed to be reached by 1999 at the latest, but there is still not any final agreement. Given this fact and the population growth, both the total well and spring production and the individual Palestinian share of water today are considerably less than before Oslo[[17]](#footnote-17).

1. The lost economic potential due to the occupation’s control of the Palestinian land and resources including water is massive. For instance, the revenue of the industries which are based on the Dead Sea is 4.2 billion US$/yr, from which Palestine’s share is zero[[18]](#footnote-18). The lost potential of the Agricultural sector has been estimated at 2 billion US$/yr[[19]](#footnote-19) and the lost potential of Area C as 3.4 billion US$/yr[[20]](#footnote-20).[[21]](#footnote-21) The occupation’s control over (joint but not shared) water resources has not only deprived the Palestinians of their water rights since 1967, but further impacted their future rights. For instance, Israel has diverted the route of the lower Jordan river[[22]](#footnote-22). This illegal unilateral out-of-basin transfer of the international Jordan River led to the rapid shrinkage and drastic drops in water levels of the Dead Sea (by over 1.5m per year!), besides the additional losses by enhanced evaporation for the mineral industry (which alone accounts for 30-40% of the total depletion of the Dead Sea by some accounts[[23]](#footnote-23)).
2. The drop of water levels in the Dead Sea also leads to an rapid and sever depletion (de-watering) of the Eastern Aquifers groundwater storage (according to the Israeli Tahal reports for the RSDS-Canal Feasibility studies)[[24]](#footnote-24), thus directly impacting this only available groundwater resource in the entire Southern West Bank (Bethlehem and Hebron governorates).
3. In 2017, an Israeli-Palestinian agreement was signed for the Palestinian Authority to purchase additional 22 mcm/yr for the West Bank and 10 mcm/yr for the Gaza Strip[[25]](#footnote-25). This made the total amount that Palestinians buy from Israel 90 mcm/yr. The new agreement increases the price for water purchased for the West Bank from 2.8 Israeli Shekel (ILS) in the previous agreements to 3.3 ILS and the price of the water purchased for the Gaza Strip from 2.5 ILS to 3.2 ILS[[26]](#footnote-26). The agreement paves the road for additional potential increases in the price of the water that Palestinians buy from Israel. Ironically, Palestinians are forced to purchase water from Israel only, because it controls the Palestinians´ equitable and reasonable share of water resources in contravention of international water law.
4. In April 2020, an agreement of the Israeli government stipulated that a draft bill for annexing parts of the West Bank will be presented to the Israeli Parliament “Knesset” as of 1 July 2020. In and by itself the agreement forms a major shift in the Israeli position as it has been approved by the majority of the government members[[27]](#footnote-27). “To give effect to formal annexation, would require repealing the Oslo Accords”[[28]](#footnote-28), which will in all likelihood would dismantle the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Although, the formal annexation is on temporary hold[[29]](#footnote-29), destruction of property - including WASH structures - which has been employed as an effective coercive tactic to advance the forcible transfer of Palestinians has increased in 2020 and the first quarter of 2021 at an unprecedented rate[[30]](#footnote-30). Since the beginning of 2009, the UN has registered demolitions of 7,563 structures including 684 WASH structures, resulting in forcible transfer of over 11,000 Palestinians[[31]](#footnote-31).
5. The Israeli legislations and policies deprive all the Palestinians their right to their equitable and reasonable share of available water resources, albeit to differing degrees. Moreover, they are a primary reason for prohibiting 60.5% of the Palestinians their right to access safe drinking water and an even higher percentage of their right to adequate sanitation and/or disconnecting them from these services[[32]](#footnote-32).

