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Agenda item 4

Human rights situations that require the Council's attention**Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran****Summary*

The present report, submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to Council resolution 58/21, consolidates the findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to recent and ongoing serious human rights violations. This includes the repression during and after the June 2025 hostilities, the sharp rise in executions recorded in 2025, persistent impunity and structural discrimination, particularly against women, girls and minorities. The report also includes an update on the Mission's ongoing investigations of credible allegations that gross human rights violations and crimes under international law may have occurred in the context of the protests that began on 28 December 2025.

* The present report was submitted to the conference services for processing after the deadline so as to include the most recent information.

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 58/21, in which the Council decided that the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran should continue for one year, until April 2026. The Council gave the Mission the mandate: (a) to thoroughly and independently monitor and investigate allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations in the Islamic Republic of Iran; to establish the facts, circumstances and structural causes of such violations, including discrimination on grounds of gender, ethnicity, religion or belief and political views; and (c) to collect, consolidate, analyse, record and preserve evidence of such violations, to maintain and preserve the evidence that it has collected to date, and to ensure that all evidence is accessible for use in any independent legal proceedings.

2. On 23 January 2026, the Council convened a special session on the deteriorating situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the resulting resolution, S-39/1, the Council decided to extend the Mission's mandate for a further period of two years (until the end of the sixty-seventh session of the Council, to be held in 2028) and requested the Mission to conduct an urgent investigation into allegations of recent and ongoing serious human rights violations and abuses and crimes perpetrated in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025, including for potential future legal proceedings, in line with its mandate.

3. The Council has consistently called on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to cooperate fully with the Mission, including by granting it unhindered access to the country. The Mission deeply regrets that the Government has not granted it any access to the country since its mandate began. To date, the Mission has sent 44 information requests to the Government. Although it received responses to 12 of the requests, the Mission regrets that the rest remained unanswered. In the 12 responses the Mission received, the Government did not provide the underlying information requested, including details on incidents, investigations undertaken and relevant medical and judicial records.

4. While the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other international organizations in Geneva has not responded to the Mission's requests for meetings, it did provide a briefing to the Mission on the events in the country since 28 December 2025 and a second briefing on its armed conflict with Israel and the United States of America, which began on 28 February 2026. During the first briefing, the Mission reiterated its concern regarding a written threat made by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran against the Mission's members.

5. The Mission has reviewed 29 reports submitted by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran since December 2025. Where relevant, they are reflected in the present report.

6. The Mission also sent a request for information to the Government of Israel on 24 October 2025, but has not received a response to date.

7. The Mission faced a United Nations-wide hiring freeze during the current mandate, which left its secretariat to operate with a variable staffing rate that did not exceed 60 per cent. The Mission spent several months operating with a staffing rate of around 20 per cent and only one staff member was continuously employed throughout the mandate. The Mission lacked an English-Persian interpreter for five months and a second interpreter for the entire mandate.

8. Given these and other operational constraints, the Mission had to prioritize investigations based on gravity, scale, access to information, impact on victims and their families, and the wider landscape of accountability efforts, including justice, truth and reparations pursued by victims and their families.

9. The Mission has highlighted the need for further investigations into areas where it could not find sufficient information to make findings under its standard of proof. The Mission requires additional resources, as well as unhindered access to relevant sites and people of interest to complete these investigations.

10. On 28 February 2026, Israel and the United States began a new wave of air strikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran and by 3 March, the armed conflict had already expanded to involve over 10 countries. Some senior Iranian officials, including Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, have been killed through United States-Israeli air strikes. The Islamic Republic of Iran has also conducted air strikes in countries in the region, which have killed civilians and caused damage to civilian infrastructure.

11. Reports of civilian casualties as well as damage and destruction of critical civilian infrastructure, hospitals and schools in the Islamic Republic of Iran are rapidly emerging. On 3 March, the Iranian Red Crescent Society reported that 787 people had been killed in the Islamic Republic of Iran since the air strikes had begun.

12. On 28 February, a missile struck a school in Minab, Hormozgan Province, reportedly killing over 165 people, the vast majority of whom appear to have been schoolgirls. The Government shut down the Internet on 28 February, as it did during the June 2025 hostilities, again preventing people from accessing vital updates on the hostilities and safe escape routes and cutting off communication between loved ones inside and outside the country.

13. Concerns about the fate and whereabouts of detainees, including in Evin prison compound, are markedly increasing, especially for those reportedly detained in unofficial detention facilities. This includes tens of thousands of people detained in relation to the protests that began on 28 December 2025, as well as activists and human rights defenders, many of whom are being held arbitrarily, in prisons throughout the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some detainees are reportedly facing expedited death penalty proceedings, in violation of international fair trial and due process rights and the right to life. A durable peace – rooted in full respect for international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and international human rights law – offers the only sustainable way to safeguard the rights of the Iranian people and international security.

14. The Mission expresses its gratitude to victims, witnesses and civil society organizations that came forward to provide information on their experiences, despite the constant risks posed to them and their families, including well-founded fears of reprisals for cooperating with the Mission.

II. Methodology and standard of proof

15. The Mission was guided by the methodologies and best practices of the United Nations, ensuring a victim-centred approach, with specific attention paid to the gender dimensions of the violations documented and to intersectional factors shaping survivors' experiences. The Mission continued to ensure strict adherence to the principles of "do no harm", independence, impartiality, objectivity, transparency and integrity in its activities.

16. In line with United Nations investigative bodies' general practice, the Mission applied the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard of proof.

17. The Mission conducted interviews with victims, witnesses and other sources, both inside and outside the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as using information received from credible human rights organizations, satellite imagery, forensic, military and other subject-matter experts, and hundreds of secondary sources to corroborate and contextualize information.

III. December 2025 protests and government response

18. On 28 December 2025, three months before the end of the Mission's current mandate, protests erupted in the Islamic Republic of Iran and quickly spread to all 31 provinces. Initially sparked by an economic crisis and deteriorating living conditions, protesters' demands rapidly evolved into broader calls for rights and fundamental change. While the Government initially adopted a conciliatory tone, its response quickly descended into increasing violence.

