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Agenda item 4
Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention

Supplementary information to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Myanmar since 1 February 2021*

Conference room paper

I. Introduction

1. This conference room paper serves as supplementary material to the written update A/HRC/48/67 prepared for the Human Rights Council according to resolution 46/21. Providing both description and analysis of thematic issues, the written update contextually frames developments in Myanmar over time from the 1 February military coup and associated rights violations.

2. This paper elaborates on aspects of that written update, particularly in providing:
   (a) A selection of quotes from individuals from across Myanmar who were interviewed for the written update, giving a snapshot of the impact of the coup on individuals across the country;
   (b) A chronology of key events from 1 February 2021 until end of June 2021;
   (c) Details on the evolution of peaceful anti-coup protests, particularly regarding street demonstrations and use of social media, and, in turn, the response from Myanmar’s security forces. Four specific incidents are elaborated, with accompanying maps, to further demonstrate the increasing use of lethal force. These incidents occurred (i) on 3 March in North Okkalapa, a township in northern Yangon; (ii) on 14 March in Hlaingtharya, a township in western Yangon; (iii) on 27 March, also Armed Forces Day, across the country; and (iv) on 9 April in Bago city; and
   (d) A detailed account of airstrikes launched by the Tatmadaw against civilian areas in south-east Myanmar, marking a significant escalation in conflict between the Karen National Liberation Army and the Tatmadaw following the coup, accompanied by satellite imagery which shows damage to a school. A national map showing the locations of reported armed conflict and armed resistance incidents demonstrates growing insecurity and expanding armed violence around Myanmar to accompany analysis of international human rights, and in certain situations humanitarian law, violations in those contexts.

3. This paper provides greater context to the written update by examining trends in the use of force by security forces in different locations, each involving grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the impact on civilian populations. By presenting this detailed information, it is hoped that this paper will serve as a resource for Member States in assessing their responses to the human rights crisis in Myanmar and to support people in the country.
II. Voices from Myanmar

“The day we went to collect the dead bodies, there were 19 ... There may be other dead bodies nearby the army area, but we did not dare to go there.... I collected 8 bodies and 6 were shot in the head.”

A villager in Sagaing Region

“People cannot sleep at night because they are scared of getting arrested and now the military are trying to kill and arrest and torture people. I hope the international community will see this and help people.”

A religious leader from Kachin State

“The army still does not allow food transportation. If they see food transport, they burn it down and they even make trouble for ambulances. People come from the jungle road into the village, hiding, get food and go back. The army was hiding in the village and when they saw the people, they shot.”

A villager from Kayah State

“This protester from Mandalay Region ran away with seven others down a street. In that road, I saw two protesters get shot and killed. One was shot in the head and another beside me was shot in the back...we did not have any weapons or anything...It is hard to talk, the memories are hard. But I will keep telling no matter how hard. The international community must know.”

A protester from Mandalay Region

“Please don’t ignore the people of Myanmar. They need support and please do everything you can to help them in the most effective way.”

A CDM teacher

“They came inside the house and they searched for him...they even searched a neighbour’s house. They were shouting, “if we cannot get you, we will take hostage your wife and family.”

Relative of an arrested individual

“I want the support of the UN because now the conditions are very difficult for us.”

Family of a child who was killed

“The students were resisting so the army beat them and took them into the army truck. I think they took them to prison...but families have not been told. I am worried about them.”

A protest leader from Mon State

“As Karen people we want to be recognized as human.”

An IDP from Kayin State

“Some soldiers … used a sniper, this is how people got shot. The first person … was shot in front of me, he fell on me and a lot of his blood got on my shirt.”

A protester from Shan State

Disclaimer: The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.
III. Chronology of Key Events

**February 1:** Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar military ("Tatmadaw") removes the civilian government, detains the country’s political leadership and hundreds of parliamentarians, and vests all legislative, judicial and executive powers of the State in himself.
Nationalwide internet shutdown.

**February 2:** Tatmadaw forms State Administrative Council (SAC) and begins making ministerial appointments.
A coordinated civil disobedience movement (CDM) begins.