**The Palestinian Authority violations of the human rights to water and sanitation – full cost recovery and further marginalizing the poor under occupation as a long-term strategy.**

1. In 2008, the Palestinian Authority set their long-term goal as ensuring that “public infrastructure and utilities are managed on a commercially-oriented and financially viable basis and, with increasing level of private sector investment and participation”[[33]](#footnote-33). This was envisioned in a sovereign state[[34]](#footnote-34). The UN General Assembly resolution 67/19 of (2014) upgrading Palestine to "non-member observer state" changed nothing in the Palestinians’ reality. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Authority remain committed to their goal. Today, 11% of the Palestinians are connected to prepaid water meters[[35]](#footnote-35),[[36]](#footnote-36). Moreover, the Cabinet passed a tariff system for achieving full cost recovery. Yet, no measures have been taken to prohibit water disconnections not even during crisis including Covid-19. Moreover, service providers lack standards for accountability when their performance reports show mismanagement. Thus, the full cost recovery includes cost of mismanagement.
2. The common core document which the State of Palestine submitted to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasized on the separation between water rights and land rights in the Palestinian law as a measure to ensure the right to water[[37]](#footnote-37). The water law No 4 (2014) considered all water resources a public property, which the Palestinian Authority has the power to manage in a manner that ensures justice and efficient distribution. This however remains an ink on paper given the fact that Israel has de facto annexed all Palestinian water in 1967, and given the restrictions that the occupation imposes on water development in the occupied Palestinian territory. For instance, “it is hard to regulate springs and wells in private land in Area C. Moreover, springs in Area A are subject to historical right and shares of owners”, said Shaddad Attili, the Head of the Palestinian Water Authority (2008 - 2014)[[38]](#footnote-38). Mohammad al-Hmaidi, CEO of the Water Sector Regulatory Council said that “the Palestinian Authority have to deal with the fact that private owners would not easily give up their historical water rights”[[39]](#footnote-39). The Gaza Strip’s regional water utility noticed that regulation of illegal wells in private property becomes easier when the service provider is able to provide sufficient, safe and reliable supply service. According to Monther Shoblaq, the Director of the utility, “citizens use their private wells or drill new ones -without following the Palestinian Authority’s regulations- when the service is interrupted. However, when the service improves, they tend to self-regulate as they abandon their private wells and the rate of drilling of new wells declines significantly”[[40]](#footnote-40).
3. The core document submitted to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to article 5 of the water law No 4 (2014) as a measure for ensuring the right of access to sufficient water. This exact same article is problematic; it states that “every person has the right to obtain his needs of suitable quality drinking water for utilization at specific prices set in accordance with the Tariff Regulation”. By connecting water access to payment, it made a shift from the water law No 3 (2002) and the water law No 2 (1996) which did not make this link. “The Palestinian Authority should separate the human right to water from the collection of water utility fees. Every person has the right to water regardless of their ability or even their willingness to pay”, said Abdelrahman Tamimi, the Director of the Palestinian Hydrology Group.
4. The Tariff Regulation issued by the Cabinet in February 2021 aims to achieve a full cost recovery, except for infrastructure or aspects of the service funded by foreign aid[[41]](#footnote-41). Apparently, the full cost recovery will oblige the citizens to pay for cost incurred as a result of mismanagement. The Water Sector Regulatory Council issues regular reports on the performance of the water and sanitation service providers[[42]](#footnote-42). While it is possible to identify by common sense service providers which the results of their indicators suggest mismanagement, it is not possible to proof mismanagement with absence of a standard.
5. Besides passing a tariff system for achieving full cost recovery, the Palestinian Authority have been promoting “enforcement measures” for collection of water and other utilities services’ fee. These measures include requiring citizens to present a “certificate of payment” of utility bills in order to receive public services such as water, electricity and permits for construction. They also included installation of prepaid water meters. Today nearly 19%[[43]](#footnote-43) of the households in the West Bank have prepaid water meters, and the number is still increasing. Moreover, some of the service providers who provide both water and electricity services and have not installed prepaid meters, deduct the water service fee from the prepaid electricity bill.