19. On 29 December, the President, Masoud Pezeshkian, published a post on social media noting the need to listen to the protesters' demands and for the Minister of the Interior to engage in dialogue with their representatives. On 31 December, the then Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, appointed Ahmad Vahidi, former Minister of the Interior, deputy commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Mission had previously found that, considering his role and authority, Mr. Vahidi bore responsibility for violations of the obligations of the Islamic Republic of Iran under international law.¹

20. On 3 January 2026, the then Supreme Leader announced that, while a protest was justified, a riot was different, and he called for rioters to be "put in their place".

21. On 5 January, the President instructed the Minister of the Interior, Eskandar Momeni, to carry out a comprehensive, transparent investigation into incidents in Ilam Province. The Minister then tasked the Deputy Minister of Security and Law Enforcement, Ali Akbar Pourjamshidian, with conducting that investigation.

22. On the evening of 8 January, the Government imposed a total Internet, mobile and landline communications shutdown. People were cut off from the outside world, unaware of the scale of violations unfolding elsewhere in the country and unable to contact loved ones inside the Islamic Republic of Iran and abroad. Credible reports indicated that a marked escalation in violence and deaths began shortly thereafter, as millions of people took to the streets. The shutdown concealed this shift and the increasingly violent repression that followed. On 9 January, the National Security Council reportedly issued a statement ordering security forces to crack down decisively on protesters, without restraint, and to bring the protests to an end.

23. On 17 January, the then Supreme Leader acknowledged that thousands of people had been killed and yet called for the authorities to "break the backs of the seditionists". On 21 January, the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans Affairs announced that 3,117 individuals had been killed, including members of the security forces, and 690 "rioters". At the time of writing the present report, one credible human rights organization had estimated that over 7,000 people, including up to 6,500 protesters, over 230 children and at least 200 members of the security forces had been killed.

24. Despite severe communication restrictions imposed by the Government, the Mission collected information on credible allegations that gross human rights violations and crimes under international law may have occurred in the context of the protests that began on 28 December 2025. The preliminary information contained herein is based on investigations conducted up to 18 February 2026. Investigations are ongoing and it remains open to the Islamic Republic of Iran to assist the Mission, including by facilitating a country visit, so that a full accounting of the evidence can be reflected in future reports.

A. Use of force resulting in deaths and injuries

1. 28 December 2025–7 January 2026

25. Reports received indicate that security forces shot and killed protesters on or around 31 December 2025 in some provinces such as Fars and Lorestan. A credible human rights organization reported that at least 28 protesters and bystanders, including children, were killed across eight provinces, including minority provinces, between 31 December 2025 and 3 January 2026.

2. 8 and 10 January 2026

26. On the night of 8 January 2026, according to credible information, the presence of security forces increased in several provinces, with special forces of the Police Command of

¹ See the conference room paper of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran, dated 18 March 2025, available on the web page of Mission, at <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/ffm-iran/index>, para. 687.

the Islamic Republic of Iran (FARAJA), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, uniformed armed Basij and plain-clothed agents deploying to protest sites.

27. On 25 January, the commander of the Police Command special forces, Mehdi Sharif Kazemi, stated that the police had not used firearms against the protestors and had instead used non-lethal means, such as water cannons, paintball guns and flash-bang instruments to handle the situation.

28. Nevertheless, the Mission has learned that protesters, including women, older persons and children, were reportedly killed between 8 and 10 January 2026 in Alborz, Gilan, Ilam, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Kordestan, Lorestan, Mazandaran and Tehran Provinces. In Karaj, Isfahan and Tehran, witnesses saw traces of blood and dead bodies scattered on the streets. Security forces allegedly shot at injured protesters in Karaj.

29. In Fardis, Karaj and Tehran, witnesses saw security forces shooting at crowds with shotguns loaded with lethal ammunition, rifles and DShK heavy machine guns, injuring and killing protesters.

30. On 10 January 2026, in Fardis, a witness saw fellow protesters falling to the ground after security forces chased the crowd into an alley and fired lethal ammunition at them. Reports and open-source information also indicated that snipers shot and killed protesters.

31. Video footage verified by credible human rights organizations shows security forces, including some on motorcycles, beating, chasing and shooting at crowds and protesters fleeing in Fardis, Hamedan, Karaj, Mashhad and Tehran. In some videos, people can be seen carrying bodies covered in blood. In one video from Mashhad, the person recording stated, "Look, they shot a girl. They are using weapons of war." Video footage published in January 2026 also showed individuals covered in blood lying motionless on the street, on hospital floors in Armak and Tehran, and near a hospital entrance in Tehran. Witnesses provided the Mission with pictures of ammunition indicating that security forces may have fired at protesters with 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition associated with Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles and solid plastic .50 calibre balls.

32. Witnesses, photographs and video footage revealed injuries to protesters, including to their faces, eyes and genitals, from metal pellet ammunition. This is consistent with patterns the Mission previously established concerning the use of force by State authorities during the 2022–2023 protests. In one instance, the Mission reviewed footage of a boy who was blinded in one eye after being shot at close range with metal pellets during a protest. The child had pellet wounds to the upper half of his face and the back of his forearm, indicating that he is likely to have adopted a defensive position before being shot.

33. One source described how doctors at a hospital in Isfahan had to surgically remove the eyeballs of some 450 protesters due to the severity of their injuries.

34. Information indicates that protesters may have committed acts of violence during protests, such as burning vehicles, including motorcycles. Video footage showed individuals storming and vandalizing the Abuzar Mosque in Tehran, causing significant damage. Images reviewed by the Mission showed damage to other buildings, including a bank. A video, published on 10 January, showed an individual throwing what was described by the person posting it as a Molotov cocktail into a government building, reportedly in Tehran. In reports sent to the Mission on 15 and 19 January, the Government stated that "public" vehicles, mosques, banks, residential homes, government centres or institutions, medical facilities, ambulances and emergency and Red Crescent bases were damaged, as well as relief infrastructure and warehouses in different provinces, including Khorasan-e Razavi.