**February 3:** Ministry of Transport and Communication orders a three-day suspension to Facebook access – a suspension that was extended and remains in effect as of 15 July.

**February 4:** SAC dismisses four NLD-appointed Supreme Court judges and appoints two new judges.

**February 5:** Elected National League for Democracy (NLD) parliamentarians form Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union Parliament) (CRPH).

**February 6:** Nationwide Internet shutdown for 48 hours.

**February 7:** Nationwide peaceful protests begin.

**February 8:** Military-affiliated Myanmar Radio and Television issues a warning to anti-coup protesters, announcing that “action would be taken in accordance with the law if there are violations of state stability and peace, safety of people, and the rule of law”.
The military issues “section 144 orders”, prohibiting “unlawful assembly, talks, using vehicles or in persons in marching around, protests, destroying and violent acts”, limiting public assemblies to less than five persons, and imposing a curfew from 8.00 p.m. to 4.00 a.m. in townships across Naypyidaw Council Territory, Ayeyarwady, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Yangon Regions, as well as Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon and Shan states.

**February 9:** Live ammunition used in Naypyidaw, resulting in the death of a young female protester.

**February 10:** Law Protecting Privacy and Security of Citizens and Ward and Village Tract Administration Law amended.

**February 11:** Beginning of nationwide internet shutdown from 1.00 a.m.-9.00 a.m. enforced nightly.
Electronic Transactions Law amended.

**February 12:** State pardon and release of 23,369 prisoners.
29th special session of the Human Rights Council is held on the human rights implications of the crisis in Myanmar and adopts resolution S-29/1.

**February 13:** Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure amended.

**February 14:** General strike held.

**February 15:** Martial law ordered in six townships in Yangon.
Nationwide mobile internet shutdown.

**February 16:** Ethnic armed organization signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement announce they will support the CDM.

**February 17:** SAC revokes the licenses of Democratic Voice of Burma, Khit Thit Media, Mizzima, Myanmar Now and 7Day media organizations.

**February 18:** Hlaingtharya crackdown.
CRPH announces responses to military violence by individuals and groups in self-defence will not be considered criminal acts.

**March 3:** North Okkalapa crackdown.

**March 11:** Fighting resurges in Kachin State.

**March 15:** Martial law ordered in six townships in Yangon.
Nationwide mobile internet shutdown.
April 2: Fixed wireless Internet suspended.

April 16: CRPH forms National Unity Government (NUG) and begins appointing Acting Union Ministers.

April 27: Airstrikes in Hpapun Township, Kayin State.

April 30: Nightly internet shutdown and mobile internet shutdown lifted for whitelisted applications.

May 5: NUG announces the formation of the People’s Defence Force.

May 8: SAC declares the CRPH, NUG, PDF and all their subordinates are terrorist organizations under the Counter-Terrorism Law.

May 18: NUG forms Federal Constitution Commission to oversee drafting of a federal union constitution.

June 1: SAC reopens all schools.

June 3: NUG issues a policy position paper on the Rohingya.

June 7: NUG declares the Tatmadaw and its affiliated organizations terrorist organizations under the Counter-Terrorism Law.

June 30: SAC releases 2,296 individuals detained since the coup.

March 17: CRPH declares SAC a terrorist organization and removes the designation of “unlawful associations” from all ethnic armed organizations.

March 21: SAC declares CRPH an unlawful association under the Unlawful Associations Law.

March 27: Armed Forces Day crackdown. Airstrikes begin in Kayin State.

March 22: SAC releases 628 persons detained since the coup.

March 24: SAC releases 628 persons detained since the coup.

March 31: CRPH announces that the 2008 Constitution is abolished and publishes Federal Democratic Charter.

April 9: Bago crackdown.

April 17: Annual Thingyan (Burmese New Year) prisoner release of 23,184 individuals.

April 24: Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Leaders Meeting in Jakarta and adoption of a Five-Point Consensus.

April 28: Mobile Internet access restored for banking, financial and commercial applications.

May 6: Fixed wireless Internet access restored for banking, financial and commercial applications.

May 10: Legal Aid Law amended.