6. The Palestinian Authority have taken no measures to prohibit water disconnections, not even during crisis including Covid-19[[44]](#footnote-44). Moreover, they have abandoned their commitment to ensure the poor access to water. In 2010, the Cabinet issued Resolution No.13/51/03 encouraging all water service providers to install pre-paid meters. It committed to support the poor through the "cash transfer strategy" of the Ministry of Social Development. The strategy which was issued in 2010 did not mention the pre-paid water meters[[45]](#footnote-45), thus there is, in fact, no social protection mechanism in place. The National Water and Wastewater Strategy for Palestine for 2013 – 2032, transferred the responsibility for supporting poor access to water from the Palestinian Authority to the citizens. The strategy suggested a ‘’pro-poor water tariffs”. The tariff system introduced in February 2021 aims to achieve full cost recovery. It charges an increasing fee as consumption increases. However, it does not ensure connectivity of the citizen if they do not pay their water bill -in advance if they have a prepaid meter-.
7. A full cost recovery, prepaid meters and other “enforcement measures” for collecting water utility fees might increase water unaffordability, especially where the unemployment rate is 30.8%[[46]](#footnote-46). Moreover, the monthly income of 41.1% of the population is below the national poverty line[[47]](#footnote-47), and the minimum wage defined by law is 59% of the national poverty line[[48]](#footnote-48). Furthermore, The Ministry of Social Development provides assistance to only 35% of citizens under the national poverty line. The assistance is 83 – 200 ILS/household/month, when the national poverty line is 2,470 ILS/month[[49]](#footnote-49). Thus, with its current capacity, the social protection system is unable to ensure the fulfilment of the basic needs including access to water of the poor, not even the beneficiaries of social assistance.
8. Studies prove that some citizens have been disconnected from the water service based on their ability to bay[[50]](#footnote-50). The support mechanisms that exists are random, inconsistent and not publicly known. My primary research found that in the villages served by North-West Jenin Service Council, the service provider staff paid the water bill for a poor woman from their pocket[[51]](#footnote-51). Inadvertently, the very modern pre-paid water meters have in some places contributed to empowering out-dated and pre-democratic dependency structures, in that poor consumers needed a recommendation from a senior head of the extended family to receive aid from the council. In particular, this is the case for those who are not regular beneficiaries of the Ministry of Social Development[[52]](#footnote-52). Dependence on family unsurprisingly also showed up in my survey, in that some consumers were forced to borrow from their extended family in order to pay for water. Still other consumers without such the possibility to borrow money from family live without access to water. The prepaid water meters consist a burden systematically laid on the poorest, weakest, already most marginalised and suffering parts of the population, which includes many of the 11% of the households in Palestine which are headed by women.
9. The random and inconsistent social support mechanisms violate citizens’ rights and dignity. Furthermore, available data gives reason to assume they further increase inequality between men and women. In 2020, the rate of women’s participation in the labour market was 16%, compared to 65% for men. Moreover, 25% of the employed women were paid below the minimum wage[[53]](#footnote-53). Besides being poorer, women have less access to support from family networks than men, since the available support goes via the patriarchal tribal system and not the state.
10. Human rights activists have been criticising the weak to absent engagement of the civil society by the Palestinian Authority including in development and monitoring of their policies related to water. The civil society are engaged when it is a donor requirement. Furthermore, their input is usually ignored[[54]](#footnote-54). This has been worsened by Covid-19 despite the potential for remote participation which the technology provides.
11. Al-Haq, human rights organization reported that the Palestinian Authority has issued during Covid-19 legislations that violates both their obligations under the international law as well as the Palestinian basic law, including the prolonged state of emergency which was declared over Covid-19 since the identification of the first case in 5 March 2021 up to the date . These acts harmed the health situation as well as the economy. In addition, “violation of freedom of expression continued and increased with increasing variety of methods”[[55]](#footnote-55).
1. The disengagement plan is the unilateral withdrawal of Israeli settlers and ground troops from the Gaza Strip in 2005. See: Al-Haq (2005), One Year after the ‘Disengagement’: Gaza still Occupied and under Attack Definition of disengagement plan [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - Concluding observations in 2003 and 2011 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. 101.3 mcm from the mountain aquifer and 40.6 from springs. Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/postar.aspx?lang=ar&ItemID=3943> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Regional resources like the Mountain Aquifer as of Oslo (not including minor local aquifers like the Eocene or the Pleistocene) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Rough estimate as detailed below:

Jordan River 254 mcm/yr as per Johnston plan (1953)

Western Aquifer Basin 192 mcm/yr, half of the safe yield of 384 mcm/yr

North-Eastern Aquifer Basin 72 mcm/yr, half of Oslo Peace Accords’ yield of 145 mcm/yr

Eastern Aquifer Basin 150 mcm/yr. According to the Oslo Peace Accords, its yield is roughly 170 mcm/yr (of which 150 for the Palestinians and the surplus for Israel) [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. I did not include quantities abstracted from the Southern end of the Costal Aquifer by the Gaza Strip as most of this water cannot be counted as fresh and therefore is unfit for human consumption. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Military order No 92 (15.08.1967) [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Military order No 158 (19.11.1967) [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Military order No 291 (19.12.1968) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Shehadeh, Raja (1985). *Occupier's Law, Israel and the West Bank*. Washington DC: Institute for Palestine Studies. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. In the JWC, Israel uses its veto power to deny the vast majority of the project applications submitted the committee. Projects in areas C, which comprise of 61% of the West Bank, require in addition to the approval of the JWC an official military permit by the Israeli Civil Administration. Moreover, in 1997, the committee started making its approval of Palestinian projects conditional of the Palestinians approval of water projects of the illegal Israeli settlements. Thus, Israel has a triple veto power. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Oslo Peace Accords divided the West Bank into three administrative areas: Area C -which consists 61% of the West Bank- is under full Israeli control, Area B is under Israeli military control but the Palestinian Authority provides the administrative services and Area A is under the control of the Palestinian Authority. This divide was supposed to end as Israel withdraw from the West Bank, which did not happen [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. The term “severe constrains” was used by UN OCHA, Special Focus: Restricting Space: The Planning Regime Applied by Israel in Area C of the West Bank, December 2009, at P. 16. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Jan Selby (26.01.2017), Renewing cooperation on water: what hope for the two-state solution? <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/what-hope-for-two-state-solution/> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Legal Task Force – Protection Cluster in the occupied Palestinian territory, presentation for the Association of International Development Agencies on 16.12.2020 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Article 40.2 of Annex II states that both sides of the agreement “recognize the necessity to develop additional water for various uses”. However, the Oslo Accords stipulated a false and highly discriminatory estimation of so-called ‘’future water needs’’ of the Palestinians in the West Bank of 70 – 80 mcm/yr for the 4 years of the interim period, while no such cap was set for Israeli “future water needs’’. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. National Water and Wastewater Strategy for Palestine: Towards Building a Palestinian State from Water Perspective (2013) Palestinian Water Authority [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Palestine TV, Interview with Missyef Jamel from MAS and Mahmoud el-Khafeef from UNTCAD on 11 September 2020. Last accessed on 16 September 2020. Available at: (https://www.facebook.com/PalestineTV/videos/376121420056991/UzpfSTEzNjc2MzYxMzA2NzMyMTozMzEyNTcyNDM4ODE5NzQw/) [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. The Palestinian Ministry of National Economy and the Applied Research Institute- Jerusalem (ARIJ). (2011) *The economic costs of the Israeli occupation for the occupied Palestinian territory*. Ramallah: The Palestinian Ministry of National Economy and ARIJ [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. World Bank (2013), Palestinians Access to Area C Key to Economic Recovery and Sustainable Growth [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. The 3 figures here are separate examples. The total cost of occupation is not limited to their sum. In addition, I have not checked if there is overlapping between them or not. The Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem found that the economic cost of the Israeli occupation in 2014 which they have been able to measure was 9.46 billion US$, representing almost 74.27% of Palestinian nominal GDP of that year. Source: The Applied Research Institute - Jerusalem (ARIJ). (2015) *The economic costs of the Israeli occupation for the occupied Palestinian territory*. Bethlehem: ARIJ. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. The diversion of the route of the lower Jordan river -from Tiberias to the Dead Sea- in 1964 made its annual flow drop to 2% of the historical flow rate -mostly from sewage along the lower Jordan’s route-. Source: Zayneb al-Shalalfeh, Fiona Napier & Eurig Scandrett (2017): Water Nakba in Palestine: Sustainable Development Goal 6 versus Israeli hydro-hegemony, Local Environment, DOI: 10.1080/13549839.2017.1363728 [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. EcoPeace: <https://old.ecopeaceme.org/projects/dead-sea/> [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Tahal, Geological Survey of Israel, 2011, Final Report Dead Sea Study – Red Sea Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/8/1/water-deal-tightens-israels-control-over-palestinians> [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Figures provided by Shaddad Attili, Advisor ranking Minister at the Negotiations Affairs Department [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. The only parties who did not approved the annexation are the Joint Arab List and Meretz [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Itay Epshtain (20.04.2020) Initial Information on the Coalition Agreement for the Establishment of an Emergency and National Unity Government, Norwegian Refugee Council [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. After 1 July 2020, the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee held successive meetings dedicated to "Government activities to prevent the Palestinian Authority from taking over Area C" [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Rate is unprecedented since OCHA started recording demolitions in 1 January 2009. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. OCHA demolitions database: <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiMmJkZGRhYWQtODk0MS00MWJkLWI2NTktMDg1NGJlMGNiY2Y3IiwidCI6IjBmOWUzNWRiLTU0NGYtNGY2MC1iZGNjLTVlYTQxNmU2ZGM3MCIsImMiOjh9> [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/postar.aspx?lang=ar&ItemID=3943> [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Palestinian National Authority/ PNA. (2007)*, Palestinian Reform and Development Plan 2008 - 2010*. Ramallah: PNA [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Palestinian National Authority/ PNA. (2011)*, National Development Plan 2011 - 2013*. Ramallah: PNA [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Approximate figure calculated by dividing number of installed prepaid meters on number of households as detailed below:

Number of prepaid water meters installed by December 2020 was nearly 113,000 (Source: prepaid water meters suppliers)

Population size in 2020 was 5,101,152 (Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%81%D8%B8%D8%A7%D8%AA%20%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B2%D9%8A%2097-2017.html>)

Average size of household in 2020 was 5.1 (Source: Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2020) Palestinians by the end of 2020. P. 25) [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. The prepaid water meter allows the citizen to charge a limited amount of cm3 of water in debt for one time, after that the citizen get disconnected from water if their credit runs out. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. State of Palestine (2020) Common core document for the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Treaty Body database [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Interview with Shaddad Attili, Advisor ranking Minister at the Negotiations Affairs Department and Head of the Palestinian Water Authority for the period from 2008 to 214 (11.04.2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Interview with Mohammad al-Hmaidi, CEO of the Water Sector Regulatory Council (11.04.2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Interview with Monther Shoblaq, Director of the Costal Municipalities Water Utility (12.04.2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Advisory and Legislation Bureau, Palestinian Official Gazette, Al-Waqa'I, Issue No 177 (18.03.2021) [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Water Sector Regulatory Council (2019) The comparative data of water and wastewater service providers in Palestine. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Figure calculated as explained in footnote 34 above, however, this figure is for the West Bank alone as the Gaza Strip has zero prepaid meters up to the date. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. WASH Cluster (2020) WASH Covid-19 response guidance [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Ministry of Social Affairs (2010) Cash transfer strategy [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, 2019, Palestinian Labour Force Survey – Annual Report P. 31 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2018), Household Expenditure and Consumption Survey (October 2016 – September 2017) P. 26 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The minimum wage is 1450 ILS (Cabinet, Resolution No 11 (2012) ) whereas the poverty line for a household with 5 members is 2470 ILS (<http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/site/617/default.aspx>). Moreover, many labors are paid below the minimum wage with the poor measures for ensuring that employers commit to payment of the minimum wage. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Palestinian Ministry of Social Development (2018), Annual Statistical Report 2017, P. 16, P. 22, P. 25

and Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (2018), Household Expenditure and Consumption Survey (October 2016 – September 2017) P. 26

 <https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Downloads/book2368.pdf?date=7_5_2018> [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. See also: Riyahi, I. (2011) *Two Years After Palestinian Reform and Development Plan: The Poor Are Still Paying the Price*. Ramallah: Bisan Center for Research and Development

And Hamdan, A. and Yahya, A. (2012) *The Pre-payment System in Water and Electricity Sectors*. Ramallah: Bisan Center for Research and Development [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Jarradat, M. (2017) Interviewed by Zayneb al-Shalalfeh for MSc theses on the prepaid meters and water governance, 1 August. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Hawwash, S. (2017) Interviewed by Zayneb al-Shalalfeh for *MSc theses on the prepaid meters and water governance*, 19 July. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (08.03.2021) <http://www.pcbs.gov.ps/postar.aspx?lang=ar&ItemID=3933> [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Source: interviews with civil society and water rights activists [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Al-Haq Kathren Abu Amsha (2020) Freedom of expression between legislation, practice and state of emergency [↑](#footnote-ref-55)