35. The Mission analysed video footage published on social media between 15 and 17 January, which was verified by a credible human rights organization, along with a separate video published on social media on 16 January. The videos show security forces units, heavily armed with lethal firearms, deployed in Borujerd, Karaj, Mashhad and Tonekabon, patrolling on foot and in vehicles, including armoured vehicles. The Mission analysed another video published on 20 January, which showed security forces armed with Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles patrolling residential streets with their faces covered, moving in pick-up trucks mounted with heavy machine guns. They repeatedly ordered

residents to “go inside” while chanting slogans praising the then Supreme Leader. It was not possible to verify the location of the most recent video.

3. Families of victims

36. State authorities appear to be concealing the truth about the protesters who were killed, while silencing their families, reflecting patterns previously established by the Mission. Credible information indicated that bereaved families have been prohibited from organizing funerals, subjected to severe funeral-related restrictions and coerced to pay large sums of money to receive the bodies of their loved ones.

37. According to a witness, State authorities have threatened to bury victims in unidentified locations unless their bereaved families remain silent about the cause of death and agree to declare that their loved ones were “martyrs” who were “killed by terrorists”. Another witness stated that security forces reportedly forced families to falsely claim that their killed loved ones had been plain-clothed Basij members. To retrieve their bodies, some families were forced to pay for damage to property allegedly attributed to their loved ones. One family informed the Mission that they attempted to bury their loved one in the yard of their home instead of a graveyard, fearing that otherwise, the security forces would take the body away.

B. Hospitals and morgues

38. According to medical staff, increasing numbers of protesters, some disfigured, were admitted to hospitals in Tehran as of 8 January with injuries caused by lethal ammunition. In one hospital in Tehran, over 200 injured people reportedly arrived within one hour on the evening of 8 January.

39. Hospitals were also attacked by security forces. On 4 January, security officers reportedly raided Imam Khomeini Hospital in Ilam, beat injured protesters and medical staff there, and used tear gas inside the facility.

Forensic Diagnostic and Laboratory Center in Kahrizak, south of Tehran city

40. The scale of casualties, the nature of recent events – including the Internet blackout – and the refusal of the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide access have made it difficult for the Mission to arrive at precise estimates at the time of writing of the number of people killed and injured. Nevertheless, the Mission’s preliminary investigations indicate that people were killed and injured on a staggering scale. Credible information received concerning the number of bodies in the morgue in Kahrizak has informed the Mission’s ongoing efforts to determine the extent of casualties nationwide.

41. On 11 January, video footage and pictures emerged on social media showing grieving families searching for their loved ones among what appeared to be hundreds of body bags in the Kahrizak morgue.

42. Videos showed victims in body bags scattered across a warehouse floor, the morgue courtyard, laid out on a sidewalk and near a parking lot. Grieving families were seen frantically searching for their loved ones as medical staff in white laboratory coats appeared to document injuries on the bodies. Some bodies appeared covered with blood, with many bearing open wounds, including apparent gunshot wounds. The Mission observed the spray pattern of metal pellets fired from shotguns on several bodies.

43. Videos showed people gathered in front of a monitor, likely to be inside the Center, on which the photographs of deceased individuals were being displayed. The people were seeking to identify their loved ones among what appeared to be more than 200 images of the upper torsos and heads of men.

C. Arrests, detentions and emerging reports of secret executions

44. On 16 January, State-affiliated media announced that thousands of people had been arrested in relation to the protests. A credible human rights organization estimated that by mid-February, over 50,000 people had been arrested, including women, university students, schoolchildren, human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and members of minorities. On 26 January, the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps reported that at least 11,000 people had been summoned by intelligence and security forces, and on 17 February, the judiciary stated that 10,538 individuals had been referred for prosecution, with over 8,800 indictments issued.

45. By the time of writing, several reports had emerged on social media platforms indicating that security forces had arrested and detained significant numbers of medical personnel for providing injured protesters with treatment, reflecting a pattern previously established by the Mission in the context of the 2022–2023 protests.

46. Allegations of torture and gender-based violence by security forces against protesters, including children, have emerged.

Death penalty

47. On 10 January, the Prosecutor General, Mohammad Movahedi Azad, declared that all protesters had committed *muharaba* (enmity against God), a charge that incurs the death penalty under the Penal Code. On 10 and 14 January, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, the Head of the Judiciary, issued instructions to act quickly and show no mercy or leniency on that occasion towards those deemed responsible for the protests. Read together, those statements raise serious concerns that detained protesters may be at risk of possible execution or other ill-treatment.

48. At the time of writing, there were at least two individuals on death row in relation to the protests. On 31 January, Branch 1 of the Criminal Court in Qom sentenced one man to death for the alleged killing of a member of the security forces during a protest on 8 January in Qom.

49. State media broadcast numerous “confessions” by detained protesters, including a 16-year-old girl, in which they admitted to having led “riots”. In one such video, a young man is heard crying as he is told that he has been charged with *muharaba* and sentenced to death. Such conduct is consistent with previously established patterns whereby State media aired videorecorded forced confessions by persons accused in connection with the 2022–2023 protests and the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement immediately after they were arrested.

D. Root causes

50. The Mission previously found that, in repressing the 2022–2023 protests, State authorities were responsible for gross human rights violations and crimes under international law, including crimes against humanity.

51. The national legal framework effectively criminalizes dissent and renders it virtually impossible for individuals or groups to obtain permits for assemblies, except in narrowly defined circumstances and only where the purpose of the assembly aligns with the “fundamental principles of Islam”, a term not defined in the Constitution. Assemblies held without authorization are deemed illegal, and police and security forces are allowed to use force, including firearms, to disperse them. Laws governing assemblies, together with the provisions of the Penal Code, enable the arbitrary deprivation of life and the arbitrary arrest and detention of protesters and bystanders, including children.

52. The absence of adequate domestic legal protections to express dissent, reinforced by a judiciary that lacks independence, and security and intelligence entities that operate with impunity, perpetuate cycles of repression that, in turn, enable gross human rights violations. This has been documented during the successive waves of protests in the Islamic Republic

of Iran, including the protests that began on 28 December 2025, but also in the State's response following the June 2025 hostilities, as examined below.