May 13: SAC imposes martial law on Mindat, Chin State.

May 20: Fighting begins in Kayah State.

June 4: ASEAN delegation, comprising of ASEAN Secretary-General and Brunei Second Foreign Minister, meets Tatmadaw Commander-in-Chief in Naypyidaw to present nominations for the special envoy of the ASEAN chair to Myanmar relating to the 24 April Five-Point Consensus. (Brunei currently holds ASEAN Chair and the Secretary-General is also from Brunei.)

IV. Myanmar security forces’ responses to peaceful anti-coup protest and resistance over time

4. Following the February military coup d’état, large-scale, peaceful protests throughout Myanmar galvanized the world’s attention by their sheer size as well as the creativity expressed in street protests, in homes and online, spreading the message of the Myanmar people across borders. From early on, several neighbourhoods across the country started banging pots and pans together in unison every night, based on a traditional ritual to drive out evil. These unique protests have continued for months as a show of ongoing resistance to the actions of the military.

5. Peaceful protests flooded streets across Myanmar, giving rise to artistic expressions of dissent. Pro-democracy slogans, depictions of protesters and anti-coup imagery were all used to represent the unity of the Myanmar people. Online artistic content also flourished as a result of campaigns calling for art showing the three-finger salute adopted by protesters as a pro-democracy symbol to be submitted and shared with hashtags such as “#ThreeFinger”, “#FightWithArt” and “#WhatsHappeningInMyanmar”. (See below for samples of such artwork by anonymous artists available online.) Musicians of numerous genres made songs of protest and performed at street protests and online, traditional dance performances were held, and poets recited anti-coup poems. These creative displays contributed to a vibrant atmosphere surrounding the protest movement, broadcast around the world.

6. Young people continue to propagate a steady stream of comical and satire-based content in the form of both picture and video “memes”, which reach a large online audience. This indicates that a younger generation is actively involved, arguably at times even in the lead, in voicing dissenting reactions to the military authorities.

7. Creative forms of protest have also reflected Myanmar’s culture. For example, in one protest dubbed by some as the “Sarong/Htamein Revolution”, women hung a traditional women’s garment called a htamein, a kind of longyi or sarong, over entrances to towns and villages. This reflects the traditional belief that men who pass beneath women’s clothing will bring bad luck onto themselves. In some places, some security forces were unwilling to pass beneath these garments due to this belief. In some demonstrations, individuals carried placards referencing “R2P,” or the international community’s responsibility to “help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” and to act where “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from these atrocities.1

8. Following increasing use of lethal force employed by security forces to disperse protests, demonstrations evolved to be more symbolic in nature rather than performative. One example of this was the “blood strike” protest, which saw anti-coup protesters spraying red paint in public spaces to represent the blood of protesters killed by security forces and further show their defiance. Another such protest involved the use of soft toys placed on streets, instead of protesters, holding cardboard placards. As demonstrated in the incidents elaborated below, protesters also organized brief “flash mob” protests in the morning or late in the evening to avoid security forces. It is evident that the celebratory forms of protest observed shortly after the coup have shifted in response to violent actions of security forces.

9. The following subsections examine in detail four incidents in March and early April: North Okkalapa, Hlaingtharya, Armed Forces Day, and Bago. These incidents clearly demonstrate the deployment of increasingly deadly tactics by the security forces to suppress opposition to the military authorities, which resulted in hundreds of arbitrary killings and wounding of peaceful protesters.

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1 See A/RES/60/1 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 139.
Images courtesy of “Raise Three Fingers”
https://www.threefingers.org/
A. North Okkalapa Township, northern Yangon (3 March 2021)

10. In the days prior to the incident on 3 March in North Okkalapa, a township in northern Yangon, there were indications that the authorities had increasingly employed force to suppress anti-coup demonstrations in different parts of the country. The incident in North Okkalapa signified a perceptible shift in Tatmadaw tactics, as they began to use lethal force against peaceful protesters and attacked medical equipment and facilities, as well as first responders and medical personnel assisting injured protesters. From about 9.30 a.m. on 3 March, hundreds of anti-coup protesters had peacefully gathered on Thudhamma Road, near a traffic junction and Kyauk Ye Twin Bridge in North Okkalapa. (See map of North Okkalapa at the end of section.) When the protest was at its most crowded, around 11 a.m., multiple trucks carrying police and military forces arrived and stationed themselves on the bridge. Security forces reportedly occupied the surrounding buildings, including a hospital, and blocked various routes in and out of the area.

11. Security forces allegedly warned the protesters to clear the area or be met with further action. When the protesters refused to disperse, the security forces began firing rubber bullets and threw tear gas canisters and stun grenades. Many protesters were unable to flee, and reports suggest that over 100 protesters were arrested and loaded onto military trucks stationed near the traffic junction. Some of those who managed to escape into the side streets were reportedly chased down and beaten by the security forces.

12. At around 4.30 p.m. on the same day, unarmed demonstrators gathered again on Thudhamma Road. According to credible reports, the protesters surrounded the police on the bridge, demanding the release of arrested persons, and several military trucks carrying soldiers from the Light Infantry Division (LID) 77 arrived on the scene. When the crowd began to agitate for the release of the arrested protesters, three soldiers got off the truck and started to fire live ammunition at them. At the same time, those troops remaining on the truck also began to shoot into the crowd using semi-automatic rifles. At this moment, snipers reportedly posted in the surrounding buildings also began to open fire. There are consistent reports that some soldiers loudly exclaimed their intention to kill the protesters, and eyewitness accounts confirmed that several protesters suffered fatal gunshot wounds to the head, which may be indicative of an aimed shot. Individuals attempting to assist the wounded also came under fire. Use of lethal force against the protesters led to a high number of fatalities and injuries. Multiple credible sources reported from 9 to 32 deaths and 50 injuries.

13. Multiple reports indicate that security forces also attacked health workers, ambulances, equipment and facilities in North Okkalappa, and detained volunteer medics who were treating injured protesters. In one instance, police fired on and stopped an ambulance on the way to collect injured protesters, and kicked, beat, and arrested four volunteer medics. That evening, security forces raided the office of a charitable organization responsible for sending emergency medical assistance to injured protesters. Police reportedly physically abused some staff members present, demanded a list of civil disobedience movement supporters, and seized equipment such as computers, video cameras and mobile phones.
B. Hlaingtharya Township, western Yangon (14 March 2021)

14. Security forces launched an operation in Hlaingtharya Township, western Yangon on 14 March, that marked another threshold in the escalation in use of lethal force. Military authorities swiftly imposed martial law in Hlaingtharya on the same day, provoking a mass exodus of its urban migrant workers and undermining the rule of law.

15. From about 8 a.m. on 14 March, protesters gathered and built barricades and roadblocks at several bus stops along Hlaing River Road, with hundreds of people gathered at each bus stop. (See Hlaingtharya map after the end of this section.) Around 9 a.m., the security forces reportedly fired warning shots under the Aung Zaya bridge along this route.

16. Protesters at different bus stops began to merge, and at around 10 a.m., the security forces reportedly started to fire live rounds at the protesters at 1 Htiek bus stop. They then moved along to 3 Htiek bus stop, deploying smoke bombs and then live ammunition without warning. Reports suggest that they fired live rounds continuously and indiscriminately between 1 Htiek, 3 Htiek, and 5 Htiek bus stops, killing at least five persons and injuring 10 more. A further 20 casualties from this area were reported later in the afternoon.

17. Further down Hlaing River Road, security forces allegedly set up base in the immigration office, police station and town hall. An eyewitness account indicates that security forces fired live rounds from some of these buildings at the protesters near Yone Shae bus stop.

18. Security forces reportedly proceeded to Tadar Phyu bus stop around 3 p.m., continuing to shoot “non-stop” at the protesters, including those who tried to assist the injured. Consistent reports indicate that security forces chased fleeing protesters into houses and fired live rounds into those houses, injuring people inside. This incident near Tadar Phyu bus stop resulted in the deaths of at least 16 people, at least two of whom suffered gunshot wounds to the head, indicating that they may have been targeted.