IV. Conflict between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran

53. Between 13 and 25 June 2025, the Israeli Defense Forces conducted hundreds of air strikes on Iranian territory that struck both military and nuclear facilities, as well as critical infrastructure, the television broadcasting agency of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRIB) and residential areas. Israeli air strikes also caused collateral damage to medical facilities.

54. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated, in a report to the Mission, that 1,100 people had been killed and over 5,600 injured during the air strikes.² Officials later reported civilian death tolls ranging from 276 to 700. Credible information indicated that between 1,082 and 1,190 individuals were killed following the strikes by the Israeli Defense Forces, including an estimated 182 to 436 civilians, among them 45 to 65 children and 49 to 69 women.

55. The Islamic Republic of Iran responded on 13 June 2025 with missile and drone attacks on Israel, reportedly striking military sites, critical infrastructure, residential areas and medical facilities. On 26 June, Israeli authorities stated that 32 people had been killed in Israel, 31 of whom were civilians and 4 of whom were children, and more than 3,400 had been injured, among them 346 children.³

56. The Mission was unable to independently verify overall casualty figures in the Islamic Republic of Iran or in Israel.

1. Air strikes on Evin prison compound, 23 June 2025

57. On 23 June 2025, at around 12 noon, the Israeli Defense Forces launched targeted air strikes on the Evin prison compound, causing severe damage to buildings, including the visiting hall, administrative section, a medical centre, the Prosecutor's office and prison wards. The air strikes took place during visiting hours, when family members of prisoners were expected to be on the prison grounds. Israeli officials claimed responsibility for the air strikes, asserting that they targeted the "suppression bodies" of the Islamic Republic of Iran and stating, without providing any supporting evidence, that intelligence operations against Israel were taking place inside the prison.

58. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that 79 or 80 people were killed, including at least one child and eight women, and at least 21 were injured.

59. A credible organization focused on documenting civilian casualties independently confirmed the death of 73 civilians in the prison compound, including some who were killed while visiting or paying bail for their imprisoned loved ones. It further estimated – but was unable to confirm – that another seven civilians were killed, totalling 80 deaths. Of those, at least one woman, a painter, and one man, a businessman, were killed on the street outside the prison.

60. The Mission found no information indicating the presence of military personnel, weapons or military installations within the prison compound or in its vicinity at the time of the events. The Mission sent a request for information to the Government of Israel on 24 October 2025 regarding the strikes, but has not received a response to date.

2. Transfers of prisoners

61. The authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran failed to take measures to protect the prisoners prior to, during and in the aftermath of the Israeli air strikes. Families and detainees pleaded with the authorities to relocate or conditionally release prisoners prior to the events,

² Report by the High Council for Human Rights of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 10 October 2025.

³ See <https://www.gov.il/en/pages/operation-rising-lion-update>.

given that air strikes had already been heard near the prison the night before. However, the State authorities did not do so. Instead, during the strikes, the authorities kept some detainees locked in their cells.

62. After the strikes subsided, inmates were violently transferred to other prisons and placed in overcrowded cells lacking basic facilities.

63. Families and lawyers of some detainees were unable to obtain information about the detainees' whereabouts for weeks, and sometimes months, after their transfers – a delay that caused relatives significant anguish. When contact was eventually allowed, some detainees were prohibited from disclosing their location. When asked by family members about two prisoners after their transfer, the authorities denied having any knowledge about their fate or whereabouts.

V. Intensification of measures of repression during and after the June 2025 hostilities

64. During and after the June 2025 strikes, the State authorities took coordinated action to suppress dissent, including through large-scale arbitrary arrests and detention, unlawful use of lethal force by security forces, undue calls by the judiciary to expedite trials, a disturbing increase in executions following flawed trials in violation of the right to life, and undue digital restrictions.

65. Although the contexts of past and current protests in the Islamic Republic of Iran and the June 2025 hostilities markedly differ, the State employed similar repressive measures in both situations, aimed at silencing individuals critical of, or perceived as having criticized, State-sanctioned ideologies and rules. That such cycles of violence recur, and impunity persists, indicates that repression in the Islamic Republic of Iran functions as a governing strategy to suppress and criminalize dissent, rather than as an isolated response to situations of crisis.

A. Arrests, detention and criminal prosecution for protected conduct

66. Starting as early as 14 June 2025, State media issued almost daily announcements of alarming numbers of arrests across the country of individuals allegedly detained on national security grounds, such as “spying”, “spreading lies” and “disturbing public opinion”.

67. On 22 July, the Head of the Judiciary, Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, announced that 2,000 people had been arrested, while on 12 August, the spokesperson of the Police Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saeed Montazer Al-Mahdi, announced that 21,000 suspects had been arrested. In a statement issued in August, the Head of the Judiciary noted that, while many of them had been released on bail, others would face severe punishments, including the death penalty, due to the severity of their crimes.

68. Despite those claims, the authorities have not disclosed to date how many individuals remain detained, how many have been released, the charges brought against them or the conditions under which any releases occurred.

1. State action and the nature of arrests

69. Arrests were accompanied by public threats and calls for accelerated trials by State officials, raising concerns about potential violations of due process and fair trial rights. Officials from the Ministry of Intelligence, the Police Command and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps repeatedly urged the public to report suspicious individuals or activities deemed supportive of the Zionist regime.

70. Security and intelligence forces, including the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, arrested individuals in at least 11 provinces, including ones populated primarily by minorities. Detainees were neither informed of the reasons for their arrest nor of the charges against them. Some reported that they were not provided with written

summons, were denied access to a lawyer and were not promptly brought before a judge. Others were also held incommunicado and subjected to harassment and beatings during their arrests and while in detention.

71. State authorities subjected human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, academics, artists other members of the creative community and social media users, including women, to arbitrary arrest and detention for protected conduct such as activism and online expression. Evidence indicated that the Iranian authorities primarily targeted social media users who expressed criticism of the war or called for an end to hostilities.

2. Criminal prosecution

72. Victim interviews, court documents, credible information and open-source material indicated that detainees were subjected to criminal prosecution and lengthy prison sentences, in addition to bans on travel or on social media use, or both, for expressing views critical of the Government on social media.