19. Further reports indicate that security forces used lethal force against approximately 100 protesters near Mee Kwa Zay bus stop. Around 100 people were gathering peacefully, chanting pro-democracy slogans and shouting at the police officers present there to retreat. Military forces arrived with bulldozers and weapons and allegedly deployed smoke bombs and live ammunition without warning. According to an eyewitness, at least two persons died from gunshot wounds and another suffered injuries to the face.

20. Credible sources confirmed 62 deaths from the 14 March incident, including five children. It is likely, however, that the actual number of fatalities is higher, as allegedly there was a lack of coordination between local medics and the Hlaingtharya Hospital, and some dead bodies reportedly went missing.

21. In the late afternoon of 14 March, three Chinese-financed factories located near the junction of Kanaung Minthargyi Road and Yaw Atwin Wun U Phoe Hlaing Road in Shwe Lin Ban Industrial Zone were burnt down. While the cause of the fires remains unclear, there was a perceptible pattern of attacks against Chinese businesses. According to the Chinese State media, a total of 32 factories supported by Chinese investments in Hlaingtharya were vandalized and two Chinese employees suffered injuries on 14 March.

22. These incidents of 14 March, as well as continued shootings, raids, and abductions since then, instilled a climate of terror among the Hlaingtharya residents. From the evening of 14 March, over 100,000 Hlaingtharya residents, mostly migrant workers originally from Ayeyarwady Region and Rakhine State, began to flee Hlaingtharya and return to their home villages.

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C. Armed Forces Day (27 March 2021)

23. Armed Forces Day is marked annually in Myanmar. In the days preceding the event, security was reportedly increased in several towns and cities. On 26 March, the SAC-affiliated Myanmar Radio and Television (MRTV) apparently warned that youngsters should “learn from earlier ugly deaths that you are in danger of getting shot in the head and back.” This warning was reiterated in the SAC-affiliated Myanmar Alin newspaper the following day.3

24. On 27 March 2021, a large parade was held in Naypyidaw featuring members of the Army, Navy and Air Force (collectively, the Tatmadaw). On the same day, protests were planned across the country, despite an increase in the presence of security forces in several areas. By this point, protesters had adopted various strategies in response to use of lethal violence by security forces, such as building small roadblocks and carrying makeshift armour and rudimentary weapons. In at least one location, some protesters had slingshots or catapults and in another also Molotov cocktails. In at least one instance, these weapons did cause injuries to police, but they were apparently primarily used to distract the attention of security forces after they deployed force. Despite these strategies, security forces violently dispersed protests in townships across 12 of Myanmar’s 15 states, regions and union territory. Yangon and Mandalay were particularly affected, with incidents involving the use of lethal force reported in numerous townships in each region. The map below shows the distribution of some of the protests that were forcefully dispersed across the country.

25. Multiple credible reports indicated at least 130 deaths resulted from security forces’ widespread use of lethal force on Armed Forces Day, the highest number of reported fatalities on a single day since 1 February 2021.4 In some cases, police and military used less-lethal weaponry, such as rubber bullets or tear-gas, to disperse the crowds before employing live ammunition. In other instances, security forces used live fire from the outset. In all but one case, interviewees reported that no warning was given before the use of force and that in all cases demonstrators were peaceful prior to the arrival of security forces. Witnesses attributed a majority of deaths to gunshot injuries, many to the head or torso. OHCHR documented several of these cases, including individuals being shot from behind whilst running away, another being shot in the chest after standing up from where he had been hiding, and of security forces shooting at people trying to help the injured. In all these cases the individuals shot at were unarmed.

26. At least 17 children were killed on 27 March, ranging from ages 9 to 17, and an unknown number of others injured. Several younger children were killed in or near their homes. In one case, a bullet fired by the military at a protest hit and killed a child nearby. In others, raids by security forces resulted in children being killed. Many older children suffered fatal injuries whilst protesting. A relative of a teenager who was killed recalled begging their family member not to protest. The teenager insisted on attending and was reportedly shot from behind in the chest by a member of the security forces positioned in buildings surrounding the unarmed demonstrators.

27. In several places, protesters were also arrested either at the protest site or in raids that followed. In two cases, those detained were reportedly subjected to ill-treatment, in one case shortly after arrest and in the other in detention. Reportedly, two individuals who were detained on 27 March later died in custody.

28. Several families interviewed described police interference in last rites of deceased relatives in connection with the events of Armed Forces Day. In one account, authorities cremated an individual’s remains without the family’s consent, and before the family knew about the individual’s demise. In another case, police searched the home of a relative of a person who was killed, looking for the dead body and later chasing an ambulance believed to contain it. In a third case, police threatened to exhume the body of a buried child. One interviewee told of going to great lengths to bury the interviewee’s family member without

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4 This figure excludes deaths from the airstrikes in Kayin State which began on the same day (see section VA).
interference. The family travelled to a rural village by backroads to avoid being stopped, but the villagers refused to allow them to bury the body, having apparently been ordered by the army not to allow burials of individuals from outside the area. The family eventually succeeded in burying their relative elsewhere, far from home. Repression by the authorities caused already grieving families additional pain and suffering and, in at least one instance, visits from the security services caused relatives of the deceased to go into hiding.

29. Several factors suggest a strategy or planned operation to use a concerted display of lethal force to disperse the protests and crush dissent: warnings issued the day before, the tactics used, and the high numbers of deaths and widespread geographic locations of crackdowns across the country.

Map of Myanmar - Armed Forces Day crackdowns

The image shows a non-exhaustive list of urban areas and townships which saw violent dispersal of protests by the security forces on Armed Forces Day.
D. Bago city (9 April 2021)

30. In Bago city (Bago Region), protests occurred daily from 8 February, with demonstrations initially centred at Shwe Maw Daw Pagoda around which are the main city roads. Security forces had allegedly dispersed such protests deploying violence and arresting protesters. As a result, assemblies began to move towards smaller streets. To stop security forces from entering these streets, protesters built roadblocks, primarily using sandbags. Demonstrators established roadblocks in neighbourhoods or wards within an area bounded by three main roads in Bago. One of these roads is San Daw Twin Road which starts from the southern gate of the Shwe Maw Daw Pagoda. Parallel to it is Ma Ga Dit Road, which runs through Shin Saw Pu and Hmaw Kan wards. (See following map.)

31. Former students had been organizing anti-coup demonstrations in Bago since the start of the protests, acting in concert with CDM participants and others. With the establishment of protected streets, protests continued to take place day and night, despite attempts by security forces to disperse them including by shooting from afar and arresting suspected anti-military activists and protest organizers. Turnout was generally larger at night when it was harder for security forces to come after the protesters. Protesters chanted slogans and delivered speeches at these assemblies. Some protesters were assigned with keeping a lookout for incoming security forces while others were tasked with maintaining the roadblocks.

32. Some of the protest leaders had their bases in various locations in neighbouring wards, including a school on Shin Saw Pu 14th Street which was heavily protected. At the same time, security forces established a base at San Daw Twin Monastery (about 800-900 metres away from the main protesters’ barricade on Ma Ga Dit Road). Snipers were seen here daily atop the tree within the compound. Security forces also stationed themselves at the southern gate of Shwe Maw Daw Pagoda, as well as at a police station on the far opposite side of San Daw Twin Monastery, closer to Bago River, about 700-800 metres away from the main protesters’ barricade on Ma Ga Dit Road. Not far from this police station, security forces were also said to have occupied Pan Hlaing Monastery. Soldiers reportedly also regularly patrolled the perimeters of the neighbourhoods which are served by Ma Ga Dit Road.

33. In the evening of 8 April, protest leaders were alerted to a possible crackdown the next day and expected that security forces would use live bullets as they had in previous crackdowns. In addition to sandbag roadblocks, some protesters relied on homemade body shields, as well as motorcycle and construction helmets as protective equipment. Some also employed rudimentary weapons such as slingshots, catapults, Molotov cocktails, and air guns as defensive gear.