73. Court documents obtained by the Mission demonstrated that social media users had been brought before revolutionary courts and that their convictions were based on their criticism of the Government. Victims were then charged with espionage, propaganda against the State, spreading false news or disturbing public opinion.

B. Digital space

74. The Mission has previously documented the extensive use of digital space by the wider public and its critical function in the Islamic Republic of Iran, enabling people to communicate, organize, express their views and seek truth and justice.

75. During and after the hostilities in June 2025, State authorities used digital tools to silence dissent, further tightening digital space and restricting the freedoms of expression and association. These measures were implemented in conjunction with the targeted arrest of social media users and human rights defenders for their online expression, a total Internet shutdown during the hostilities, the continued blocking of social media platforms, and the deactivation of the SIM cards of human rights defenders and journalists. This combined approach illustrates how the Government weaponizes digital restrictions and punitive measures to conceal violations and suppress online communication and dissent in times of crisis. The Government likewise imposed a total Internet shutdown during the protests that began on 28 December.

Deactivating SIM cards

76. The Mission documented cases of journalists and human rights defenders whose SIM cards were deactivated in late June 2025, apparently for expressing views online that were critical of the Government. This reflects patterns previously established by the Mission.

77. Victims' SIM cards were deactivated without a clear legal basis, in the absence of a judicial order or formal charges, resulting in the suspension of their access to communication, banking, education and other essential services, often without prior notice and without transparency or the ability to challenge the decision. Interviewees explained how, in order to have their SIM cards restored, they were forced to either delete social media posts and publish content supporting the Government, take down their social media profiles or both.

C. Use of force at checkpoints and during raids

78. Domestic legislation does not establish a clear threshold for the use of force, including lethal force, which aligns with international human rights law. In addition, the Islamic Republic of Iran systematically fails to disclose the circumstances in which force was used or whether any assessments of legality, necessity, proportionality, precaution, accountability and non-discrimination were conducted. In most cases, the absence of effective investigations and prosecutions, or of any information indicating that such assessments were carried out, further entrenches impunity for use of force violations.

79. The Mission documented several incidents where force, including lethal force, was used unlawfully at security checkpoints and during raids, leading to deaths – including of a 3-year-old girl – and injuries between June and November 2025. There has been no official information to date indicating that the victims’ conduct during those incidents would have permitted law enforcement officers to use force under international human rights law.

D. Impact on ethnic and religious minorities

80. Security measures imposed during and after the June 2025 hostilities also affected minorities, some of whom appear to have been disproportionately impacted.

1. Ethnic minorities

81. On 25 June 2025, State affiliated media reported that more than 700 people had been arrested for alleged collaboration with Israel in Kermanshah and Khuzestan Provinces, which are predominantly populated by ethnic minorities, including Kurdish and Ahvazi Arabs. These provinces were listed among those with the largest numbers of arrests since 13 June.

82. In the village of Gounich, in Sistan and Baluchestan Province, at least 1 Baluch woman was killed and 11 Baluch women were injured during a raid by security forces on 1 July 2025. Evidence shows that Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officials fired lethal ammunition at a group of women who had thrown stones at them to prevent them from entering the village. No public information indicates that an investigation has been initiated.

2. Religious minorities

83. Arrests of members of the Baha’i religious minority reportedly intensified following the June hostilities, after officials labelled them a “Zionist” sect and “spies of Israel”. Property belonging to Baha’i individuals was confiscated, including pursuant to a judgment reportedly justifying the seizures based on adherence to the Baha’i faith, alleged connection to the Zionist regime, and holding underground classes related to the Zionist regime.

84. At least 53 Christians were arrested between 13 June and 12 August 2025. At least 35 Jews were reportedly summoned and interrogated in Shiraz and Tehran for maintaining contact with families in Israel.

VI. Death penalty

85. As part of the intensified repression that began during the air strikes on the Islamic Republic of Iran by Israel, State authorities accelerated executions and expedited emergency legislation expanding the application of the death penalty for “espionage” and alleged cooperation with Israel.

86. While the Government continues to withhold comprehensive data on executions and death sentences, credible human rights organizations recorded an astonishing 1,639 executions in 2025 alone, surpassing the global total for known executions in 2024. This reflects a 68 per cent increase compared to 2024, marking another high point in the continuous surge in executions since 2021. Forty-eight per cent of the executions in 2025 were for drug-related offences and 3 per cent were for vague security charges such as *muharaba*, *efsad-e-fil-arz* (corruption on earth) and *baghi* (armed rebellion against the State). According to State-affiliated media, the highest number of executions per capita in 2025 was recorded in Sistan and Baluchestan Province.

87. The number of executions rose sharply following the June 2025 hostilities, with credible human rights organizations recording at least 464 executions between July and September. A further 222 people were executed in October alone – the highest monthly total recorded in at least 25 years.

A. Legal developments

88. On 15 October 2025, Parliament expanded the application of the death penalty by enacting its law intensifying the punishment for espionage and cooperation with the Zionist regime and hostile States against national security and interests. That law automatically classifies espionage and cooperation with a hostile Government as “corruption on earth”, which carries the death sentence.

89. The Mission notes that the 2025 anti-espionage law presents numerous areas of concern, including broad provisions susceptible to arbitrary interpretation and enforcement. It does not define the term “espionage” and requires espionage cases to be expedited by branches of the revolutionary court, which undermines fair trial rights. It also criminalizes the sharing of images or videos with foreign media, as well as the use or possession of unlicensed satellite Internet tools such as Starlink, which unduly restricts freedom of expression and access to information. Those offences may also lead to the death penalty if the alleged offender is found to be an “enemy agent”, a term also not defined by the law.

B. Factual findings

90. Individuals were sentenced to death in judgments issued by revolutionary courts in several provinces following convictions for vaguely formulated security offences, including “corruption on earth” and “enmity against God,” consistent with a pattern previously established by the Mission during the 2022–2023 protests. Individuals were also sentenced to death for possessing quantities of drugs that exceeded statutory thresholds.