34. At 4 a.m. on 9 April, protesters began preparing for the military to move in, but were unable to complete their preparations and fortifications. Security forces surrounded the entire area covered by the roadblocks and, following drone surveillance, started shelling the barricades at around 5 a.m. Security forces employed grenade launchers and artillery shells to destroy the roadblocks without apparent care for the impact of such munitions within a high-density residential area. Protesters and ward residents suffered injuries, some fatally, from shrapnel. In at least one instance, security forces shot and killed an injured protester being transported away from the shooting on San Daw Twin Road on a motorcycle.

35. Upon breaching the protesters’ roadblocks first on Ma Ga Dit Road and then on San Daw Twin Road, security forces chased fleeing protesters down the ward’s alleys and into residents’ homes and compounds. One unarmed man who was not involved in the protests was shot and killed inside a compound for no apparent reason; sources noted that he may have been wearing clothes similar to the student protesters. Security forces issued no warning and no attempt to arrest him was made. After killing the man, soldiers threatened those inside the house that they would be shot if they left the building. Security forces reportedly piled up the dead and injured in the compound of Shin Saw Pu Pagoda (also known as Zeya Muni Pagoda). Monks and local medics apparently attempted to approach the military authorities to provide medical attention to the injured but were denied access to the pagoda compound.

5 A ‘ward’ is a fourth-level administrative subdivision of Myanmar’s cities and towns below township.
36. Security forces reportedly killed at least 82 people in Bago on 9 April. It is likely that the actual figure is much higher considering the indiscriminate methods employed by the security forces to destroy the barricades and to chase after suspected anti-military activists and protesters.

37. International standards dictate that any use of force by law enforcement officials shall comply with the principles of legality, precaution, necessity, proportionality, non-discrimination and accountability.6 Intentional use of lethal force is only justifiable when strictly unavoidable in order to protect life,7 and the use of firearms to disperse a peaceful assembly is always unlawful. In their attempts to breach the roadblocks and stop protests from continuing in Bago, security forces employed methods that were disproportionate and highly likely to cause casualties in densely populated residential areas. Security forces pursued predominantly unarmed protesters, using weapons without taking precautionary steps to avoid or minimize the risk of injury or death. Indeed, it appears that security forces shot at people indiscriminately, and intentionally used lethal force against individuals, resulting in the highest number of fatalities reported in a single location in one day since the military seizure of power on 1 February.

38. There have been reports of extortion by security forces against families and relatives who wanted to retrieve the bodies of loved ones. Security forces set conditions for retrieving remains, including requiring some families to sign a document absolving them of responsibility for the death. Further, citing a municipal law as pretext, military officials reacted against the joint burial of some of those killed, which had been marked as “revolutionary heroes,” by directing the relatives to exhume the bodies and re-bury them separately. When the families did not comply, truckloads of soldiers reportedly arrived to dig up the bodies and re-bury them according to the military authorities’ instructions.

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6 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 37, para. 78.
7 Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.
V. Armed resistance and conflict

39. At the same time as the Tatmadaw responded with increasingly lethal force against peaceful protesters, they also continued to conduct attacks apparently directly targeting civilians and civilian objects in areas already affected by conflict. Airstrikes occurred in south-east Myanmar that failed to distinguish between military and civilian targets, in violation of international humanitarian law principles. Similar patterns have been noted in past decades during Tatmadaw operations conducted against ethnic minorities in border areas. International humanitarian law requires all parties to the conflict to take constant care to spare civilians and civilian objects, including by taking all feasible precautions to avoid and in any event minimize loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects. Use of airstrikes marked a significant escalation in conflict following the coup in south-east Myanmar, displacing tens of thousands of people and causing significant impacts on their access to food, livelihoods, health and education services, and fulfilment of their economic, social and cultural rights. These strikes, the first in over two decades in Kayin State, also occurred on Armed Forces Day on 27 March, the same day that the highest number of protesters were killed on a single day in other states and regions of the country. The information presented about these incidents also reinforces a recommendation of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar that the situation of the Karen ethnic group in Kayin State receive further investigation.8

A. Airstrikes in south-east Myanmar

40. Tatmadaw use of airpower appeared to have been in retaliation for the capture of three Moo Hta Tatmadaw bases in Hpapun District, Kayin State, by Brigade 5 of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), an armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU). Targeting Day Pu Noh area, Hpapun Township, (Kayin State), the first airstrikes began at around 7 p.m. on 27 March and continued for several hours, with another set of strikes on the same area the following night. While two strikes hit a KNU/KNLA regional headquarters building, several others hit civilian buildings, including houses, some of which were not in the vicinity of the headquarters. Four civilians died in the attacks on Day Pu Noh area on 28 March, including one civilian who fled on 27 March, but later returned to his house to cook a meal. At least 11 people suffered injuries. Day Pu Noh served as an educational hub for the area, with students from neighbouring areas staying in the village to access education, all of whom fled during the attacks. Additionally, the Number 1 State High School in Day Pu Noh was significantly damaged in the strikes. Newly built in 2017, the school was a 30 minutes’ walk from the KNU/KNLA headquarters building. In the words of one interviewee, the building is “very clearly a school and they had to know it was there.” (See satellite imagery below.)

41. Other areas were also attacked using airstrikes in Hpapun Township including Paw Kah Der, Lay Ther Hkoh and Khoh Kay villages, on 28 March; Hto Htee Per Hkoh and Ler Htoh Poe villages on 29 March; and Mae Kaw Law and Khaw Hpoh Kyi on 30 March. An airstrike also occurred on 30 March targeting a gold mine in Nyaunglebin district (Bago Region). These attacks reportedly killed at least 12 civilians, injured an additional 17 people, including children, and destroyed Daw Khoo Hta Number 3 High School in Ler Htoh Poe village. The airstrikes also destroyed the villagers’ means of livelihood including rice barns and farming equipment as well as crops and livestock.

42. Several of these incidents occurred at night, making it harder for villagers to flee. One interviewee recounted how he, along with several other families including young children, spent two days in the forest without shelter after fleeing Day Pu Noh. Villagers fled quickly and were often unable to carry supplies. Some people were unable to eat for several days, with others managing to buy a small amount of rice from nearby villages. Injured villagers had difficulties accessing medical care. An interviewee also recalled that with families displaced and several schools destroyed, children are currently unable to access education.

Reportedly, around 3,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Ei Tu Hta camp and people from nearby villages fled across the border into Thailand after rumours there might be an airstrike on the camp, but many were later reportedly forced to return to Myanmar.

43. Further airstrikes occurred in the following months. In April, there were reports of the Tatmadaw firing from a military camp on boats carrying supplies to IDPs. On 27 April, the KNLA seized the military camp. In the following days, military forces apparently carried out airstrikes in several areas of Hpapun Township including on villages several hours’ walk from the base and apparently containing no KNU/KNLA buildings. These strikes triggered additional displacements. There were no additional casualties as many civilians were already in hiding. Military aeroplanes continued to fly over several areas, continuing to instil fear in IDPs such that they were reluctant to return to their villages, fearing further airstrikes. One impact of this is significant psycho-social damage among the population, who have experienced relative peace for nearly a decade.
B. Geographic spread of reported incidents

44. Prior to the coup, armed violence in Myanmar was primarily confined to its border areas. Since the coup, incidents of armed conflict between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations and of clashes between the Tatmadaw and new armed resistance elements have grown to encompass almost all states and regions of the country. The following map illustrates those townships across the country where clashes linked to the armed conflicts between the Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (red colour) and clashes between new armed resistance elements and the Tatmadaw (blue colour) have been reported as of 15 July.
VI. Conclusion

45. As has been further demonstrated in this paper, security forces have increasingly used lethal force against individuals peacefully demonstrating their opposition to military rule. Concurrently, armed conflicts have resurfaced and escalated in areas of the country where ethnic minority groups have long been persecuted, while new instances of violence have emerged with the Tatmadaw’s responses to armed resistance against military rule and attempts to suppress any opposition. It is clear that in post-coup Myanmar, the Tatmadaw is continuing to demonstrate gross disregard for its obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law across the country, in particular to protect the right to life, liberty and security of the person.