91. Often, there is little or no public information available about death penalty proceedings, as the State does not publish comprehensive data on death sentences and, in security-related cases, revolutionary courts often deny defendants, their lawyers and families access to court documents. Nevertheless, evidence shows that executions are frequent, geographically dispersed and coordinated by several State entities, including the judiciary, intelligence entities and the Police Command. In cases investigated by the Mission, victims were denied due process guarantees and fair trial rights and, according to credible information, sentenced to death and executed based on confessions obtained under torture. Detainees were denied the right to a meaningful appeal, with one man executed while his retrial petition was under review by the Supreme Court.

92. Families were not informed of their loved ones’ impending executions, were denied the right to see them prior to the execution and in some cases, were pressured to remain silent.

1. Due process guarantees and fair trial rights

(a) Executions in connection with the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement

93. Between December 2022 and the time of writing, the Government executed 12 men in connection with the 2022–2023 protests. Ten of them were protesters who were executed between December 2022 and August 2024, without due process or fair trial guarantees. At the time of writing, at least five individuals remain at risk of execution, including two women.

94. Two protesters, Abbas (Mojahed) Kourkouri and Mehran Bahramian, were executed on charges of *muharaba* between April and September 2025.

95. Mr. Bahramian was executed on 6 September 2025 for the alleged killing of a police officer during a protest in December 2022. According to the judiciary, Mr. Bahramian had been arrested on 16 January 2023 and sentenced to death by the revolutionary court in Isfahan. Credible information indicates that he was initially held in a detention facility of the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, where he was tortured.

(b) Executions for alleged espionage for Israel

96. Beginning on 15 June 2025, the judiciary began urging courts to expedite trials of persons alleged to be collaborating with Israel and promised to show no leniency in dealing

with “spies and Zionist agents”. At least 19 men, including at least 9 of minority background, were executed on espionage charges between June and December.

97. For example, between 15 and 25 June, three Kurdish men detained in 2022 and 2023 were executed for alleged collaboration with Israel. Their trials in a revolutionary court lasted only a few minutes and were held by videoconference and without lawyers of the men’s own choosing.

98. On 4 October 2025, six Arab men were executed following conviction in a group trial. According to the judiciary’s news agency, Mizan, the men were accused of being in contact with Israel and were supported by hostile foreign actors, although the specific charges brought against them were not publicly confirmed. Credible information indicated that, before the executions, the men were provided with only a State-approved lawyer, who was denied access to their case files.

(c) Executions for membership in a political group, including for alleged affiliation with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization

99. The Mission investigated cases where individuals were sentenced to death by revolutionary courts and executed for alleged membership or collaboration with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq Organization. In one such case, Zahra Shahbaz Tabari, aged 66 or 67, was sentenced to death in a trial held by videoconference that lasted only a few minutes. Although her sentence was overturned, her case is under review by the Supreme Court and she remains at risk of execution under circumstances that would violate international human rights law.

(d) Executions for drug-related offences

100. In 2025, at least 795 people were executed for drug-related offences pursuant to death sentences rendered by revolutionary courts, reflecting a 58 per cent increase since 2024.

101. In cases investigated by the Mission, individuals, including women, were sentenced to death for transporting or temporarily storing quantities of drugs which exceeded the legal threshold established by the 2017 anti-narcotics law. Individuals agreed to transport drugs due to economic hardship, and some were unaware of the contents of the packages they had been asked to transport. Many were unable to afford a lawyer, rendering them more vulnerable to physical violence in custody. As in other cases before the revolutionary courts, the trials were reportedly brief, with the accused having access only to a State-appointed lawyer by videoconference.

2. Treatment of persons facing the death penalty and persons convicted to death

102. The Mission previously established a pattern of systematic dismissal by revolutionary courts of complaints of torture and reliance on confessions obtained under torture to convict protesters and political opponents.

103. Some individuals on death row were subjected to beatings, waterboarding and electric shocks amounting to torture. Many were held in solitary confinement and prevented from contacting their families or a lawyer for prolonged periods of time.

104. Families were seldom informed of impending executions until very late, or after the fact, making it impossible to visit their loved ones or attend the burials. In some cases, victims were buried in unmarked graves, far from their homes, denying families the ability to mourn. Some families were threatened in order to ensure their silence and were denied access to their loved ones’ bodies.

VII. Continuous discrimination against women and girls in law and in practice

A. Arrests and detention of women human rights defenders

105. On 12 December 2025, several women human rights defenders, including Narges Mohammadi, were arrested and detained at a memorial ceremony held in Mashhad for a prominent lawyer, Khosrow Alikordi, who was found dead in his office on 6 December under apparently suspicious circumstances. The Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and plain-clothed agents violently arrested the women, transferred them to a detention facility and prevented them from contacting their families for several days.

106. In early February, Ms. Mohammadi was sentenced to seven and a half years of imprisonment for assembly and collusion against national security and propaganda against the State, two years of internal exile and a two-year travel ban, reportedly resulting in a total sentence of 44 years' imprisonment. Even though she has been taken to hospital twice since her arrest, her state of health continues to deteriorate.

B. Continuous enforcement of the mandatory wearing of the hijab

107. At the time of writing, the State has not ended its efforts to implement the non-human rights compliant "hijab and chastity" law. All that remains is its signature by the President for it to become enforceable.

108. Its legal status notwithstanding, the underlying discriminatory legal framework that enforces the mandatory wearing of the hijab on women and girls and allows for the arrest, detention and criminal prosecution of those who are deemed non-compliant remains in place and continues to produce the same gendered harms and violations of women's fundamental rights.

1. Official statements

109. State rhetoric appeared to have shifted towards characterizing those opposing the mandatory wearing of the hijab as "enemies", in an apparent effort to frame non-compliance as threatening security, rather than exercising a protected right. Senior officials, including members of the judiciary, branded the refusal to wear the hijab as a sign of "mental disorder" and harmful social behaviour. In December, the head of the judiciary instructed law enforcement and intelligence officers and prosecutors to confront non-compliance with the mandatory wearing of the hijab.

110. State authorities continued to rely on State-sponsored vigilantism to enforce the mandatory wearing of the hijab. According to official statements, this included the deployment of organized "volunteer squads of hijab enforcers" comprising 80,000 "trained personnel" to monitor compliance in public, as announced on 17 October 2025 by the head of the Tehran Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. Video footage published in May 2025 showed patrols of the "morality police" harassing women in Isfahan Province.

111. In March 2025, the Public Prosecutor of Isfahan called for women who failed to comply with the mandatory wearing of the hijab to be denied access to tourist sites and ordered warning signs to be installed at entrances. Women prisoners were also denied family visits and access to a prison medical clinic for non-compliance.

2. Repression of women and girls for alleged non-compliance with the mandatory wearing of the hijab

112. On 4 April 2025, State officials reported that more than 97,500 public warnings for non-compliance with the mandatory wearing of the hijab had been issued during the Iranian

new year (Nowruz). Women in Gilan, Isfahan and Tehran Provinces continued to receive text messages on their personal mobile phones warning them that they had violated the mandatory hijab laws.

113. Video footage reviewed by the Mission showed women and girls being harassed by State officials and private individuals for allegedly not complying with mandatory hijab laws in public. Some were beaten on the street, while others had their vehicles impounded for alleged non-compliance.

114. Reportedly, cases were initiated against women attendees and organizers of a journalism award ceremony in Tehran, held on 6 March 2025, after several attended without wearing a hijab.

115. At least 50 establishments, including cafes and restaurants, were closed by State authorities between June and October 2025 for serving women who were not complying with the mandatory wearing of the hijab.

C. Violations of women's right to life

116. Violations of the right to life of women are not isolated, but rather a foreseeable outcome of a legal system that fundamentally discriminates against women and girls.

117. Despite reports of at least three women dying in Qarchak prison, reportedly due to denial of medical care, there is no indication that the authorities have initiated any investigations into their deaths.

118. The imposition of the death penalty further entrenches this pattern, as women are sentenced to death under discriminatory laws and following proceedings that disregard patterns of gender-based violence, including domestic violence. Some women, often those from marginalized provinces, were also executed for drug-related offences, despite minor or no direct involvement in the offence, and were not allowed to defend themselves against the charges brought against them.

119. Systemic structural inequalities affecting women and girls are also reflected in the violence against women and alarming patterns of femicide, where the State's persistent failure to protect, prevent, investigate or punish indicates tolerance for women's deaths. Credible human rights organizations have documented a marked increase in femicide in the Islamic Republic of Iran since at least 2023, with at least 176 cases documented by November 2025. While reported cases were often referred to as "honour killings" or family disputes, the underlying motives of the killings of women were often driven by efforts to prevent them from accessing their fundamental rights and achieving greater independence.

D. Deportation and expulsion of Afghans, including women, from the Islamic Republic of Iran

120. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), women and children represented a substantial portion of the persons returned from the Islamic Republic of Iran to Afghanistan. Deportees included women travelling alone, unaccompanied children, human rights defenders, journalists, LGBTQ+ persons and others who had earlier opposed the Taliban.

121. Women and girls face a serious risk of becoming victims of gross human rights violations and deprivation of their fundamental rights once returned to Afghanistan, where according to arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, the de facto authorities commit the crime against humanity of gender persecution. Women and girls are at serious risk of arrest, persecution, enforced disappearance, torture and other serious human rights violations by the de facto authorities.

122. Credible information showed that some Afghan women in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including detained human rights activists and researchers, were threatened with deportation. In detention, some women reportedly experienced insults, threats and, in some cases, beatings by Iranian officials.

VIII. Transnational repression

123. The Mission found that human rights defenders, including some of minority background, journalists and victims and witnesses of protest movements continue to be subjected to physical threats, harassment, intimidation, assassination and other forms of repression in at least 14 countries, reportedly by Iranian State agents or their proxies. These acts of transnational repression continued to result in gross human rights violations and generate fear and harassment for victims' families in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

124. Acts of transnational repression, including in the digital space, appear to have increased in 2025, and especially in June 2025, mirroring the peak in State repressive measures to silence dissent inside the Islamic Republic of Iran during and immediately after the June 2025 hostilities.

A. Alleged State involvement and targeted individuals

1. Indicators of State role

125. On 28 July 2025, the Ministry of Intelligence issued a statement noting that 98 citizens had been summoned or arrested in the Islamic Republic of Iran based on their links to a Persian-language media outlet outside the country. The Ministry claimed that these individuals, described as "citizen-journalists", were connected to the Iran International media outlet and were considered part of an "affiliated operational network" inside the Islamic Republic of Iran.

126. The Mission reviewed statements and reports issued by the Governments of third States referring to the alleged increase in transnational threats in 2025 by the Islamic Republic of Iran against individuals on their territories, including human rights defenders and journalists. On 12 September 2025, members of the Group of Seven Rapid Response Mechanism issued a statement noting that "Iranian intelligence services have increasingly attempted to kill, kidnap and harass political opponents abroad".⁴

127. In March 2025 and January 2026, respectively, four men were convicted and sentenced for two separate plots to kill Masih Alinejad in the United States.

2. Victims

128. Victims of transnational repression included human rights defenders, including some of minority background, journalists, and victims and witnesses of protest movements. Journalists working for Persian-speaking media outlets based outside the country, such as BBC Persian and Iran International, were subjected to threats to their lives and safety, including kidnapping threats which, in some cases, led to police involvement. Threats against Iranian journalists abroad escalated following the June 2025 hostilities.

129. The Mission previously found that in late 2022, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran had designated BBC Persian, Iran International, Radio Zamaneh and Radio Farda terrorist organizations.

B. Impact on victims and families

130. Journalists' families and survivors of past and present protest movements continued to be targeted and punished to pressure them into silence, deter reporting and suppress their calls for justice and accountability for past violations. Some journalists' family members in the Islamic Republic of Iran lost their jobs, while others were detained, interrogated and had their homes raided by security forces. Many journalists abroad were forced to cut off contact with their families in the Islamic Republic of Iran out of fear for their safety.

⁴ See <https://g7.utoronto.ca/rrm/250912-rrm.html>.

131. Victims continued reporting severe anxiety, self-isolation and constant fear of being attacked, regardless of the location.

IX. Legal findings

A. International humanitarian law

132. The Mission found that an international armed conflict pursuant to article 2 (1), common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, existed between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran at least between 13 June 2025, the date of the first air strikes by Israel on Iranian territory, and 25 June 2025, when the air strikes ended. The Mission examined whether any investigated acts of the parties to the conflict constituted violations of international humanitarian law pursuant to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and customary international law.

133. International humanitarian law prohibits directing attacks against civilian objects. A party to a conflict is under the obligation to distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. The Mission found no information that any activities in Evin prison compound constituted an effective contribution to military action against Israel and that the destruction of the compound or the neutralization of the State entities based in the compound offered a definite military advantage to Israel, so as to render the compound a military objective. As it is not a military objective, the Evin prison compound is a civilian object under international humanitarian law.

134. Pursuant to the principle of precaution, a party to a conflict must take all feasible precautions to protect the civilian population and objects under its control against the effects of attacks. The Mission is concerned that the Islamic Republic of Iran did not take practicable or practically possible precautions to protect civilians from air strikes, including constructing shelters, distributing information and warnings, and mobilizing resources to assist evacuations from Evin prison.

B. International human rights law

135. The Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for gross human rights violations during the reporting period, including violations of the rights to life, to freedom from torture and ill-treatment, to security and liberty of person, to a fair trial and an effective remedy, of peaceful assembly, to freedom of religion or belief, to the freedoms of expression and of association, to equality and non-discrimination, to privacy, to health, to a livelihood and work, as well as persecution, including against Baha'i, Kurds, Ahvazi Arabs and Baluch.

136. In law and in practice, the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to commit individual violations that cumulatively amount to gender persecution. The Mission found that women, girls and persons supporting demands for gender equality and women's rights were targeted by reason of their identity as a group, especially by the death penalty, enforcement of the mandatory wearing of the hijab and femicide.

137. Iranians present on the territory of third States were also subjected to human rights violations, offline and online, including to the rights to life, to security and liberty of person, to freedom of religion or belief, to the freedoms of expression and of association, to equality and non-discrimination, to privacy and to a livelihood and work. Such violations also give rise to positive human rights obligations of the territorial State. The Mission recalls that States Parties to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights must ensure the right to life and exercise due diligence to protect lives against deprivations caused by actors whose conduct is not attributable to them. This obligation to respect and ensure the right to life extends to reasonably foreseeable threats and life-threatening situations that can result in loss of life.

C. Crimes

138. In relation to the attack on Evin prison compound, the Mission finds that Israel committed the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against a civilian object.

139. It also finds that many gross human rights violations committed by the Islamic Republic of Iran amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture, sexual violence, gender persecution, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts, committed as part of a widespread and systematic attack directed against a civilian population, namely women, ethnic and religious minorities, human rights defenders and perceived dissenting or opposing actors. As it found previously, it again finds that judges issuing death sentences relied on torture-tainted evidence and presided over trials marred by serious fair trial violations in cases amounting to the crimes against humanity of murder, torture, persecution and other inhumane acts.

140. As for the contextual elements for crimes against humanity, the Mission is satisfied that an attack occurred during the reporting period, since acts of violence continued and several prohibited underlying acts of crimes against humanity were committed. The Mission concludes that the attack was directed against a civilian population, considering the civilian nature of the victims and the collective nature of the crimes. The attack remained widespread, based on the number and variety of victims and the prevalence across the country of the recurring patterns of violations amounting to crimes. The attack remained systematic because of the organized nature of the crimes and the improbability of their random occurrence. Lastly, the Mission inferred that the underlying acts were committed in furtherance of a State policy based on the conduct of the State as reflected in official statements, including by the judiciary, court rulings, alleged perpetrators' impunity and the State's failure to condemn violations. Acts were planned, directed, organized and coordinated by different State entities, including security and intelligence entities and the judiciary, and considerable State resources were invested therein.

141. The violations found in the context of transnational repression may also amount to offences under the domestic legal systems in third States and give rise to a duty by those States to investigate and prosecute those responsible.

X. Conclusions

142. **The gross human rights violations and crimes under international law found by the Mission across its three successive mandates did not occur in isolation. Rather, they arose from a domestic legal framework that operates as a system to silence dissent, shield perpetrators from responsibility and deny victims and their families their rights to truth, justice and reparations.**

143. As evidence continues to emerge, the story of the protests that began on 28 December 2025 is becoming more visible, exposing unprecedented levels of violence not seen since the revolution of 1979. The alleged violations do not appear sporadic, but rather widespread, and carried out in an organized manner. They confirm that patterns previously established by the Mission not only remain present but continue to evolve and deepen.

144. Recent events increase the already present risk that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue to commit gross human rights violations and repress its people during protest movements and beyond, with increasingly grave consequences for victims and families. This compounds the harm suffered by victims of earlier cycles of repression, including those imposed in 2019 and 2022–2023, whose rights to truth, justice and reparation remain violated by the State.

145. The Mission underscores the urgency of accountability, justice and reparations for victims and their families, and calls for the findings of the Government's investigation into the protests that began on 28 December to be made public without delay. It recalls that any such investigation must comply fully with international human rights norms and standards governing domestic investigations.

146. While sustained accountability efforts remain essential, the Mission emphasizes the need for the international community to take immediate measures to protect the victims and survivors of the protests that began on 28 December 2025 and to address the ongoing harm. In this regard, States should take steps to ensure protection and assistance for those fleeing or at risk of persecution, including by providing them with humanitarian visas, temporary protection or other emergency admission pathways, while guaranteeing access to appropriate medical, psychosocial and legal support, paying particular attention to individuals and groups at heightened risk of reprisals.

147. The human rights situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran has been severely exacerbated by the United States-Israeli air strikes since 28 February 2026. The Iranian population is now caught between a large-scale military campaign that may go on for weeks or months, and a Government with a long record of gross human rights violations, after having barely emerged from a violent crackdown following the protests that began on 28 December 2025. The Mission is closely monitoring the rapidly evolving situation and its impact on the rights, safety and security of the civilian population. An immediate cessation of attacks by all parties is imperative to prevent further civilian harm in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and more broadly in the region.
